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  Abstract  
The aim of the current study is to investigate the relationship between earnings 
management (EM) and voluntary disclosure quality (VDQ) on Islamic and non-
Islamic banks (IBs and NIBs) listed in Middle East and North African (MENA) 
countries during the period from 2006 to 2015.  
In accordance with the empirical work of Kanagaretnam et al., (2004) and Yasuda et 
al., (2004), the two-stage and modified Jones models were employed as major and 
alternative models respectively to measure EM practices. The multidimensional 
method of Beretta & Bozzolan (2008) was developed in order to measure VDQ. The 
panel regression analysis was utilised for the regression model used in the current 
study. 
The findings show that the VDQ has a negative and significant impact on EM in both 
IBs and NIBs, which are in line with the perspectives of both signalling and agency 
theories. In addition, this result remains unchanged after robustness and several 
additional tests. Furthermore, the findings of the multivariate analysis show that IBs 
and NIBs behave differently in terms of both EM practices and VDQ. This result was 
supported by several alternative tests.  
Overall, the methodological contribution of this study is the further development of 
the multidimensional framework of Beretta & Bozzolan, (2008) in order to measure 
VDQ. It is also the first empirical research, to the best of the researcher’s knowledge, 
on the relationship between EM and VDQ in the banking industry, especially in 
Islamic banking. Additionally, it provides empirical evidence on the differences 
between IBs and NIBs that are listed in MENA countries in terms of EM and VDQ.  
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
1.1 Research Background 
The recent global financial crisis has shown that information disclosed in the banking 
industry is insufficient and information asymmetry problems are very high 1 
(Grougiou et al., 2014). For instance, the incidence of bankruptcy among Bear Stearns 
and Lehman Brothers was attributed to poor quality financial reporting, which misled 
users into making inaccurate decisions (Jones & Finley, 2011). However, managers 
can take deliberate procedures through the process of generally accepted accounting 
principles (GAAP) and utilise their judgement and knowledge to select reporting 
methods, estimates and disclosures that reflect the underlying economic conditions of 
the firm to reach the desired levels of profits (Beneish, 2001).  
The conflict of interest may occur between managers and shareholders when the 
former use discretion over accounting profits either to gain some private benefits at 
the expense of shareholders or to mislead stockholders about the company’s financial 
performance (Lambert, 2001). This opportunistic behaviour allows bank managers 
greater freedom to manipulate earnings (Black & Shevlin, 1999), resulting in a 
negative influence on the reliability and quality of the company’s financial reports, 
which in turn affects shareholders’ decisions and confidence in the reported 
information (Chen et al., 2010).  
                                                        
1
 Banks in MENA countries have been impacted by the recent global financial crisis because of their higher exposure to real 
estate and their limited reliance on risk sharing or equity based transactions (Bourkhis and Nabi., 2013). This, in turn, might have 
an influence on both EM and VDQ. Thus, it is vital to include the period of financial crisis in this study. 
  
 
2 
Recently, two different strategies of EM behaviour have been discussed by EM 
literature: (1) Accrual2 based EM, which involves the flexibility to choose from a set 
of accounting methods or to change accounting estimates. (2) Real EM, which 
involves the timing of the recognition of events such as (expenditure, sales, 
investment and financing decisions) in the period that is most advantageous to 
management (Zang, 2011). Since the financial reports are considered as the main 
source for investors to obtain reliable and relevant information, it is important to 
disclose relevant and credible information, which helps the investors in making 
investment decisions (Healy, Hutton & Palepu, 1999).  
On the other hand, the purpose of disclosure is to provide high quality information in 
the annual report, which will benefit different stakeholders by enabling them to 
evaluate the organisation and to make the right decision (Grossman, 1981; Kasznik & 
McNichols, 2002; Milgrom, 1981). Additionally, relevant and high quality disclosure 
mitigates the investor's estimation risk, suggesting that high quality information is 
considered as a valuable resource, which could assist more informed trading decisions 
(Coles et al., 1995). Corporate disclosure is a vital instrument for bridging the 
information asymmetry gap between manager and stakeholders and thus reduces EM 
practices (Ahmed & Courtis, 1999; Healy & Palepu, 2001; Schipper, 1989). 
Consequently, voluntary disclosure quality (VDQ) is one of the most important 
monitoring instruments that control the opportunistic behaviour of managers 
(Bushman & Smith, 2001). The literature on the association between EM and VDQ 
found that high VDQ is useful in reducing EM practices and controls managers’ 
opportunistic behaviour (Hunton et al., 2006; Iatridis & Kadorinis, 2009; Katmun, 
2012; Lobo & Zhou, 2001; Tariverdi et al., 2012). These studies argue that firms that 
                                                        
2 Accruals are the incurred expenses and earned revenues which have an overall influence on both income statement and balance 
sheets (Hribar and Collins., 2002). 
  
 
3 
disclose high level of information extensively are less likely to engage in EM, which 
implies a negative relationship between VDQ and EM.  
Based on the literature, there are two points of view with regard to the association 
between EM and VDQ; these are long-term perspectives and managerial opportunism. 
The long-term perspective indicates that the main concern of firms that provide great 
voluntary disclosure is not only to raise current profits and executives' wealth but also 
to enhance and build a robust future relationship with their stockholders. With this 
regard, Qu et al., (2015) suggested that voluntary disclosure provides stockholders 
and other outside users with credible and relevant information, which, in turn, 
facilitates them to make more accurate and informed decisions. Since the asymmetry 
costs is borne by the company's manager, signalling theory suggests that managers 
will behave in a responsible manner when voluntarily signalling truthful information. 
The long-term perspective is consistent with previous studies (Hunton et al., 2006; 
Iatridis & Kadorinis, 2009; Katmun, 2012; Lobo & Zhou, 2001; Tariverdi et al., 
2012), which indicated that voluntary disclosure is negatively linked to EM 
behaviour.  
On the other hand, the perspective of managerial opportunism suggests that company 
managers may disclose more information voluntarily in order to lid their opportunistic 
behaviour of EM (Li et al., 2012). This perspective is in line with the agency theory, 
which suggests that actions of individual are strongly linked to their self-interest and 
each individual will increase their wealth by behaving in an opportunistic manner 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In this regard, managers employ poor voluntary 
disclosure as an important tool to cover their opportunistic behaviour and to protect 
themselves against any possible reaction and attention from stockholders. This 
argument is supported by Martínez-Ferrero, et al., (2015); Francis et al., (2008), who 
  
 
4 
indicated that the relationship between EM and voluntary disclosure could be 
substitutive in the sense that firms might report poor- quality voluntary disclosure as a 
mechanism of legitimacy to substitute the lack of good disclosure. The perspective of 
managerial opportunism is consistent with several studies (Kasznik, 1999; Muttakin et 
al., 2015; Patten & Trompeter, 2003; Prior et al., 2008), which indicated that 
voluntary disclosure is positively related to EM behaviour. 
It is worth mentioning that EM and VDQ studies have used several methods to 
measure VDQ. One such method is the Association for Investment Management and 
Research (AIMR) rating, which is available only for specific firms in the US, was 
used by Lobo and Zhau (2001) as proxy for VDQ, while other research focused on 
disclosure indices that measure only the level of information disclosed without paying 
attention to the richness of this information (Al-Janadi et al., 2013; Alotaibi & 
Hussainey, 2016; Alturki, 2015; Habbash et al., 2016; Lapointe-Antunes et al., 2006). 
In addition, empirical researches that specialise on the quality of disclosure 
measurements have provided general frameworks, which are applicable to several 
types of information (e.g. Anis, Fraser & Hussainey, 2012; Beattie, McInnes & 
Fearnley, 2004; Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004; Beretta & Bozzolan, 2008; Braam & van 
Beest, 2013). These frameworks were based on the dimension of quantity and several 
other dimensions such as spread, financial orientation, time orientation, quantitative 
orientation, economic sign, coverage and dispersion of information.  
 
However, Beretta & Bozzolan (2008) argued that disclosure quality is not only linked 
to the level of information disclosed but also to what is disclosed and the variety of 
topics disclosed. Additionally, Botosan (2004) argued that the notion of VDQ should 
be based on the conceptual frameworks created by the standard setters (FASB and 
  
 
5 
IASB). This reflects a generally accepted interpretation of disclosure quality, and lead 
to high quality information that is useful for decision-making (IFRS, 2010). 
Consequently, the current study measure differs from existing measures because it 
takes into account the recommendations of both Beretta & Bozzolan (2008) and 
Botosan (2004) by developing a comprehensive framework that considers both the 
quantity and richness of disclosed information with attention focused on satisfying the 
conceptual frameworks of both FASB3 and IASB4 when measuring VDQ.  
The quantity dimension provides users with the relative amount of information 
disclosed voluntarily (how much is disclosed). However, the richness dimension 
consists of two sub-dimensions, namely width and depth. The width of disclosure 
considers the topics included in the disclosure index for the classification and 
identification of disclosure items. This captures the coverage and concentration of 
disclosed information. This sub-dimension offers investors a more general overview 
of the business alongside its aim of focusing on relevant issues. On the other hand, the 
sub-dimension of depth takes into account the information’s usefulness to users as 
defined in the conceptual framework of the IASB (2010). For information to be 
useful, it must be relevant, understandable, comparable and faithfully represent what 
it purports to represent (IASB, 2010). 
 
Several empirical studies have investigated the impact of voluntary disclosure level 
on EM practices (Bagnoli & Watts, 2010; Bauer & Boritz, 2013; Hunton etal., 2006; 
Iatridis & Kadorinis, 2009; Jo & Kim, 2007; Kasznik, 1999; Kwag & Small, 2007; 
Lapointe-Antunes et al., 2006; Lobo & Zhou, 2001; MeilaniPurwanti, 2013; Riahi & 
Ben Arab, 2011; Shaw, 2003; Tariverdi et al., 2012). In addition, some other 
                                                        
3 - FASB requirements: A) identifies the aspects of the company’s business that are especially important to the company’s 
success. These are the critical success factors for the company. B) Identifies management’s strategies and plans for managing 
those critical success factors in the past and going forward. (Width means that the wider the variety of topics disclosed the 
better).  
4 IASB frameworks (understandability, relevance, reliability, comparability and timelines). 
  
 
6 
empirical studies have only focused on the influence of a part of voluntary disclosure 
level (such as corporate social responsibility or forward-looking information) on EM 
practices (e.g. Belgacem & Omri, 2015; Bozanic et al., 2013; Burgstahler & Eames, 
2006; Chan et al., 2007; Kiattikulwattana, 2014; Muttakin et al., 2015; Patten & 
Trompeter, 2003; Prior et al., 2007; Rahman et al., 2007; Sun et al., 2010; Yip et al., 
2011). Based on the above, it can be seen that empirical studies on EM and voluntary 
disclosure have only focused on the impact of voluntary disclosure level on EM 
without paying attention to the quality of this information. Consequently, the current 
study bridge this gap in the literature by examining the relationship between EM and 
VDQ. 
Furthermore, organisations that are compliant with Islamic law “Shari’ah” behave 
justly when dealing with their client and forbid riba, ambiguity and manipulation in 
their transactions (EM) (Hossain et al., 2014). They are also required to conform to 
the concept of full disclosure (Abdulrahman, Anam & Fatima, 2010). Thus, the 
researcher was motivated to examine the relationship between EM and VDQ by using 
data from both IBs and NIBs.  
Additionally, EM and VDQ literature provides evidence on the impact of corporate 
governance mechanisms in influencing VDQ and mitigating EM practices (e.g. 
Katmun, 2012; Riahi & Ben Arab, 2011). Although a few empirical studies have been 
applied to some of the corporate governance mechanisms5 and control their effect on 
both EM and voluntary disclosure (Katmun, 2012; Prior, Surroca & Tribó, 2008; 
Riahi & Ben Arab, 2011; Shaw, 2003), the majority of EM and voluntary disclosure 
literature has failed to include corporate governance as a control variable when 
investigating the influence of voluntary disclosure on EM practices (Hunton et al., 
                                                        
5 Board and audit committee independence, meeting, size and Big4.  
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2006; Iatridis & Kadorinis, 2009; Muttakin, Khan & Azim, 2015; Tariverdi et al., 
2012). Therefore, this study employed several proxies of corporate governance in 
order to control their effect on both EM and VDQ.  
The economic conditions have a significant influence on the firm's performance, 
which may increase managers' motivation to practice EM. Furthermore, it has been 
argued that managers may manipulate earnings to raise the confidence of stockholders 
about the company's performance during and after the economic crisis (Berndt & 
Offenhammer, 2010; Filip & Raffournier, 2014). Considering this, the current study 
has utilised a period of 10 years (2006 to 2015), which includes the financial crisis of 
2008. 
1.2 Research Motivation 
Corporate disclosure is considered as a powerful monitoring tool, since an appropriate 
monitoring system of the company's managers and ownership will have a significant 
effect in reducing EM. Corporate disclosure is used by several bodies, such as 
investors and regulators, as a monitoring system, as it aims to minimise the 
asymmetric information between managers and shareholders. This, in turn, decreases 
the agency cost (Huang & Zhang, 2011). In this sense, delivering high quality 
information to investors will lessen the conflict of interests, increase investors’ 
confidence about the company’s performance and enable them to detect EM (Sun et 
al., 2010; Jo and Kim 2007). Therefore, EM is expected to be lower in banks that 
disclose high quality information. 
In order to explain the link between VDQ reporting and EM, the literature suggested 
two perspectives: the long-term perspective and the legitimacy approach. According 
to the long-term perspective, firms signal VDQ to reduce asymmetric information, 
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mitigate the uncertainty risk, and improve financial decisions in the capital markets 
(Uyar, Kilic, & Bayyurt, 2013). Given that managers are more likely to engage in EM 
when there is high information asymmetry, voluntary disclosure is assumed by 
signalling theory as a means for mitigating the information asymmetry between 
management personnel and stakeholders. On the other hand, the legitimacy approach 
assumes that firms’ managers may disclose more information voluntarily in order to 
cover their opportunistic behaviour and to protect themselves against any possible 
reaction from stockholders (Li, Mangena, & Pike, 2012). According to this 
perspective, the relationship between EM and VDQ could be substitutive in the sense 
that firms might report poor VDQ as a mechanism of legitimacy to substitute for the 
lack of good VDQ (Francis et al, 2008; Martínez‐Ferrero et a, 2015).  
To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, no study has examined the association 
between EM and the VDQ in the banking industry, especially in IBs, which has made 
the relationship between both elements obscure until now. Thus, the current study is 
motivated to fill this gap in the literature by using data from both IBs and NIBs that 
operate in MENA countries. This will add a different point of view to the literature 
and thus make a unique contribution in the field of EM and disclosure in general. The 
justification for excluding other Islamic institutions from the full sample (e.g. Islamic 
investment companies and Islamic insurance companies) is that capital structure and 
accountancy requirements for these Islamic institutions are substantially different 
from those of IBs and NIBs (Islamic Financial Services Board, 2005). 
Furthermore, the reason for choosing MENA is that $2.5 trillion of worldwide assets 
are owned by IBs, and the majority of developed IBs are found in MENA countries 
(Ernst and Young, 2015; Nazim & Bennie, 2012). In addition, both IBs and NIBs in 
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MENA countries adopt the same accounting standards (IAS, IFRS), which allows the 
researcher to outline a comparative study between them (Maha & Hakim, 2013).  
Furthermore, in most disclosure studies, a measure of the level of disclosed 
information is utilised as a quality of disclosure (Aljifri & Hussainey, 2007; Alotaibi 
& Hussainey, 2016; Aribi & Gao, 2010; Menicucci, 2013; Salama, 2009; Urquiza et 
al., 2009).  However, Beretta & Bozzolan (2008) argued that disclosure quality is not 
only linked to the level of information disclosed but also to what is disclosed and the 
variety of topics disclosed. Additionally, Botosan (2004) argued that the notion of 
VDQ should be based on the conceptual frameworks created by the standard setters 
(FASB and IASB). Consequently, to measure VDQ, the current study is motivated to 
develop a comprehensive framework that considers both the quantity and richness of 
disclosed information with the attention on satisfying the conceptual frameworks of 
both FASB6 and IASB7. 
 
In spite of the extensive literature on disclosure, researchers have generally paid less 
attention to the quality of voluntary disclosure of financial institutions (e.g. Ahmed 
Haji & Anum Mohd Ghazali, 2013; Alotaibi & Hussainey, 2016; Beattie et al., 2004; 
Beretta & Bozzolan, 2008; Chakroun & Hussainey, 2014; Elzahar et al., 2015; Maali 
et al., 2006; Qu et al., 2015). The majority of these studies have not focused on the 
banking sector, especially IBs. Furthermore, to the best of the author’s knowledge, 
IBs listed in MENA countries have not yet been the focus of any study regarding 
VDQ. Therefore, this study sheds more light on VDQ in both IBs and NIBs listed in 
MENA countries.  
 
                                                        
6 - FASB requirements: A) identifies the aspects of the company’s business that are especially important to the company’s 
success. These are the critical success factors for the company. B) Identifies management’s strategies and plans for managing 
those critical success factors in the past and going forward. (Width means that the wider the variety of topics disclosed the 
better).  
7 IASB frameworks (understandability, relevance, reliability, comparability and timelines).  
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Regardless of the efforts that are made by the regulatory bodies for banks to mitigate 
EM practices, the opportunistic behaviour of EM still exists and continues to concern 
related parties such as standard setters, regulators and practitioners (Beaudoin et al., 
2015). The banking collapse of 2008 has raised attention among financial information 
users about the quality and reliability of the information provided, which in turn made 
the opportunistic behaviour of EM as one of the constituting factors (Cohen et al., 
2014). Furthermore, it is important to compare EM practices of IBs and NIBs because 
opportunistic behaviour is prohibited and immoral in IBs, and is condemned by Islam 
(Hamdi & Zarai, 2013), whereas opportunistic behaviour may be more likely in NIBs 
(Naughton & Naughton, 2000). For instance, the IBs are guided by the Shari'ah law, 
which establishes the ethical codes for appropriate behaviour and conduct in order to 
ensure fairness (Hamdi and Zarai, 2013). The absence of such control among NIBs 
may allow social inequity and unfair wealth distribution, such as remuneration 
packages paid to encourage managers to indiscriminately ensure profit maximisation 
(Naughton & Naughton, 2000).  Therefore, the current study is strongly motivated to 
investigate and compare EM practices in both IBs and NIBs listed in MENA 
countries.   
1.3 Research Aim and Objectives   
This study aims to investigate the relationship between EM and VDQ in the banking 
sector in MENA countries. In order to address this aim, three objectives are 
determined:  
1- To investigate and compare EM practices in both IBs and NIBs listed in 
MENA countries during the period from 2006 to 2015. 
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Managers of institutions with religious affiliation usually follow certain socially 
acceptable norms, which are related to anti-manipulative behaviour (Dyreng et al., 
2012). Since IBs must adhere to Islamic Law (Shari’ah), and the majority of IBs 
employ AAOIFI standards; these may mitigate EM practices. Furthermore, beyond 
the general monitoring system for all banks, IBs are also monitored by another 
supervisory board, the Shari’ah Supervisory Board (SSB). Thus, it is essential to 
examine whether there is any difference in EM practices between IBs and NIBs. 
2- To investigate and compare the VDQ in both IBs and NIBs listed in MENA 
countries during the period from 2006 to 2015. 
Alongside the Islamic ethical values, Shari’ah, AAOIFI standards and the SSB, IBs 
are required to adopt the full disclosure concepts and accountability, which are not 
demanded by NIBs (Ashraf et al., 2014). This entails that IBs need to report more 
information than NIBs (AAOIFI, 2005). Therefore, taking into account to all these 
obligations, it is essential to examine whether there is any difference in VDQ between 
IBs and NIBs. 
3- To investigate the relationship between EM and VDQ in both IBs and NIBs 
listed in MENA countries during the period from 2006 to 2015. 
Examining the impact of VDQ on EM contributes to the knowledge in several ways. 
It bridges the gap in the literature, since the empirical studies have only focused on 
the relationship between EM and voluntary disclosure levels without paying attention 
to the quality of this information. It also sheds more light on VDQ in both IBs and 
NIBs listed in MENA countries. 
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1.4 Overview of the Study Methods 
The following is a brief description of the methods that are utilised in the present 
study. Additional details, specification and justification for the chosen methods and 
methodology are presented in chapter 4. In accordance with the empirical work of 
Kanagaretnam et al., (2004) and Yasuda et al., (2004), two-stage model and modified 
Jones were employed as major and alternative models to measure EM practices8, 
respectively. Besides using the descriptive analysis and univariate analysis based on 
the t-test to determine whether the EM level is different in IBs and NIBs. Additional 
analyses were employed to assure the main results. The Orbis Bank Focus database, 
OSIRIS database and Bloomberg database were used as primary sources of EM data 
for a sample of 106 banks listed in MENA countries, which are divided into 29 IBs 
and 77 NIBs over a 10-year period from 2006 to 2015. The first objective of EM is 
addressed in chapter 5. 
With regard to the second objective, the multidimensional framework of Beretta & 
Bozzolan, (2008) is developed to capture VDQ. The current study employed content 
analysis and disclosure index method to measure VDQ. Banks’ annual reports were 
utilised as primary sources for VDQ data because they provide the most 
comprehensive pertinent data on an annual basis and are considered to be a major 
source of voluntary disclosure to users (Neu et al., 1998; Salama et al., 2012). 
Following voluntary disclosure studies (Aribi & Gao, 2010; Campbell, 2004; Zeghal 
& Ahmed, 1990), the current study has selected words as a recording unit in order to 
measure the VDQ from the banks' annual reports over the period from 2006 to 2015. 
                                                        
8 LLPs represent the largest portion, and are considered to be the primary source, of accruals in the banking system, which 
creates the conditions for potential accounting manipulations. They play a major role in managers’ decisions with regards to 
accounting manipulation (Abdelsalam et al., 2016; Belal et al., 2015). Other EM measurements models, such as Kothari et al.’s 
(2005) model, are not suitable to capture EM in the banking industry because they do not take into account the LLPs in their 
model. 
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This study applied the method used by Botosan (1997) in order to validate the study's 
categories and items and to ensure that this study covered most of the items used in 
voluntary disclosure literature. Descriptive analysis and univariate analysis based on 
the t-test are used to determine whether the VDQ is different in IBs and NIBs. The 
second objective of VDQ is addressed in chapter 6.  
 
With respect to the third objective, this study has employed both univariate and 
multivariate analyses to examine the relationship between EM and VDQ in IBs and 
NIBs. The univariate analysis includes: descriptive statistics and both correlation 
coefficients matrix and variance inflation factor (VIF), which were used in order to 
check the existence of collinearity issues between study variables. Besides univariate 
analysis, the present study has used multivariate analysis using a panel regression of 
1,060 firm-year observations of both IBs and NIBs listed in MENA countries during 
the period from 2006 to 2015. Several additional analyses were adopted to ensure the 
validity and robustness of the primary findings. In order to examine whether the 
finding of the association between EM and VDQ is affected by an endogeneity 
problem, the current study has examined this issue through employing (2SLS) 
regression analysis and applying instrumental variables. The third objective of the 
relationship between EM and VDQ is addressed in chapter 7.  
1.5 Research Key Findings 
The current study offers several interesting results. Firstly, the descriptive analysis 
provided in chapter 5 illustrates that the mean values of EMLLPs and EMDA9 for the 
entire sample are 0.1115 and 0.0155. Across years, the descriptive analysis indicates 
that the highest mean values of EMLLPs and EMDA were in the years 2006 and 2011 
                                                        
9 EMLLPs and EMDA represent the EM achieved from the two-stage and modified Jones models, respectively. 
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respectively, whilst the lowest EMLLPs and EMDA were in 2012. In addition, the 
average values of EMLLPs across years are higher than those of EMDA. Comparing 
EM across countries, Iraqi banks reported the highest mean values of EM compared 
to those of other countries. Based on the univariate analyses (t-test) of EM for IBs in 
comparison to NIBs, the result indicates that the mean values of EM in IBs are less 
than in NIBs and the t-test shows a significant difference at a level of 1%. This 
confirms that IBs are less likely to manipulate earnings than NIBs. Moreover, these 
findings remain unchanged after several alternative tests. 
Secondly, the descriptive analysis provided in chapter 6 illustrates that the mean 
value of VDQ for the entire sample is 0.5774. Furthermore, the descriptive analysis 
across years indicates that the highest and lowest mean values of VDQ are 0.6465 and 
0.5352 in 2015 and 2012 respectively. Comparing VDQ across countries, banks listed 
in Kuwait reported the highest mean value of VDQ, while banks listed in Iraq 
reported the lowest mean value of VDQ. In addition, the result of univariate analyses 
(t-test) of VDQ indicates a significant difference between IBs and NIBs at the 1% 
level, and the mean values of VDQ in IBs markedly higher than those of NIBs. This 
suggests that VDQ in the banking sector in MENA countries differs based on the 
bank’s type, and confirms that IBs are more likely to disclose high quality 
information voluntarily than NIBs.  
Finally, the prime findings of this study, presented in chapter 7, show that VDQ has a 
negative influence on EM. This result is in line with the agency and signalling 
theories, which suggest a negative relationship between EM and VDQ.  This study 
conducted a series of tests in order to ensure the validity of the main results and to 
maintain consistency with the theories used in this study. For instance, the Jones 
model, modified for banking institutions, was adopted as an alternative measurement 
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for EM in order to examine whether the different measure of EM has any influence on 
the main outcomes. The results confirmed that banks in MENA countries with a high 
VDQ are less likely to engage in EM. Furthermore, the result obtained by re-running 
the model using sub-samples of banks with relatively high incentives of EM show a 
negative and significant relationship between EM and VDQ. In general, these 
analyses confirm that both IBs and NIBs in MENA countries with high VDQ are less 
likely to manipulate earnings. 
1.6 Research Contributions  
The current study has two main contributions, which include a contribution to 
knowledge and a methodological contribution.  
1.6.1 Contribution to Knowledge 
The empirical studies have only focused on the relationship between EM and 
voluntary disclosure level without paying attention to the quality of this information. 
This has made the relationship between both EM and VDQ obscure until now. Thus, 
the current study is the first of its kind to investigate this relationship (between EM 
and VDQ) in both IBs and NIBs in MENA countries.  
Furthermore, while several empirical studies have investigated the quality of 
voluntary disclosure (e.g. Ahmed & Mohd Ghazali, 2013; Alotaibi & Hussainey, 
2016; Beattie et al., 2004; Beretta & Bozzolan, 2008; Chakroun & Hussainey, 2014; 
Elzahar et al., 2015; Qu et al., 2015), none of these studies have focused on the 
banking sector, especially IBs.  To the best of the author’s knowledge, IBs listed in 
MENA countries have not yet been the focus of any study regarding VDQ. Therefore, 
this study sheds more light on VDQ in both IBs and NIBs listed in MENA countries.  
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Additionally, corporate governance mechanisms provide evidence on the joint impact 
of VDQ in mitigating EM practices. Although few empirical studies have applied one 
or two proxies of corporate governance mechanisms10 to control their effect on both 
EM and voluntary disclosure (Katmun, 2012; Prior, Surroca & Tribó, 2008; Riahi & 
Ben Arab, 2011; Shaw, 2003), none of these studies have employed many proxies of 
corporate governance in order to control their effect on both EM and VDQ. Therefore, 
the present study is the first (so far) that takes into account several corporate 
governance mechanisms in the study model when examining the relationship between 
EM and VDQ. 
1.6.2 Methodological Contribution 
In addition to the above contributions, the present study provides a methodological 
contribution by developing a multidimensional framework to measure VDQ. The 
empirical studies on EM and voluntary disclosure have used several other methods to 
measure VDQ (i.g. AIMR rating and disclosure indices), without paying attention to 
the richness of the information disclosed voluntarily (e.g. Lobo and Zhau 2001; Al-
Janadi et al., 2013; Habbash et al., 2016). However, the current study measure takes 
into account the recommendations of both Beretta & Bozzolan (2008) and Botosan 
(2004)11 by developing a comprehensive framework that considers both the quantity 
and richness of disclosed information with attention to satisfying the conceptual 
frameworks of IASB12 when measuring VDQ.  
 
                                                        
10 Board and audit committee independence, meeting, size and Big4 usage.  
11 Beretta & Bozzolan (2008) argued that disclosure quality is not only linked to the level of information disclosed but also to 
what is disclosed and the variety of topics disclosed. Whereas, Botosan (2004) argued that the notion of VDQ should be based on 
the conceptual frameworks created by the standard setters. 
12
 IASB frameworks (understandability, relevance, reliability, comparability and timelines). 
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1.7 Structure of the Study 
This section provides the structure of this research, which is divided into eight 
chapters and is organised as follows: Chapter 1 is an introduction for the thesis, which 
includes: research background, research motivation, aims, objectives, methods, key 
findings and contribution.   
Chapter 2 presents EM definitions, motivations, and techniques. It provides the EM 
practices from Islamic perspective. It also covers EM measurements and a detailed 
review of EM literature in the banking sector.  
Chapter 3 introduces the main concepts that are related to voluntary disclosure 
quality (VDQ) 13 , which include definitions of voluntary disclosure, benefits of 
voluntary disclosure to both investors and companies and determinants of voluntary 
disclosure. It also provides disclosure from Islamic perspective, the theoretical 
framework, reviews the empirical studies on the association between VDQ and EM, 
and summery of the chapter.   
Chapter 4 outlines the development of the research hypotheses, methodology, 
philosophy, strategy and approach used in this research. It describes the sample and 
data collection. Measurements of variables and the model used for data analysis were 
provided. It also provides the procedures of data analysis and summary of the chapter. 
Chapter 5 reports the analysis and summarises the results regarding the study’s first 
objective, namely “to investigate and compare EM practices in IBs and NIBs in 
MENA countries”. Two empirical research models were utilised to investigate EM in 
both IBs and NIBs. It introduced the findings through a descriptive analysis of EM for 
the entire sample, across years and across countries. It presents the results of 
                                                        
13 For the purpose of this study, VDQ is defined, following Beretta & Bozzolan (2008) and Botosan (2004), as the quantity and 
richness of information disclosed voluntarily with the intention of satisfying the conceptual framework of IASB. 
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univariate analyses (t-test) of EM level for IBs in comparison to NIBs. Additional and 
robustness analyses were provided in order to support the primary findings. 
Chapter 6 shows the results regarding the study’s second objective, namely; “To 
investigate and compare the VDQ in IBs and NIBs in MENA countries”. The 
multidimensional framework of Beretta & Bozzolan, (2008) was developed to 
measure VDQ. The results were shown through descriptive statistics based on the 
entire sample, across years and across countries. Univariate analyses (t-test) of VDQ 
for IBs in comparison to NIBs were provided. Finally, the validity of 
multidimensional framework was shown. 
Chapter 7 provides the analysis and discussion about the current study’s main 
objective, which is "to investigate the relationship between EM and VDQ in both IBs 
and NIBs listed in MENA countries during the period from 2006 to 2015". This 
chapter shows the findings of the third objective by using several types of analysis 
including descriptive statistics, variance inflation factors, a correlation matrix and a 
multivariate analysis. Robustness test and additional analysis were provided. Lastly, 
the endogeneity problem was checked through (2SLS) regression technique and VDQ 
was used as an instrumental variable. 
Chapter 8 provides the summary of the primary results, outlines the implications of 
this study and provides suggestions for future research and improvements. 
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Chapter Two: Literature Review on Earnings Management 
2.1 Introduction    
Based on the study’s first objective, which is to investigate and compare earnings 
management (EM) in IBs and NIBs in MENA countries over the period from 2006 to 
2015, this chapter is allocated to understand and to review the related literature on EM 
practice. This chapter is structured as follows: Section 2.2 presents the EM 
definitions. Section 2.3 illustrates EM motivations. Section 2.4 presents EM 
techniques. Section 2.5 covers EM measurements in the banking sector, section 2.6 
provides a literature review on EM in the banks sector. Section 2.7 demonstrates EM 
practices from Islamic perspective, whilst section 2.8 presents a summary of this 
chapter.  
2.2 EM Definitions 
Beneish (2001) defines EM as a deliberate intervention in the preparation of financial 
reports for private gain through the process of generally accepted accounting 
principles (GAAP). It could be said that managers can be involved in EM for the 
purpose of reaching the profits that reflect the management's target, yet not the profits 
that reflect the actual financial performance of the entity. 
EM is considered to be one of the modern subjects that attracted the interest of 
researchers and investors, and also one of the most crucial ethical financial reporting 
issues (Armstrong, 1993). EM literature has defined EM severally. Healy and Wahlen 
(1999) argue that EM takes place when managers utilise discretion in order to 
manipulate the information provided in the annual reports “either to mislead some 
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shareholders regarding the company's economic performance or to effect contractual 
outcomes which rely on published financial figures” (Healy and Wahlen1999, p. 7).  
 
The majority of EM literature shows that EM involves managerial judgment or 
support (Levitt Jr, 1998, Mulford and Comiskey, 2005, Dechow and Skinner, 2000, 
Beneish, 2001, Issa, 2008, Mohammady, 2010). For instance, Levitt Jr (1998, p. 27) 
describes EM as  “a grey area in which the accounting is being manipulated, where 
disclosed earnings does not reflect the underlying company's financial performance 
but it reflects the manager’s desire, and where managers are cutting corners”.  
 
Furthermore, Schipper (1989) describes EM as management disclosure, arguing that 
through EM, managers purposefully intervene in the process of external financial 
reporting in order to gain some particular benefits. Also, Ronen and Yaari (2008) 
explain that EM is a set of management decisions that lead to the non-disclosure of 
the true financial performance of the company, which affects the company's financial 
report. 
 
In addition, Jordan et al., (2008) indicated that, despite the lack of a particular 
definition for EM, there is an essential character for EM that is a process of 
manipulating earnings for personal gains. Likewise, Rahman et al., (2013) defined 
EM as the managers’ ability to control discretionary accruals and change earnings in 
order to meet their expectations, under pressure from both the constraints of GAAP 
and the owners. In other words, Al-Khabash and Al-Thuneibat, (2009) indicated that 
accounting standards give managers a wide range of alternative techniques to address 
the same event or financial transaction. 
EM studies (e.g, Beneish, 2001; Jiraporn et al., 2008; Lo, 2008) suggest that there are 
two conceptions of EM, which are informative and opportunistic. The aim of the 
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informative perspective is to disclose more related information on the company to 
investors, while the opportunistic perspective attempts to mislead investors or to 
secure the manager’s reputation and compensation. In this respect, Parfet (2000) 
argued that EM could be a good behaviour if suitable and rational EM practice is 
utilised in a well-managed firm and if it conveys information of good value to 
investors.  
On the other side, Lo (2008) argued that opportunistic EM has many victims, for 
instance creditors, unions, equity investors, suppliers and regulators; thus, 
distinguishing between EM practices as either opportunistic or beneficial is still 
contentious. In this regard, Dechow and Skinner, (2000) indicated that EM practice is 
categorised in two groups: practicing EM within the GAAP and practicing EM 
outside the range of GAAP. Merchant, (1987) suggests that accounting practice that 
falls within the GAAP is considered to be legal if managers can provide reasonable 
economic justification for their accounting choices, for instance excessive recognition 
of provisions and reserves, overstatement of restructuring, asset write-offs and 
earnings that result from a neutral operation of the process.  
 
Conversely, the accounting practices that fall outside the GAAP are considered as 
fraud. This includes altering or falsifying documents, deleting transactions from 
records, fabricating false invoices and concealing significant information (Merchant, 
1987; Stolowy & Breton, 2004). On the other hand, Ronen and Yaari (2008) 
distinguish three categories of EM practices: black, grey and white. The black area is 
the practice of using tricks to reduce or misrepresent transparency of the financial 
reports (Healy & Wahlen, 1999), while the grey area is choosing an accounting 
treatment that is either opportunistic (increasing managers' private benefits only) or 
economically efficient (Roychowdhury, 2006). The white area of EM is taking 
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advantage of flexibility available in the accounting standard to signal the manager’s 
private information on future cash flows (Beneish, 2001). 
2.3 EM Motivations      
Bank managers tend to manipulate earnings with the purpose of avoiding the penalties 
of non-compliance with the minimum capital requirements and minimising the 
political costs (Elleuch, 2015; Healy & Wahlen, 1999). Incentives for EM illustrate 
the rational basis for EM practice. Healy and Wahlen (1999) argued that identifying a 
manager’s incentives for managing earnings could help in reducing EM practices. EM 
literature identified several incentives for managers to engage in EM, such as 
managers’ desire to achieve personal gain or to reduce losses, to impact on 
contractual results, to mislead investors, to have a positive effect on the stock prices, 
to meet the financial analysts' expectations, and/or to impact on the taxes owed (Healy 
and Wahlen, 1999, Gaa and Dunmore, 2007, Noronha et al., 2008, Lo, 2008, 
Madhogarhia et al., 2009, Shafer and Wang, 2011). For instance, Noronha et al., 
(2008) identified five types of incentives: (a) Capital market motivations, (b) 
Management compensation contract motivations, (c) Lending contract motivations, 
(d) Regulatory motivations and (e) Political cost motivations. Other similar EM 
incentives have been suggested by Kamel and Elbanna (2009), such as enhancing the 
company's financial reports to obtain bank loans, maintaining a certain level of  
profitability, avoidance of loss announcement, an overall increase in the firm’s value, 
mitigation of certain threats, stability of dividend etc. Habbash et al., (2015) pointed 
out that four main incentives for EM in Saudi Arabia are (1) to increase the amount of 
compensations, (2) to disclose acceptable earnings, and to avoid loss, (3) to gain a 
bank loan, and (4) to raise the share prices. Many studies on EM incentives found that 
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the most commonly reported intention is to mislead stakeholders concerning a bank’s 
financial performance (Gaa and Dunmore, 2007, Noronha et al., 2008, He et al., 
2010), and this occurs when the management has more information than the investors. 
According to the EM literature  (Gaa & Dunmore, 2007; Habbash et al., 2015; He et 
al., 2010; Noronha et al., 2008), this section extends the difference in managerial 
motivations for manipulating earnings, which are classified into five categories (see 
figure 2.1); (1) Management compensation (2) Lending contracts, (3) Political cost 
and regulatory motivations, (4) Taxation motivations, and (5) Job security concerns. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
24 
Figure 2. 1 Earnings Management Motivations  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: the researcher's development 
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2.3.1 Management Compensation (Contract Motivations) 
A compensation contract between a firm’s manager and its owners is written 
explicitly and specifies the compensation of the former. However, Deegan (2013) 
indicated that there are two types of contracts; (1) fixed contract and (2) a contract 
that is tied at least in part to the performance of the company. Managers under a fixed 
contract won't take considerable risks, as they would not share any potential gains, 
whereas a performance-related contract will motivate managers to take risks in order 
to receive any potential rewards (Deegan, 2013). In this regard, putting a cash bonus 
scheme in place will align the interests of both the principals and the agents, and both 
parties will receive benefits if the company performs well. Accounting profits are 
usually used to calculate the payoff given to managers, since this is the most accurate 
way of measuring managerial performance, compared to other measurements such as 
realised cash flows and stock prices (Healy, 1985). The reason behind this is that 
market factors that are outside the control of management have a vital impact on stock 
prices.  
Furthermore, using realised cash flows, managerial actions are not accounted for at 
the point these actions have a possibility of increasing firms’ values. Hence, both 
stock price and realised cash flows are inaccurate tools for measuring performance 
resulting from managerial actions (Dechow, 1994; Sloan, 1993). Accounting profits, 
therefore, are considered as an accurate measurement for performance and have a 
major impact in determining the punishment and reward of performance. In this 
regard, a manager will be more likely to use the flexibility in the accounting standard 
to increase the current period reported income. This is especially if managers are 
rewarded based on accounting profits, which on the other hand will increase 
managers’ bonus (Scott, 2003, p. 275). Several studies have investigated the impact of 
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management compensation on earnings management practices. For instance, 
measuring discretionary accruals by both Jones and modified Jones models, Dye 
(1991) suggested that adopting accounting profits in calculating managers’ 
compensation contracts is considered an essential internal motivation for managers to 
engage in EM practices. Thus, managers tend to involve in EM practices in order to 
enhance and increase their compensation, since their bonuses are attached to the firm's 
profits.  Similarly, a study conducted by Keating and Zimmerman (1999) stated that 
companies would choose to manipulate earnings by changing depreciation methods 
for all assets if they exhibited bad financial performance. It provides evidence that 
companies which change their method of depreciation to all assets are likely to 
increase managers’ compensation. Furthermore, Shrieves and Gao (2002) suggests 
that discretionary accruals have a positive relationship with bonuses, and the intensity 
of EM was linked to whether pre-managed earnings were close to specified goals.  
In Japan, Shuto (2007) found that those who are not awarded bonuses tend to use 
income-decreasing accruals and negative extraordinary items. Conversely, managers 
who have bonus plans are more likely to use discretionary accruals to manipulate 
earnings and increase management compensation, suggesting that Japanese managers 
were rewarded based on the persistence of earnings. A study by Kurniawan, (2013) 
has examined the influence of EM and voluntary disclosures on asymmetric 
information using 37 Indonesian listed companies. The study emphasised that 
managers of companies with a bonus plan are more likely increase their own 
compensation by shifting future earnings into an actual period to raise their current 
profit. 
In summary, a manager’s compensation is closely linked to the company’s 
performance. Therefore, managers tend to engage in EM by adopting different 
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methods, such as changing the depreciation method for all assets or shifting earnings 
from the future to the current period in order to boost their compensation and bonus 
(Keating & Zimmerman, 1999; Kurniawan, 2013).  
2.3.2 Lending Contracts 
The association between both the lender and the managers is an agency relationship. 
Lenders usually expect that company managers (borrowers) make the right decisions, 
which protect their interests. Having received the funds from lenders, borrowers are 
more likely to undertake activities, which minimise the possibility that the funds will 
be repaid, such as investing in very high-risk projects or paying excessive dividends 
(Deegan, 2013, p. 237). Aljifri (2007) indicated that company managers (borrowers) 
are more likely to be contractually motivated to shift wealth from debt-holders to 
shareholders.  
With regards to the perspective of debt covenants, Habbash and Alghamdi (2015) 
indicated that creditors are more likely to impose several restrictions on the issue of 
future loans, dividend payments and share buybacks in order to secure the repayment 
of the firm's loan. In this regard, Dichev and Skinner (2002) stated that managers of 
companies with great financial leverage ratio are motivated to manage earnings in 
order to protect their debt covenant. A study by Dechow et al., (1996) has compared a 
sample with a high leverage ratio and more debt covenant violations. They found that 
highly leveraged companies were heavily involved in EM practices in order to avoid 
violation of debt covenant constraints. Jaggi and Lee (2002) indicated that more 
financially distressed companies are likely to utilise income decreasing (EM), where a 
debt restructuring or renegotiation took place in order to convince shareholders that 
they are unable to repay their debt. In addition, Rodriǵuez-Pérez and van Hemmen 
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(2010) have investigated a sample of listed Spanish companies on the association 
between earnings management and debt. Their result proves that marginal increases in 
lending motivate managers to engage in EM. 
In respect to credit rating agencies that deem volatility in earnings as an important 
indicator of credit risk, managers would have a great stimulant to smooth earnings 
through (increasing / decreasing) accounting accruals in order to maintain or enhance 
their credit ratings, thereby convincing rating agencies of their credit worthiness  
(Jung et al., 2013). Jung et al., (2013) used 11,943 firm-year observations of bond 
issuers from 1990 to 2008 in their investigation and provide evidence that earnings 
smoothing activities increased the probability of a subsequent rating upgrade, 
suggesting that bond issuers practice EM in an attempt to influence the cost of future 
borrowing. 
In summary, external contracts, such as debt covenants, are considered to be a vital 
factor that motivates managers to engage in income- smoothing (EM) in order to meet 
the contract requirements. 
2.3.3 Political Cost and Regulatory Motivations 
Companies are usually under scrutiny by different parties, for instance, the 
government, regulators, employees and investors (Watts & Zimmerman, 1978).  
Managers of politically sensitive companies are more likely to use accounting 
methods to minimise the likelihood of any unfavourable political attention and its 
related costs, such as increased wage claims or lower government interference  (Watts 
& Zimmerman, 1990). Additionally, political pressure may stimulate managers to 
manipulate earnings, reporting high earnings in order to avoid any public attention, 
and therefore, decreasing the influence of adverse political actions and lessen 
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expected cost (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986). Kurniawan, (2013) suggests that 
managers of big companies with greater political costs are likely to postpone 
reporting of the current period’s earnings, and intentionally disclose these earnings in 
future, to minimise reported earnings during the actual period. The reason behind this 
is that profitability increases the interest of both media and consumers, thereby 
maximizing the political cost. Furthermore, Monem (2003) indicated that managers of 
Australian firms manipulate earnings through decreasing income in order to minimise 
political costs. A recent study by Hsiao et al., (2016) revealed that U.S oil companies 
were involved in income- decreasing EM in order to reduce potential political costs 
and minimise public scrutiny. 
With regards to regulatory motivations, companies that are listed in the stock market 
are often monitored for compliance with regulations that are linked to accounting 
figures (Hsiao et al., 2016). These regulations stimulate managers to manipulate 
earnings in order to meet their requirements and to minimise the political exposure 
risk (Habbash et al., 2015). In this respect, Christensen et al., (1999) have examined 
the relationship between the regulatory standards and EM on 47 insurance companies 
over a 3-year period, from 1989 to 1992. Their results emphasised that managers are 
more likely to manage earnings in order to meet regulatory standards. Furthermore, 
they suggested that meeting regulatory standards and the informativeness of earnings 
are the most important factors that influence managers to engage in EM. Haw et al., 
(2005) examined the association between income-increasing (EM) and the reaction to 
new statutory regulations of 10% ROA for firms that are seeking to issue new bonds 
or offer shares, using a sample of Chinese firms from 1996 to1998. Their result 
emphasised that these new regulations generated powerful stimulus for managers to 
manage earnings. 
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In conclusion, to minimise possible political costs, which may be produced by 
unfavourable political activities such as regulations, policies and government 
antitrust, managers are more likely to report lower earnings (income decreasing). 
Additionally, statutory regulations place strong pressure on company managers 
leading them to manipulate earnings upwards or downwards with the aim of meeting 
and complying with the regulations. Hsiao et al., (2016) show that companies that are 
facing high adverse political or regulatory pressures are highly motivated to engage in 
EM practices and report low profits in order to minimise potential political exposure. 
In contrast, Lim et al., (2007) indicated that managers of companies that decided to go 
public are more likely to manipulate earnings upwards (income increasing), in order 
to raise their share price.  
2.3.4 Taxation Motivations 
The tendency to involve in EM is attributed to changes in tax policy, which motivates 
managers to practice EM in order to avoid paying tax (Tang & Firth, 2011). In this 
regard, Tang and Firth, (2011) indicated that there are usually three strategies used by 
managers to avoid tax payment. These are; (1) managing taxable income and book 
income in an opposite direction; for instance, reporting lower taxable income and 
higher earnings. (2) Managing taxable income whilst keeping book income constant; 
for example, reducing or smoothing taxes. (3) Managing book income whilst keeping 
taxable income constant; for instance increasing earnings or taking a big bath. In 
addition, Adhikari et al., (2005) show that since the tax calculation is based on 
accounting figures and ratios, tax avoidance is considered as the most powerful 
incentive for managers to involve in EM. Keating et al., (1999) investigated the use of 
changes in depreciation methods and depreciation estimates in order to minimise 
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taxes and manage earnings. Their study suggested that companies would make more 
depreciation revision estimates and apply depreciation method changes on new assets 
only in order to manage their earnings. Additionally, Keating et al., (1999) have 
suggested that revisions of estimates increased after 1981, since they provided 
managers with the flexibility to manage accounting earnings without affecting their 
tax liability.  Frank et al., (2009) developed a method of measuring manipulation of 
tax reporting and employed discretionary accruals as an EM measure. Their findings 
suggest that non-conformity between tax law and financial reporting standards 
allowed companies to manage book income upwards and taxable income downwards 
in the same reporting period. In addition, Rahman et al., (2013) documented that 
government regulation, shareholders’ decisions and tax laws are considered to be the 
most powerful motivations that lead managers to manipulate earning and financial 
statement figures.  
In conclusion, tax cost is considered as a strong motivation for managers to engage in 
EM, particularly if managers’ goals are to increase the value of the company and 
minimise the tax cost. This will encourage them to manage taxable income. Managers 
could achieve tax savings through involving in income decreasing (EM). 
2.3.5 Job Security Concerns 
Company profitability is considered as one of the major concerns for managers. This 
is because it signals the quality of their decisions to shareholders (Cheng, Lee & 
Shevlin, 2015). Company manager seeks to act in the owners’ best interests at any 
cost to ensure that their decisions are in line with the owners’ target and to guarantee 
their position in the company (Matsunaga & Park, 2001). In this regard, Elliot and 
Shaw (1988) found that when there is a change in the company's management, such 
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as CEO, a material write-off is recognised in the same year that change has happened, 
suggesting that new managers are more likely to use this opportunity to report low 
earnings and blame the previous management on this low performance. Such action 
allows new managers to save earnings for the coming years in order to guarantee their 
position in the company. 
In addition, Murphy and Zimmerman, (1993) examined a sample of poorly 
performing companies, and found that for job security reasons the CEOs did not 
increase income, but they also noted that these CEOs thereafter left the company. It 
also suggested that the new CEOs of these companies have acted to minimise their 
income. These findings are in line with managerial incentives to secure earnings for 
the coming years, which are driven by job security concerns. Wells (2002) proved that 
new CEO's are more likely to engage in income decreasing (EM) in the same year 
that the CEO is changed. Therefore, taking over the previous CEO’s position allows 
the current CEO to decrease earnings (EM), as they would not be criticised for past 
decisions and a downward trend in the current year earnings. 
In conclusion, job security is an important motivation for EM. Managers tend to 
manipulate earnings to meet owners’ interest at any cost in order to secure their 
position in the company. 
2.4 EM Techniques  
The management relies on different ways of practicing earnings management, through 
which they planned to increase or decrease their disclosed earnings. This study 
addresses the most important forms of earnings management practices. Overall, EM 
techniques can be classified into three groups: Income- smoothing, big bath and 
accounting choice (see figure 2.2).  
  
 
33 
Figure 2. 2 EM Techniques 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: the researcher's development 
 
 
2.4.1 Income Smoothing 
The income smoothing technique is considered to be the most important earnings 
management method. It is a type of EM technique used by the company through the 
formation of reserves to reduce profits in good years, especially when the profits are 
high, so as to use them to increase profits in the bad years when profits are low 
(Vinten et al., 2005). The idea of income smoothing relies on the basis of achieving 
stability in the income figures by reducing volatility in the figures between different 
accounting periods. The management will reduce saved profits in a good period “in 
which profits rise significantly", and increase it during the bad period. The 
management indulges in income smoothing because investors are willing to pay a 
premium for shares with stable predicted earnings (Arya et al., 1998, Demski, 1998).  
Hejazi et al., (2011) have identified income smoothing as a set of methods used by 
management to reduce the volatility of income, by managing real or artificial earnings 
in order to reach the required level of income. Martinez and Castro (2011) identified 
income smoothing as a deliberate control of income in order to achieve certain results, 
such as to reduce or increase the published earrings to reach a certain level as desired 
by the management.  The management engage in income smoothing due to the belief 
EM Techniques 
Income- smoothing 
techniques 
Big Bath 
Accounting Choice 
Techniques 
  
 
34 
that earnings volatility is one of the elements by which its performance is assessed, 
and to ensure that financial analysts and investors will not concentrate on a variation 
in income figures as a measure of the risk posed to the company. 
There are two basic types of income smoothing; the first one is called normal accrual. 
It is caused by the nature of the entity's production and operations. It is estimated by 
using the statistical model based on the company's assets, property, plant, and 
equipment, and change in sales. The second type is abnormal accruals, which is a 
result of the accounting manipulation undertaken by management in order to reduce 
income fluctuations, and it is the residual amount between the actual and the predicted 
accruals. In line with EM literature, this study will argue that income smoothing is a 
method used by the management to reduce or increase income, in order to maintain a 
certain level of profits from one year to another.    
Lobo and Yang (2001) and Pinho and Martins (2009) have demonstrated that bank 
managers with high variability will have more powerful incentives to smooth earnings 
by manipulating loan loss provisions (LLPs). Similarly, Kwak et al., (2009) stated 
that bank managers could shift earnings from one period to another through LLPs to 
smooth earnings over time. 
2.4.2 Big Bath Accounting 
The way the Big Bath technique works is that when a firm is suffering badly and 
definitely will incur and disclose losses, it may overstate the losses to the greatest 
extent possible. This technique is used to inflate the losses and reported bad news 
linked with poor earnings into the current financial year, which will allow the 
boosting of earnings in the coming financial years (McKee, 2005). Big bath 
accounting is defined by Mulford and Comiskey (2002, p. 15) as “A wholesale write-
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down of assets and accrual of liabilities in an effort to make the balance sheet 
particularly conservative so that there will be fewer expenses to serve as a drag on 
earnings in future years”. 
Covering up all losses in bad years or in periods where the company suffered a 
significant drop in profits may be considered by the management. Thus, the company 
will resort to increase in the value of losses in the current period, in which it can 
achieve earnings in subsequent periods (Jordan and Clark, 2011). The management 
might use exaggerated estimates for doubtful debts or postpone some of the revenue 
to a future date instead of showing it in the current period. Sometimes, the 
management resorts to using this method when the company changes the executive 
administration and then appoints a new one in order to place the blame on the 
previous administration.  
Kirschenheiter and Melumad, (2002) indicated that managers are more likely to 
engage in income- decreasing (EM) so as to use the savings in the coming year, if the 
firm is unable to meet its target and current earnings are below expectation. 
Furthermore, McNichols and Wilson, (1988) documented that managers may engage 
in EM practices through recognising future expenses in a given period when they 
know that the current earnings are inappropriate to meet earnings forecasts. Moore 
(1973) and Pourciau (1993) investigated the association between discretionary accrual 
choices and CEO change. Their results indicated that new CEOs would have more 
motivation to decrease earnings in the current year to enhance reported earnings in the 
coming years, comparing them unfavourably with former CEOs’ results. This gives 
the new CEOs the opportunity to blame the former CEOs for the previous bad year.  
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2.4.3 Accounting Choice Technique 
Company managers may abuse or exploit the flexibility available in accounting 
standards by choosing appropriate methods, such as depreciating expenses, revenue 
recognition, investments and leases or changing from First- in-first-out (FIFO) to 
Last- in-first-out (LIFO) in inventories to estimate accruals and then manipulate 
earnings to affect financial events (Aljifri, 2007; Healy & Wahlen, 1999). Managers 
usually use depreciation techniques to manage earnings, for instance double-declining 
balance, straight-line and sum-of-the-year’s digits. The reason behind using the 
depreciation techniques in managing earnings is that the straight-line method provides 
the same amount of annual depreciation expense every year. In comparison, sum-of-
the-year’s digits and the double-declining balance methods increase the first year’s 
depreciation expense over the assets’ useful life (low income) and, in the final year, 
offers the least amount of depreciation (higher income). Similarly, using a sample of 
44 Singaporean public firms, Poitras et al., (2002) found that firms exploited the 
flexibility available in GAAP and used the assets depreciation method and sales 
revenue in order to manipulate earnings. In addition, Bergstresser and Philippon 
(2006) have proven that managers could manage earnings through assuming a lower 
or higher rate of depreciation, which influences cash flow figures and reported 
earnings.  
2.5 Literature Review on EM Measurements 
EM can be described as being invisible, intangible and difficult to discover  (Beneish, 
2001). Accordingly, EM studies attempted to find a simple approach to measure EM 
practices through utilising statistical methods. Generally, in the accounting literature, 
several methods have emerged such as specific accruals (McNichols & Wilson, 
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1988), aggregate accruals (Dechow et al., 1995), and distribution of earnings 
(Burgstahler & Dichev, 1997). Aggregate and specific accruals are considered under 
the accrual basis, whilst distribution of earnings is seen as being under the non-
accruals basis (Zendersky, 2005) (see figure 2.3). The following section provides 
more details about each method.  
 
 
 
Figure 2. 3 Approaches in Detecting EM in the Banking Sector.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: the researcher's development 
 
2.5.1 Specific Accrual Models in Measuring EM in the Banking Sector 
The banking sector is considered as a critical environment for studies on EM, which 
expose serious concerns about the possibility that banks might conceal risks 
endangering their financial strength (De Medeiros et al., 2012). In this respect, Beatty 
et al., (2002); Anandarajan et al., (2007) and Leventis and Dimitropoulos, (2011) 
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indicated that LLPs and realised security gains and losses are subject to managerial 
decisions, suggesting that managers are potentially able to avoid reporting a small 
decline in earnings through underestimating the LLPs, realising fewer security losses 
or more security gains. In this regard, Cheng et al., (2011) and Kanagaretnam, 
Krishnan, & Lobo, (2010) have indicated that LLPs are an expense item on the 
income statement, which reflects the management’s current assessment of the likely 
level of future losses from defaults of outstanding loans. Recording LLPs reduces net 
income.  
In the banking system, regulators view accumulated LLPs of statement of financial 
position as a type of capital, which is used by the firm to absorb losses. Banks use 
higher LLPs to absorb unexpected losses (Ali et al., 2015; Elnahass et al., 2014; 
Kanagaretnam, Lobo & Mathieu, 2004; Kanagaretnam et al., 2007). LLPs represent 
the largest portion of accruals in the banking system and are considered to be the 
primary source, which creates the conditions for potential accounting manipulations 
(Abdelsalam et al., 2016; Alali & Jaggi, 2011; Belal et al., 2015; Gray & Clarke, 
2004; Kanagaretnam et al., 2004; Kwak et al., 2009).  
In addition, LLP plays a major role in the manager's decision with regards to 
accounting manipulation (Beaver & Engel, 1996; Kanagaretnam, Krishnan & Lobo, 
2009). In this respect, bank managers have to create reserves for loan losses during 
the good periods in order to use it in bad periods. Therefore, bank managers can raise 
their reserves by boosting LLPs during a good financial year in order to overcome any 
problems related to loan losses, meeting the regulation requirements, capital adequacy 
requirements and EM (Ben Othman & Mersni, 2014; Bushman & Williams, 2007; 
Misman & Ahmad, 2011).  
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Other EM studies investigated EM practices among IBs and NIBs in developed and 
developing countries illustrated that LLPs are considered to be an essential instrument 
for a bank manager to manipulate earnings (Abdelsalam et al., 2016; Ali et al., 2015; 
Beaver & Engel, 1996; Elnahass et al., 2014; Healy & Wahlen, 1999; Leventis et al., 
2012; Liu & Lu, 2007; Misman & Ahmad, 2011; Wahlen, 1994; Zoubi & Al-Khazali, 
2007). 
2.5.1.1 Models Utilised in Measuring Discretionary Through LLPs  
There are two kinds of procedure, which can be adopted when modelling specific 
accruals for the identification of EM practices. These are one-stage and two-stage 
models. Empirical EM studies suggested that, in using the one-stage or two- stage 
model, LLPs are utilised as a proxy to capture EM (e.g. Ahmed et al., 1999; Alali & 
Jaggi, 2011; Beaver & Engel, 1996; Cheng et al., 2011; Kanagaretnam, Lobo & Yang, 
2005; Kanagaretnam et al., 2010). The choice of procedure relies on the researchers’ 
objectives. For instance, Kim and Kross (1998); Lobo and Yang (2001); Goulart 
(2007); Kanagaretnam, Lim, and Lobo (2010); Alali and Jaggi (2011); and Misman 
and Ahmad (2011) utilised one-stage models in their studies as they were seeking the 
association between LLPs and the variables of interest in order to identify its possible 
use in income smoothing. On the other hand, Beaver and Engel (1996); Zendersky 
(2005); Marcondes (2008); Kanagaretnam, Krishnan and Lobo (2010); 
Kanagaretnam, Lim and Lobo (2010); Cheng, Warfield and Ye (2011); Ben Othman 
et al., (2014); and Abdelsalam et al., (2016), employed the two-stage model, which 
separates the non-discretionary and discretionary accruals, thus allowing the 
researchers to use the discretionary portion as a dependent variable in the second 
stage. This was done in order to assess its association with regressors, explaining the 
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management’s opportunist actions. In most cases, the control variables of the one-
stage model are compatible with the two-stage model. With regard to the two-stage 
model, non-performing loans, written-off loans, loan loss allowances and volumes of 
loan portfolios are utilised as explanatory variables in order to estimate the non-
discretionary LLPs (De Medeiros et al., 2012).  
Table 2.1 shows the most used explanatory variables in empirical EM studies with 
regards to the two-stage model. The assumption of using variables related to the loan 
portfolio, such as LOAN and ∆LOAN, is that the higher the volume of loans, the 
greater the provision to be made to offset eventual losses (Kanagaretnam et al., 2010). 
In addition, the assumption of employing variables linked to the volume of overdue 
debts, such as NPL and ∆NPL, is that they represent the risk of losses with the bank’s 
receivables and have a clear association with the level of LLPs.  
With regards to written-off loans, the argument for using the value of LCO is that it 
represents the incarnation of loss itself, which must have an association with LLPs. 
Loan loss allowance (LLA) is used as an explanatory variable because the 
expectations of losses already written off is an indicator of the quality (or lack 
thereof) of the loan portfolio, which should entail further adjustments in LLP. 
Kanagaretnam et al., (2010) argue that different types of loans and financing (TYP) 
operations have different influences on LLP requirements. Moreover, controlling for 
changing periods (PER), which has been contemplated in four more recent studies, is 
aimed at capturing changes in the economic scenario over time.  
In addition, Marcondes (2008) argued that portfolios with higher interest rates are 
those posing greater risk and, consequently, requiring greater LLP. Thus, the interest 
rate charged in credit operations (INT) might have a serious impact on LLPs. 
However, Kanagaretnam et al., (2004) model employs non-performing loans (NPL), 
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the change in non-performing loan (∆ NPL), and change in total loans (∆ TL), which 
is useful in studying IBs and NIBs in MENA countries. Other studies include written-
off loans (Beaver & Engel, 1996; Cheng et al., 2011; Kanagaretnam et al., 2009; 
Kanagaretnam et al., 2010; Zendersky, 2005), which are not provided by the majority 
of IBs in MENA countries.  
Furthermore, Elleuch (2015) also pointed out the weaknesses in applying LLPs 
models that are used in estimating the provision for a developed country, such as with 
American banks. For instance, written-off loans that are considered as fundamental 
for the estimation of the discretionary LLPs in American banks are not relevant for 
banks in developing countries (Ben, Othman & Mersni, 2014). Consequently, the 
current study employed Kanagaretnam et al., (2004) model among other LLPs models 
in order to measure EM. 
 
  
 
42 
Table 2. 1 Two-stage Models Used in Empirical EM Studies 
 
Model LOAN ∆ LOAN NPL (-1) NPL ∆NPL ∆NPL (+1) LCO LLA LLA (-1) INT TYP    PER Other 
1  √   √ √ √       
2     √   √     √ 
3  √ √  √         
4  √ √  √         
5  √ √  √  √  √     
6 √ √ √  √  √  √ √  √  
7  √ √  √  √  √   √ √ 
8 √ √ √  √  √  √  √ √  
9 √ √  √   √  √  √ √ √ 
10  √   √ √ √       
LOAN= value of total loans, ∆LOAN= change in the value of total loans, NPL (-1)= the volume of lagged nonperforming loans, NPL= the volume of nonperforming loans, 
∆NPL= the change in the volume of nonperforming loans, ∆NPL (+1)= change in the volume of led nonperforming loans, LCO= the net volume of written-off loans, LLA (-1)= 
the lagged of loan loss allowance, INT= the implicit interest rate charged by banks in their loan portfolio, TYP= the vector of control variables representing the type of loan 
included in the portfolio; PER= a dummy variable controlling for time periods. Models: (1) Beaver and Engel (1996), (2) Beatty, Ke & Petroni, (2002), (3) Kanagaretnam, Lobo 
and Mathieu (2003), (4) Kanagaretnam, Lobo and Mathieu (2004), (5) Zendersky (2005), (6) Marcondes (2008), (7) Kanagaretnam, Krishnan and Lobo (2009), (8) Kanagaretnam, 
Krishnan and Lobo (2010), (9) Kanagaretnam, Lim and Lobo (2010), (10) Cheng, Warfield and Ye (2011). 
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2.5.1.2 Realised Security Gains and Losses Model 
Gains and losses emanating from firms’ securities can only be achieved through 
investment sales, which is calculated from the variation of book values and securities’ 
market after excluding any sales taxes and commissions. Although the manager’s 
year-end adjustment underlies securities gains and losses, the extent of its adjustment 
is limited by the investment portfolios’ unrealised gains and losses (Beatty et al., 
1995; Moyer, 1990). Security gains and losses are not regulated and audited 
discretionary choices (Beatty et al., 2002). Therefore, realised security gains and 
losses appear to be an alternative method that managers might use to manage 
earnings. In this respect, Cohen, Cornett, Marcus & Tehranian, (2014) have reported 
that EM in banks is accrued through LLPs and realisation of gains and losses on 
securities, because both allow for great management discretion. In addition, the 
Financial Accounting Standards (FAS) statement no. 5 that relates to "Accounting for 
Contingencies", includes losses on loan portfolio. It requires managers to provide 
estimable and probable judgments on accrual of losses. However, the model that has 
been used to detect discretionary accrual through realisations of gains and losses on 
securities by several studies (Beatty et al., 1995; Cornett et al., 2009; Leventis et al., 
2012; Moyer, 1990) is as follows; 
GAINSit = a +β1 LNASSETit +β2 UGAINSit +εit 
Where; 
GAINS = realised gains and losses on securities as a fraction of beginning-of- year 
total assets (includes realised gains and losses from available- for-sale securities and 
held-to-maturity securities), 
LNASSET = the natural log of beginning-of-year total assets; 
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UGAINS = unrealised security gains and losses (includes only unrealised gains and 
losses from available-for-sale securities) as a fraction of total assets at the beginning 
of the year; 
ε = error term (residual). 
2.5.2 Aggregate Accruals in Measuring EM in the Banking Sector 
Aggregate accruals attempt to identify discretionary accruals using the relationship 
between total accruals and explanatory factors. This implies that the aggregate 
accruals approach employs discretionary accruals as EM proxy. Total accrual (TA) is 
made up of discretionary accruals (DA) and nondiscretionary accruals (NDA). Thus, 
discretionary accruals can be achieved from the difference between TA and NDA. In 
respect to the banking sector, Yasuda et al., (2004) argued that as the accruals are 
measured through the difference between net income and operating cash flows, which 
cover depreciation, impairments and revaluations, the Jones model (1991) modified 
for the banking sector can capture EM in a comprehensive manner. Therefore, in 
order to achieve the discretionary portion from the total accruals, the residual from 
equation (A) is indicated as the discretionary accrual portion (DA) of total accruals, 
which relies on management discretion. With a view to reducing heteroscedasticity, 
all variables in this equation were divided by the lagged total assets (Abdelsalam et 
al., 2016; Leventis et al., 2012; Yasuda et al., 2004). 
(TACit /TA t-1) = β0  (1/TA t-1) + β1 (∆ OIit/TA t-1) + β2  ( BPEit / TA t-1 ) + εit      (A) 
Where:  
TAC = is the total accruals that is estimated from the difference between net income 
and operation cash flows.  
TA= Total assets. 
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∆ OI= Change in operating income between t-1 to t.  
BPE= Bank’s premises and equipment.  
2.5.3 Distribution of Earnings Approach 
EM research suggests that managers tend to manipulate accounting figures to obtain 
certain earnings targets (Burgstahler & Dichev, 1997; Dechow et al., 2010; Hamdi & 
Zarai, 2012). It has been emphasised that managers are practising EM for three 
different purposes (benchmarks) 14 : (1) to avoid losses, (2) to avoid earnings 
decreases, (3) to beat analysts’ expectations (Burgstahler & Dichev, 1997). Managers 
tend to meet earnings benchmarks for several reasons (Graham et al., 2005): (A) to 
build strong credibility with the capital market, (B) to increase or maintain share 
price, (C) to enhance the company's external reputation, and (D) to convey future 
growth prospects. Managers also assume that missing a benchmark creates doubt 
about the company's prospects and increases the probability that deeper issues are 
being hidden (Graham et al., 2005). The distribution of earnings approach differs 
from other approaches as it endeavours to measure EM through the earnings 
distribution. Thus, this approach is considered as an innovative method for examining 
EM without the need for estimating discretionary accruals (Yu et al., 2006). Other 
empirical studies have investigated the evidence of EM practices through examining 
the reported distribution of earnings (Burgstahler & Dichev, 1997; Dechow et al., 
2010; Degeorge et al., 1999; Hamdi & Zarai, 2012; Yu et al., 2006). For instance, 
Degeorge et al., (1999) indicate that this method is based on the assumption that, in a 
                                                        
14 The distribution of ROA and ∆ROA in the interval between (0, 0.005) or (0, 0.01)  is used as a benchmark to investigate 
whether EM to avoid losses and to avoid earnings decline exists. In addition, a graphical test is utilised to examine the 
distribution of reported earnings around the benchmark and to observe discontinuities in the distribution.  If the bank manager is 
trying to avoid losses, the graphical test will present unusually small observations immediately to the left of zero and an 
unusually great number of observations immediately to the right of zero.  
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situation where EM does not exist, the distribution at the benchmark should be 
symmetric (smooth). On the other hand, EM exists when the frequency of small 
positive earnings presented by banks is unexpectedly high and when the frequencey 
of small negative earnings presented by the bank is disproportionately low. By using 
the earnings distribution method on a sample of 125 IBs over the period from 2000 to 
2009, Hamdi & Zarai, (2012) suggested that IBs are more likely to manage earnings 
in order to avoid earnings decreases and losses. Thus, managers of IBs are highly 
motivated to manage reported earnings in order to exceed a benchmark.  
Although the distribution earnings approach is assumed to be efficient in identifying 
EM practices (Xiong 2006). Healy and Wahlen (1999) argue that the level of EM 
cannot be achieved through the distribution earnings approach and that it is unable to 
provide the volume of EM. In the same vein, Durtschi and Easton (2005) disputed the 
shapes of earnings distribution pattern used as an evidence of EM practices, and 
influenced by choosing sampling criteria or changes in observational features to the 
left and right of zero. They conclude that the shapes of distribution pattern are 
insufficient proof of EM because the magnitude of EM is not captured by this 
technique (Healy and Wahlen 1999). Thus, there is insufficient evidence to suggest 
that an EM practice is as a result of the pervasive discontinuity of discretionary 
accruals at zero. 
In conclusion, it can be clearly seen that the specific accrual approach and aggregate 
approach are more accurate and beneficial in detecting the value of EM. However, the 
current study has employed the two-stage model and modified Jones model in 
accordance with the empirical work of Kanagaretnam et al., (2004) and Yasuda et al., 
(2004), as a main and alternative models respectively, to measure EM. In general, 
these models are the most suitable models to capture the value of discretionary 
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accruals in the banking industry (Abdelsalam et al., 2016; Elnahass et al., 2014; Kwak 
et al., 2009).  
2.6 EM Literature Review in the Banking Sector  
EM studies in the banking sector can be dated back to Scheiner (1978) who 
investigated income smoothing in the banking industry. Since then, various authors 
have conducted studies on earnings manipulations by banks (Abdelsalam et al., 2016; 
Ahmed et al., 1999; Alali & Jaggi, 2011; Ali et al., 2015; Anandarajan et al., 2003; 
Anandarajan et al., 2007; Beaver & Engel, 1996; Ben Othman & Mersni, 2014; 
Cheng et al., 2011; Elnahass et al., 2014; Kanagaretnam et al., 2005; Kanagaretnam et 
al., 2010; Kwak et al., 2009; Leventis et al., 2011). Table 2.2 provides summary of 
these studies. 
Grougiou et al., (2014) argued that the banking sector is more inclined to EM 
practices than the non-financial sector, because of its wide range of financial products 
and complicated operations that lead to information opacity and increasing 
information asymmetry (Levine, 2004; Mülbert, 2009). In addition, banks are 
representing a considerable attribution of total companies listed in stock markets, 
suggesting that banks have an effective part in the capital market (Kanagaretnam et 
al., 2010). In this respect, Taktak et al., (2010), argued that bank managers can sustain 
the bank’s image and robust financial position, leading to its compliance with legal 
requirements through EM practices. In addition, Bhat (1996) indicated that bank 
managers used income-smoothing practices in order to avoid earnings volatility. In 
the same vein, Leventis et al., (2011) stated that bank managers are more likely to 
involve in EM practices compared to other managers in different sectors.  
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With regards to the empirical studies on EM for IBs in comparison to NIBs, Zoubi 
and Al-Khazali, (2007) investigated the use of total LLPs in both IBs and NIBs in the 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) region from 2000 to 2003. They revealed that 
managers of both types of banks utilised total LLPs to smooth their earnings. Misman 
and Ahmad, (2011) have examined LLPs for both Islamic and non-Islamic banks in 
Malaysia from 1993 to 2009, and concluded that both IBs and NIBs used LLPs as a 
proxy for EM. However, IBs and NIBs were found to be acting differently with 
regards to the use of LLPs.  
Quttainah, et al., (2013) have investigated the practice of EM in 164 banks in total, 
which are divided equally into 82 IBs and 82 NIBs from 11 Arab countries from 1994 
to 2008. This study also examined other variables such as Shari’ah Supervisory 
Boards (SSB), its characteristics (e.g. size and composition) and their influence on 
EM. Their outcomes indicated that IBs are less likely to engage in EM compared with 
NIBs. Furthermore, whether or not banks have an SSB would appear to make no 
significant difference with regards to EM. In addition, size, Auditing Organization for 
Islamic Financial Intuitions (AAOIFI) and outside board members have a significant 
impact on EM for IBs with SSBs. 
Additionally, Ben Othman and Mersni, (2014) have analysed the use of discretionary 
LLPs by IBs and NIBs in seven Middle East countries. Their study sample contains 
21 IBs, 18 NIBs with Islamic windows and 33 NIBs for a 9-year period, from 2000 to 
2008. Their results were similar to the findings of Misman and Ahmad (2011), which 
show that both types of banks are engaged in EM. Elnahass et al., (2014) investigated 
the use of LLPs by investors in their valuations of both IBs and NIBs during a period 
from 2006 to 2011. Their findings show that there is a positive value relevance to 
investors in both IBs and NIBs. However, investors are more likely to price the 
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discretionary element relatively lower in IBs compared to NIBs, which they attributed 
to the variation in products, the religious perception of IBs and to governance 
structures. In addition, Ali and Syed Abul, (2015) examined a sample of 291 banks 
from 35 Organisation of Islamic Conference members (OIC), with 2078 bank-year 
observations, for a 6-year period, from 2003 to 2008. They indicated that managers of 
OIC banks use LLPs as a tool to manipulate earnings. More recently, Abdelsalam et 
al., (2016), examined the effect of organisational religiosity on the quality of earnings 
in both IBs and NIBs during 2008-2013. They found that IBs are less likely to 
manipulate earnings and employ high conservative accounting policies compared with 
NIBs. Table 2.2 provides summary of these studies. 
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Table 2. 2 Review of the Empirical Studies on EM for IBs in comparison to NIBs  
 
 
Year Data Authors Objectives Results 
2000 - 2003 
 
47 banks operate in GCC 
countries 
Zoubi and Al-Khazali, 
(2007) 
Examine the factors that influence 
LLPs in both IBs and NIBs to manage 
earnings. 
Both IBs and NIBs utilised total LLPs to smooth their 
earnings. 
1993-2009 
16 IBs and 22 NIBs 
listed in Malaysian stock 
market 
Misman and Ahmad, (2011) 
Exploring the treatment of LLPs as a 
tool in managing earnings and capital 
IBs and NIBs used LLPs as a proxy for EM and are acting 
differently regards to the use of LLPs. 
1994-2008 
82 IBs and 82 NIBs from 
11 Arab countries 
Quttainah, et al., (2013) 
Investigating whether IBs are less 
likely to manage earnings compared to 
NIBs and the effect of other variables 
such as Shari’ah Supervisory Boards 
(SSB) on EM. 
IBs are less likely to engage in EM compared with NIBs 
2000- 2008 
21 IBs, 18 NIBs with 
Islamic windows and 33 
NIB operate in Middle 
East region 
Ben Othman and Mersni, 
(2014) 
Investigating the differences and 
factors that may influence managers of 
IBs to use discretion in reporting LLPs. 
Both types of banks are engaged in EM 
2006- 2011 
34 IBs and 72 NIBs 
listed in MENA 
countries 
Elnahass et al., (2014) 
Examining the use of LLPs by 
investors in their valuations of both IBs 
and NIBs 
Investors are more likely to price the discretionary element 
relatively lower in IBs compared to NIBs 
2003- 2010 
46 IBs and 245 NIBs 
from 35 OIC member 
countries 
 
Ali and Syed Abul, (2015) 
Investigating whether EM practice is 
influenced by the banking nature 
whether Islamic or non-Islamic. 
Bank managers of both IBs and NIBs use LLPs as a tool to 
manipulate earnings 
2008- 2013 
24 IBs and 76 NIBs 
operate in 12 MENA 
countries. 
Abdelsalam et al., (2016) 
Examined the impact of organizational 
religiosity on the EM. 
IBs are less likely to manipulate earnings and employ high 
conservative accounting policies compared with NIBs. 
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2.7 EM Practices from Islamic Perspective 
Islamic law attributes unethical behaviour, such as fraud and irregularities in the 
financial reports, to the failures of ethics (Staubus, 2005). One of the common 
unethical behaviour examples under accounting and finance topics is EM (Du et al., 
2015). Organisations that are compliance with Islamic law “Shari’ah” are based on 
justice between clients, which forbids riba, ambiguity and manipulation in their 
transactions. In addition, Islamic law has organised the financial relations between 
people in accordance with the terms and conditions of reservation of the right of each 
party. The Islamic Bank gains its legitimacy through the embodiment of the principles 
of Islamic law "Shari’ah", and therefore it is fully committed to applying these 
principles in every transaction (Abdelsalam et al., 2016). Adhering to the ethics and 
culture of Islam leads to guarantees for the bank to continue growing, expanding their 
business and achieving an appropriate level of profits. 
According to the EM definition of Healy and Wahlen (1999, p. 27), which is 
“emphasises manager’s use of accruals in order to mislead shareholders or to 
influence the contractual results that rely on disclosed accounting figures”, the 
expressions "to mislead shareholders" and "to influence the contractual results" stress 
the opportunistic behaviour of managers. This behaviour is considered immoral and is 
prohibited in Islam (Abdelsalam & El-Komi, 2016; Hamdi & Zarai, 2013; Hossain et 
al., 2014). Shari’ah laws demand Muslims to apply instructions of Islam in every part 
of their lives and business (Hamdi & Zarai, 2013). Under Shari’ah law, basic 
principles are covered and involve how various business-related issues should be 
treated in line with the Islamic framework. 
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Managers of IBs are responsible to their shareholders as well as to Allah in the 
hereafter life; thus, they must ensure accountability, suggesting that Muslim managers 
are required to carefully manage firms’ resources and property, which they are 
responsible for. They should also ensure these properties and resources are used with 
integrity and in an efficient way that serves the interest of the community and owners  
(Alkdai & Hanefah, 2012). Overall, it is obvious that EM practices are considered to 
be opportunistic behaviour; thus, opportunism is forbidden in Islam (Rahman et al., 
2005).  
The objective of both IBs and NIBs is to obtain deposits and to reinvest those deposits 
in the market to make a profit. IBs invest deposits jointly with customers and 
investors through Murabah, Mudarabah, and Musharakah 15 , whereas NIBs invest 
deposits in loans and securities (Zoubi & Al-Khazali, 2007). Though the majority of 
EM studies focus on NIBs, a huge body of literature suggests that the current 
practices of IBs differ only in ‘form’ but not in substance from that of the NIBs (e.g. 
Chong & Liu, 2009; Dar & Presley, 2000).  
Since IBs focus on the principle of sharing both risk and profit modes (e.g. 
Musharaka and Mudarabah), these Islamic products entail risk, and threaten the 
bank’s stability. For instance, risk will occur when the partner fails to pay the bank's 
share, leading to an increase in the bank’s risk (Boulila Taktak, 2011; Elgari, 2003; 
Siddiqui, 2008). On the other hand, NIBs’ risk would be as a result of the inability of 
their customers to repay their obligations (loans) to the bank. International Financial 
Reporting Standard (IAS) and the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic 
Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) both allow bank managers to establish an allowance 
for loan loss provision (LLP) to absorb any losses in the future (Boulila Taktak, 
                                                        
15 Mudarabah, Musharakah and Murabahah are forms of Islamic trade finance. Murabaha is based upon letters of credit. 
Mudaribah is usually provides management expertise which is treated as a form of capital, whereas, Musharakah is essentially a 
sharing model. 
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2011). Therefore, managers need to estimate the amount of expected losses for loans 
that might not be collected in the future by using an accrual basis. Hence, managers 
use this flexibility to manipulate accounting figures to obtain and reach their earnings 
target (Zouari et al., 2012). IBs must adhere to Islamic Law (Shari’ah) that provides 
religious guidelines, and the majority of IBs also employ AAOIFI standards. IBs are 
monitored by another supervisory board beyond the general monitoring system for all 
banks: the Shari’ah Supervisory Board (SSB). Thus, adhering to all these obligations, 
IBs are expected to be less engaged in EM compared to their competitors (NIBs).  
With regards to comparability, the majority of MENA countries require banks under 
their financial authority to adopt the International Financial Reporting Standards and 
International Accounting Standard (IFRS, IAS) (Ghannouci & Radic, 2011; Haidar, 
2007; Hussain et al., 2002; Maha & Hakim, 2013), thus allowing the researcher to 
compare between IBs and NIBs.  
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2.8 Summary of the Chapter 
Chapter 2 presents a wide range of EM definitions, which explain in detail the factors 
that motivated bank managers to manage their reported earnings. In order to meet the 
regulatory requirements, such as capital adequacy and contract requirements, bank 
managers may engage in EM practices through different accounting techniques within 
GAAP. This chapter also illustrates the most common EM motivations, techniques 
and measurements in the banking industry. 
Although EM is difficult to ascertain, the literature provided evidence of the three 
commonly used approaches in detecting EM practices, including aggregate accruals, 
specific accruals, and distribution of earnings. Under these approaches there are 
several models used to measure EM.  Both aggregate accruals and specific accruals 
work on the derivation of the discretionary accruals from the total accruals, as this is 
the main source for managers to manipulate earnings. 
Since this research focusses on the opportunistic side of EM, where managers use 
accounting choice or accruals, the current study has employed two-stage model and 
modified Jones in accordance with the empirical work of Kanagaretnam et al., (2004) 
and Yasuda et al., (2004) respectively, to measure EM. In general, these models are 
the most suitable models to capture the value of discretionary accruals in the banking 
industry (Kwak et al., 2009; Elnahass et al., 2014) owing to their ability to separate 
the total accruals into discretionary and non-discretionary accruals. This allows the 
researcher to examine the relationship between EM (discretionary accruals) and 
voluntary disclosure quality in both IBs and NIBs in MENA countries.  
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Chapter Three: Literature Review on Voluntary Disclosure Quality 
 
3.1 Introduction  
This chapter outlines the main concepts that are related to voluntary disclosure. It is 
organised as follows. Section 3.2; definitions of voluntary disclosure. Section 3.3 
provides the benefits of voluntary disclosure to both investors and company. Section 
3.4 illustrates the determinants of voluntary disclosure. In section 3.5 covers the 
reviews of the empirical studies on the relationship between voluntary disclosure and 
EM. In sections 3.6 and 3.7 the theoretical framework and disclosure from Islamic 
perspective are presented respectively. Section 3.8 provides summary of the chapter. 
3.2 Definitions of Voluntary Disclosure Quality 
Voluntary disclosure is described as “disclosure made beyond the financial 
statements, which is not explicitly required by the Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP), the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) rules, and the 
Financial Accounting Standard Board” (Board, 2001, p15). Voluntary disclosure 
quality (VDQ) is not only limited to general information, as companies might release 
a variety of information such as qualitative or quantitative information and financial 
or non-financial information through different channels, either formally or informally 
(Gibbins, Richardson & Waterhouse, 1990, p. 122). VDQ is also defined as 
“accuracy, reliability and completeness” (Singhvi & Desai, 1971, p. 131). In addition, 
VDQ has been defined by Brown and Hillegeist (2007, p. 5) as “the accuracy, 
quantity of information provided, and timeliness”. In the same manner, Kent and 
Stewart (2008, p. 651) indicated that “more extensive disclosures are more likely to 
  
 
56 
be informative compared to the brief disclosures which in turn is considered as 
indicator of greater transparency”. Although voluntary disclosure studies (Beretta & 
Bozzolan, 2008; Brown & Hillegeist, 2007; Gibbins et al., 1990; Singhvi & Desai, 
1971) have described VDQ by using several important key words such as accuracy, 
completeness, reliability and timeliness, which are basically derived from the 
underlying theoretical assumptions adopted in research, and therefore, there is no one 
comprehensive definition which could be used (Debreceny & Rahman, 2005). 
Different research methodologies, disclosure themes and variable constructs 
employed in VDQ research has led to various VDQ definitions. This claim has been 
supported by Beretta and Bozzolan (2008, p. 341) who stated that VDQ is 
“impossible to be defined”.  
Following Beretta and Bozzolan (2008), Beattie et al., (2004) and Singhvi and Desai 
(1971) the current study defines VDQ as “the quantity and richness of the information 
provided that meet the conceptual framework of IASB”. Consequently, the current 
study considers the information as high quality when it provides users with the 
relative amount of information (how much is disclosed), and offers a general 
overview of the business alongside its aim of focusing on relevant issues with The 
intention of satisfying the conceptual framework of IASB (2010)16.  
With respect to safeguarding shareholder value, both agency and signalling theories 
presume that useful, reliable and complete disclosure should mitigate asymmetric 
information and minimise agency cost (Morris, 1987; Riahi & Mounira, 2011; 
Subramaniam, 2006). Emphasising that the definition of VDQ of Singhvi and Desai 
(1971) is consistent with the agency theory's aim, which is increasing the value of 
shareholders. 
                                                        
16 IASB (2010) relevance, understandability, comparability, faithful representation and timeliness. 
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3.3 The Benefits of Voluntary Disclosure to both Investors and the Company 
The existing and expected investors are often seen as those who benefit from 
voluntary disclosure, because they depend on this disclosed information to formulate 
risk-return judgments in order to evaluate the company’s performance (Grossman, 
1981; Kasznik & McNichols, 2002; Milgrom, 1981). Coles at a1. (1995) indicated 
that voluntary disclosure mitigates the investor's estimation risk, suggesting that 
information disclosed voluntarily is considered a valuable resource, which could 
assist more informed trading decisions. With respect to the benefits of voluntary 
disclosure to the company, trading decisions for investors have an immediate 
influence on the market prices with regards to both debt and equity, which impacts the 
cost at which firms are able to raise capital funds (Healy, Hutton & Palepu, 1999; 
Healy & Palepu, 2001).  
Botosan (1997) and Hughes at al. (2007) argued that the level of asymmetric 
information has a positive relationship with the cost of capital, suggesting that 
companies with insufficient information face difficulties in raising capital funds. This 
is because investors require sufficient information regarding the company's business 
in order to compensate for uncertainty and information risk. Thus, disclosing more 
information voluntarily is in the interest of the company in order to mitigate their 
capital cost. Additionally, Healy & Palepu, (2001) argued that disclosing more 
information voluntarily not only reduces the cost of capital but also enhances the 
company's finance and investments decisions. Furthermore, Myers & Mailuf (1984) 
show that low capital cost is a good motivation for managers to raise funds by issuing 
new securities in order to capitalise on profitable investment opportunities. Therefore, 
voluntary disclosure can indirectly influence management decisions to control the 
company’s resources in order to increase overall returns. 
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3.4 Determinants of Voluntary Disclosure 
Several studies have empirically examined the management’s incentives behind their 
voluntary disclosure (Alotaibi & Hussainey, 2016; Aryani & Hussainey 2017; Cerf, 
1961; Chakroun & Hussainey, 2014; Habbash et al., 2016; Riahi & Ben Arab, 2011). 
Healy and Palepu, (2001) argue that corporate disclosure is affected by the firm’s 
characteristics and corporate governance attributes. The following is a discussion 
about firm characteristics and corporate governance mechanisms effect on voluntary 
disclosure. 
3.4.1 Firm’s Characteristics  
Several studies (Aryani & Hussainey 2017; Barako et al., 2006; Wallace et al., 1994) 
indicated that company size, listing status, leverage, liquidity and profitability are the 
most common features of the firms.  
Company size is considered to be a vital determinant of voluntary disclosure. 
Voluntary disclosure literature suggested that big companies are more likely to 
disclose a greater amount of information voluntarily compared to small companies 
(Al-Najjar & Abed, 2014; Aryani & Hussainey 2017; Barako, Hancock & Izan, 2006; 
Hossain, Perera & Rahman, 1995; Jizi, Salama, Dixon & Stratling, 2014; Qu, Ee, Liu, 
Wise & Carey, 2015; Salama, Dixon & Habbash, 2012). The reasons behind the 
positive association between company size and voluntary disclosure could be 
attributed to the following; 
(1) According to the agency theory, big companies are linked to high agency costs, 
thus, the management of big companies tend to reduce the agency cost through 
disclosing more information voluntarily (Ruland, Tung & George, 1990). (2) Big 
companies could afford the preparation costs of voluntary disclosure, whereas small 
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companies may not be able to afford the high cost of voluntary disclosure (Lang & 
Lundholm, 1996). (3) Big companies are expected to be under a very intense 
monitoring system by the regulator bodies; in turn, this pressure leads to disclosing 
more information voluntarily in an attempt to project a good performance (Cowen et 
al., 1987).   
With respect to the listing status, voluntary disclosure studies (Cooke, 1992; Hope et 
al., 2013; Malone et al., 1993; Uyar et al., 2013; Wallace et al., 1994) indicated that 
listed companies attempt to provide more information voluntarily compared to 
unlisted companies. In addition, Ahmed & Courtis, (1999) have shown that there is a 
visible relationship between listing status and corporate disclosure. This association 
could be attributed to the common requirements of stock exchanges, which require 
companies to meet before they can be considered for listing, such as number of shares 
issued, earnings for the last three years, suggesting that higher levels of information 
disclosed voluntarily could be found in listed companies. 
With respect to leverage, liquidity and profitability,  empirical voluntary disclosure  
studies have shown that there is a positive association between a company's liquidity 
and voluntary disclosure  (Belkaoui & Kahl, 1978; Cooke, 1989). Furthermore, the 
ability of companies to meet their immediate financial obligations without being 
forced to discontinue their operations or divest their longer-term assets is widely 
regarded by stakeholders to be an important measure of a company’s prospects for 
survival (Wallace & Naser, 1995). Wallace et al., (1994) indicated that liquidity ratio 
is considered an essential benchmark for lenders and investors, because low liquidity 
potentially threatens the continuance of an enterprise. Thus, it is important for 
companies with a high liquidity ratio to provide information about the companies' 
viability as a going concern and accentuate their economic sustainability. 
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As regards to leverage, voluntary disclosure literature have shown that VDQ has a 
positive association with a company's leverage (Barako et al., 2006; Malone et al., 
1993), which could be attributed to the fact that companies with high levels of debt 
may be restricted by lenders’ covenants to disclose more information voluntarily. 
However, both Chow and Wong-Boren (1987) and Raffournier (1995) have found no 
association between corporate disclosure and leverage. The different findings of 
previous studies could be attributed to the difference in the study sample, method 
used, disclosure items chosen and to the various research methodologies adopted. 
 
In the case of profitability, corporate disclosure literature argued that in highly 
profitable firms, managers are motivated to disclose information voluntarily because 
it boosts the confidence of investors and raises managers’ compensations (Rouf & 
Abdur, 2011). Furthermore, Spence (1973) has shown that highly profitable 
companies would be eager to voluntarily provide more information about their good 
performance to investors. In this context, Cormier and Magnan, (1999) show that 
companies in a perfect financial condition tend to disclose information 
comprehensively, compared to companies in a bad financial condition, in order to 
provide evidence of their managerial capabilities and consolidate their corporate 
positions. 
3.4.2 Corporate Governance  
Corporate governance (CG) is defined by Shleifer and Vishny (1997) as the paths in 
which suppliers of finance to firms assure themselves of obtaining a return on their 
investment. Additionally, Gillan and Starks (1998) define CG as the system of rules, 
factors and laws that control operations at a company. The Cadbury Committee 
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Report, (1992) defined CG as “the system that controlled and directed listed 
companies”.  Furthermore, the OECD (2004, p.11) provides a broader definition of 
CG by stating that: “Corporate governance involves a set of relationships between a 
company’s management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate 
governance also provides the structure through which the objectives of the company 
are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance are 
determined. Good corporate governance should provide proper incentives for the 
board and management to pursue objectives that are in the interests of the company 
and its shareholders and should facilitate effective monitoring.” 
 
The need for good corporate governance is to avoid corporate failures as well as to 
protect investors (Balachandran & Bliss, 2004). Corporate governance literature (e.g. 
Aryani & Hussainey 2017; Akhtaruddin, Hossain, Hossain & Yao, 2009; Andreou, 
Louca & Panayides, 2014) indicated that the existence of good corporate governance 
mechanisms would minimise the gap between the agent and principal, which in turn 
mitigates the agency cost. Furthermore, a good corporate governance mechanism has 
a major influence on voluntary disclosure (Akhtaruddin et al., 2009; Allegrini & 
Greco, 2013; Kent & Stewart, 2008; Mohamad et al., 2010; Rouf & Al Harun, 2011; 
Wang & Hussainey, 2013). In the same manner, Alsaeed, (2006) and Gul and Leung, 
(2004) have shown that poor corporate governance has led to corporate collapses and 
bankruptcy. Therefore, the main concern of corporate governance is the effectiveness 
of corporate control that leads managers to act in the best interest of owners (Allen & 
Gale, 2000). Diverse mechanisms of corporate governance have been supported in 
prior literature, including enhancing an effective board of directors, executive 
compensation, active audit committee and concentrated holdings (Bonazzi & Islam, 
2007). With respect to voluntary disclosure, several studies indicated a positive 
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relationship between voluntary disclosure and the board’s independence (Qu et al., 
2015). Furthermore, Gandía, (2008) and Jizi et al., (2014) documented that a large 
board with a variety of backgrounds and board meetings enhances transparency and 
encourages voluntary disclosure. In addition, Nekhili et al., (2016) and Haniffa & 
Cooke, (2005) have shown that the audit committee’s independence and the audit 
firm’s size (Big 4) decreases the issue of information asymmetry which, in turn, 
positively affects voluntary disclosure. 
With regards to ownership structure, the separation between both agent and principal 
has increased the monitoring procedures by investors of the performance and 
decisions of managers, in order to protect their interests. The agency theory context 
has explained the importance of corporate disclosure to both current and potential 
investors and the presence of contractual relationships between the agent and the 
principal (Watts & Zimmerman, 1978). The asymmetric information exists between 
the management (agent) and the shareholder (principals), when the former has direct 
access to the information compared with the shareholder (Arnold & De Lange, 2004). 
Referring to the normative perspective of the accountability model17, all firms have to 
report information to both inside and outside users, because it is the firms’ 
responsibility to disclose information (Gray et al., 1996). However, the findings of the 
empirical studies on the association between ownership structure and corporate 
disclosure were mixed (Aishah Hashim & Devi, 2008; Barako, 2007; Bokpin & 
Isshaq, 2009; Bushee & Noe, 2000; Chalaki et al., 2012; Chau & Gray, 2002; Eng & 
Mak, 2003; Laidroo, 2009; Nekhili et al., 2012; Patelli & Prencipe, 2007; Rouf & Al 
Harun, 2011). The literature emphasised that the ownership structure has a significant 
                                                        
17 The normative perspective of the accountability model is defined as the responsibility of the firm to 
disclose information (Jalila and Devi, 2012). It is based on the premise that every firm must disclose 
information to anyone who has a direct or indirect interest in the firm, which gives stakeholders, such 
as creditors, tax departments, suppliers and employees, the right to hold the company accountable 
(Gray et al., 1996). 
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and positive relationship with the level of corporate disclosure (Dhaliwal et al., 1982; 
Raffournier, 1995). Some other studies, however, have found a negative association 
between the extent of disclosure and ownership structure (Barako, 2007; Patelli & 
Prencipe, 2007).   
3.5 Literature Review on the Relationship Between Voluntary Disclosure and 
EM 
Empirical evidence, however, provides inconclusive results regarding the association 
between EM and voluntary disclosure. For instance, in accordance with the long-term 
perspective, Chih et al, (2008); Francis et al, (2008); Hunton et al., (2006); Katmun 
(2012); Iatridis and Kadorinis (2009); Lobo and Zhou (2001) and Yadollah et al., 
(2012) reported a negative association between EM and voluntary disclosure. This 
implies that firms with a higher level of voluntary disclosure are less likely to engage 
in EM. This is also in line with signalling theory, which suggests that a company’s 
manager will behave in a responsible manner when voluntarily disclosing more 
credible information.  
In contrast, following managerial opportunism perspective, some studies found a 
positive influence of voluntary disclosure on EM practices (Grougiou et al., 2014; 
Kasznik 1999; Muttakin et al., 2015; Patten and Trompeter, 2003; Prior et al., 2008). 
This suggests that company managers disclose more information voluntarily in order 
to conceal their opportunistic behavior. On the other hand, other studies have failed to 
find any impact of voluntary disclosure on EM practices (e.g. Kurniawan, 2013 and 
Sun et al., 2010). 
An early study on the association between corporate disclosure and EM was 
conducted by Richardson (2000) who examined the impact of asymmetric 
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information (voluntary disclosure was used as a proxy) on EM on all NYSE 
companies over a period from 1988 to 1992. His findings suggested that a high level 
of asymmetric information is linked with a high level of EM, signifying that a high 
level of voluntary information decreases the level of information asymmetry between 
the agent and principal, and therefore, mitigates EM practices. 
A study by Lobo and Zhou (2001) has investigated the association between the 
quality of corporate disclosure and EM practices on US companies over a five-year 
period from 1990 to 1995. The AIMR18 rating was used to measure the quality of 
disclosure, while the modified Jones model was employed to measure EM practices. 
Although this study has neglected to use any of the corporate governance mechanisms 
to control for both disclosure quality and EM, their result revealed that corporate 
disclosure quality has a negative impact on EM practices, suggesting that US 
companies that disclose high quality information are less likely to engage in EM 
practices.  
In a similar way, Hunton et al., (2006); Iatridis and Kadorinis (2009); Gray (2013); 
Lapointe-Antunes et al., (2006); Riahi and Mounira (2011); Shen and Chih (2005) 
and Yadollah et al., (2012) have investigated the impact of voluntary disclosure level 
on EM on non-financial companies. Their result suggested that voluntary disclosure 
has a significant and negative effect on EM, suggesting that non-financial firms that 
disclose more information voluntarily are less likely to practice EM. In addition, Chih 
et al., (2008); Choi et al., (2013); Gras-Gil et al., (2016); Kim et al., (2012) and 
Scholtens and Kang (2013) explored the association between corporate social 
responsibility disclosure (CSRD) (as proxy for voluntary disclosure) and EM 
                                                        
18 Association for Investment Management and Research 
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practices. Their results provided evidence that companies with higher levels of 
adherence to CSRD are less likely to be motivated to engage in EM. 
On the contrary, Kasznik (1999), investigated the influence of voluntary disclosure on 
EM by using 366 US listed companies over a 5 year period from 1987 to 1991. His 
result shows that voluntary disclosure has a positive and significant impact on EM, 
suggesting that managers who overvalued earnings tended to shift published earnings 
to meet their expectations. In addition, Muttakin et al., (2015); Patten and Trompeter 
(2003) and Prior et al., (2008) have investigated the relationship between EM 
practices and the level of corporate social responsibility on non-financial firms. They 
have found that the level of CSR has a positive and significant impact on EM, 
suggesting that a high level of CSR increases the manager’s motivation to involve in 
EM behaviour.  
Conversely, a study by Sun et al., (2010) investigated the association between EM 
and corporate environmental disclosure on 245 UK companies over the period from 1 
April 2006 to 31 March 2007. The result of this study, however, failed to find any 
association between EM and corporate environmental disclosure, signifying that 
managers of UK firms did not use disclosure of environmental information in order to 
mitigate the possibility that public policy actions might be taken against their 
companies. In the same manner, Kurniawan (2013) examined the influence of 
corporate disclosure and EM on asymmetric information on 37 Indonesian listed 
firms. His findings revealed that although corporate disclosure has a negative 
influence on asymmetric information, corporate disclosure has no association with 
EM. Furthermore, a study by Kiattikulwattana, (2014) has also provided empirical 
evidence by investigating the relationship between EM and voluntary disclosure on 
181 companies that were listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand during 2009. Their 
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result has shown that there is no association between voluntary disclosure and EM. 
Table 3.1 presents the results of these empirical studies. 
Based on the above, it can be seen that EM and voluntary disclosure literature have 
only focused on the impact of voluntary disclosure levels on EM without paying 
attention to the quality of this information. However, Beretta & Bozzolan (2008) 
argued that disclosure quality is not only linked to the level of information disclosed 
but also to what is disclosed and the variety of topics disclosed. Additionally, Botosan 
(2004) argued that the notion of VDQ should be based on the conceptual frameworks 
created by the standard setters (FASB and IASB). This reflects a generally accepted 
interpretation of disclosure quality, and lead to high quality information that is useful 
for decision-making (IFRS, 2010). Consequently, the current study bridge this gap in 
the literature by examining the relationship between EM and VDQ.  
It is worth mentioning that voluntary disclosure studies have used several methods to 
measure VDQ. For instance, AIMR rating, which is available only for specific firms 
in the US, was used by Lobo and Zhau (2001) as proxy for VDQ, while other research 
focussed on disclosure indices that measures only the level of information disclosed 
without paying attention to the richness of these information. Consequently, to 
measure VDQ, the current study develops a comprehensive framework that considers 
both the quantity and richness of disclosed information with the attention on 
satisfying the conceptual frameworks of both FASB19 and IASB20. 
Most notably, none of the above-mentioned studies have examined the relationship 
between EM and VDQ in banking sector, especially IBs. Organisations that are 
compliant with Islamic law “Shari’ah” behave justly when dealing with their client, 
                                                        
19 - FASB requirements: A) identifies the aspects of the company’s business that are especially important to the company’s 
success. These are the critical success factors for the company. B) Identifies management’s strategies and plans for managing 
those critical success factors in the past and going forward. (Width means that the wider the variety of topics disclosed the 
better).  
20 IASB frameworks (understandability, relevance, reliability, comparability and timelines).  
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forbids riba, ambiguity and manipulation in their transactions (EM) (Hossain et al., 
2014), and are required to full disclosure concept (Abdulrahman, Anam & Fatima, 
2010). Furthermore, Islamic law impose further regulation, which may influence both 
EM practices and the VDQ (Hamdi & Zarai, 2013; Maali 2006). This suggests that 
the EM practices and VDQ of IBs might vary from those of NIBs, which makes 
necessary to compare both types of banks in line with the aim of this study. Thus, the 
current study attempts to fill this gap in the literature by using data from both IBs and 
NIBs. 
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Table 3. 1 Review of the Empirical Studies on the Association Between EM and Voluntary Disclosure  
Year Data Authors Objectives Results 
1987- 1991 
366 US listed companies Kasznik (1999) Investigated the influence of voluntary disclosure on EM Voluntary disclosure has a positive and significant impact on EM 
1988 - 1992. 
 
 
All NYSE companies 
over a period from 1988 
to 1992. 
Richardson (2000) Examine the impact of asymmetric information on EM, (voluntary 
disclosure “VD” was used as a proxy for information asymmetry). A negative association between EM and VD was found. 
1990 -1995 1,444 US firm-years 
observation 
Lobo and Zhou (2001) 
Investigated the association between the quality of corporate 
disclosure and EM practices 
Corporate disclosure quality has a negative impact on EM practices, 
1984 
40 US companies 
Patten and Trompeter 
(2003) 
Investigated that relationship between EM practices and the level of 
corporate environmental disclosure 
The level of environmental disclosure has a positive and significant 
impact on EM 
2005 17 US  public firms  Hunton et al., (2006) Examined the impact of transparency of disclosure on EM practices More transparent companies tend to mitigate EM practices.  
 
1997 - 2001 90 Swiss companies Lapointe-Antunes et 
al., (2006) 
Studied the relationship between voluntary disclosure and EM A negative association between EM and VDQ was found. 
1993-2002 1,653 multinational 
companies from 46 
different countries 
Chih et al., (2008) 
Explored the association between corporate social responsibility 
disclosure (CSRD) and EM practices. 
Companies with higher level of adherence to CSRD are less likely to 
be motivated to engage in EM. 
2002- 2004 593 firms from 26 
different countries 
Prior et al., (2008) 
Examined that association between corporate social responsibility and 
EM 
Corporate social responsibility is positively and significantly related 
to EM. 
2007 239 UK firms  Iatridis and Kadorinis 
(2009) 
Investigated the impact of voluntary disclosure on EM Voluntary disclosure has a significant and negative effect on EM 
2006- 2007 
245 UK companies Sun et al., (2010) 
Investigated the association between EM and corporate environmental 
disclosure 
Have failed to find any impact of VDQ on EM practices. 
 
1999- 2008 19 listed firms on 
Tunisian stock market 
Riahi and Mounira 
(2011) 
Examined the effect of voluntary disclosure frequency on EM High level of voluntary disclosure is linked to lower level of EM 
2001-2010 700 Iranian firms Yadollah et al., (2012) Explored the association between corporate disclosure quality and EM High quality of disclosure reduces the level of EM practices. 
1991- 2009 18,160 USA firm-year 
observations 
Kim et al., (2012) Examined the impact of CSRD on the level of EM The level of CSRD has a negative and significant effect on EM. 
2002-2008 2,042 South Korean 
firm-year observations 
Choi et al., (2013) Examined the effect of CSRD on EM A positive association between EM and CSRD was found. 
2008 
37 Indonesian listed 
firms 
MeilaniPurwanti 
(2013) 
Examined the influence of corporate disclosure and EM on 
asymmetric information 
Their findings revealed that although corporate disclosure has a 
negative influence on asymmetric information, corporate disclosure 
has no association with EM. 
2004-2008 139 companies listed in 
ten different Asian 
countries. 
Scholtens and Kang 
(2013) 
Investigate the association between CSRD as proxy for voluntary 
disclosure and EM 
Asian companies are less likely to practice EM when they provide 
high level of CSRD. 
2005- 2012 
100 Spanish companies Gras-Gil et al., (2016) Explored the effect of corporate social responsibility on EM 
Corporate social responsibility is significantly and negatively linked 
to EM 
2005- 2009 135 firms that are listed 
on the Dhaka Stock 
Exchange 
Muttakin et al., (2015) 
Examined the association between EM quality and CSRD CSRD is positively and significantly related to EM 
2009 181 companies listed on  
Thailand Stock 
Exchange of  
Kiattikulwattana, 
(2014) 
Investigated the relationship between EM and voluntary disclosure There is no association between voluntary disclosure and EM. 
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3.6 Theoretical Framework 
In order to test the relationship between EM and VDQ, agency, signalling and 
stakeholder-legitimacy theories are adopted. Agency and signalling theories are 
partially similar in concept because they both address the issue of information 
asymmetry between managers and users (Gallego Alvarez et al., 2008; Morris, 1987). 
Though these theories appear, from the literature, to be competing theories (Leventis 
et al., 2012; Morris, 1987), they are very useful in understanding the impact of VDQ 
on EM 
3.6.1 Agency Theory          
Agency theory is mainly focused on the relationship between the principal and the 
agent, particularly in the separation of ownership and management (Morris, 1987). 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) defined agency conflict as a contract involving one or 
more parties (the principal(s)) who may engage another party (the agent) to help them 
carry out some services. This will consists of delegating the authority to make 
decisions to the agent. The underlying premise of the agency relationship is the 
assumption that both agent and principal are opportunistically inclined and have the 
sole intention of maximising their self-interest. This theory is concentrated in 
resolving the conflict of interest that may occur in an agency relationship. This occurs 
because the agents have full access to the information in the company, while the 
principal, who is funding the company, has limited access to this information 
compared with the agent. Lambert  (2001) argues that the conflict of interest between 
the agent and principal may be as a result of the agent’s diversion of efforts, 
appropriation of resources for personal consumption and risk attitude. In addition, 
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both opportunistic behaviour and information asymmetry allows bank managers 
greater freedom to manipulate earnings (Black & Shevlin, 1999). Several studies (Bae 
et al., 2009; Beatty et al., 1995; Cornett et al., 2009) provided evidence that both 
agency costs and asymmetric information have an influence on the accounting 
accruals.  
In order to reduce any conflict of interest, the majority of EM and VDQ literature has 
placed emphasis on control geared towards aligning the interest of the agent with that 
of the principal (Barnea et al., 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). However, due to differences in the level and quality of information provided 
by the manager to the agent, it may be difficult for these conflicting interests to be 
completely aligned. Healy and Palepu (2001) suggested the use of optimal contracts 
between agents and principals since such a contract ensures disclosure of relevant 
information, thereby enabling investors to monitor alignment of interest. The 
researchers emphasised the use of voluntary disclosure, such as management 
forecasts, presentations, press releases and conference calls among others in the 
managing agency relationship.  
Agency theory is considered to be a powerful theoretical foundation for understanding 
the organisational process (Subramaniam, 2006). It contributes to a better 
understanding of the problem of information asymmetry and has been used widely by 
researchers when explaining voluntary disclosure (Allegrini & Greco, 2013; Ben-
Amar et al., 2017; Frias Aceituno et al., 2013; Ness & Mirza, 1991; Watson et al., 
2002). It is also very useful in explaining the financial contracts of Islamic institutions 
(Shamsuddin & Ismail, 2013).   
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For the purpose of this work, EM is considered to be a form of agency cost (Fung & 
Goodwin, 2013), since it causes information asymmetry and decreases the ability of 
users to understand the company’s performance and thus, affects their decisions 
(Davidson et al., 2004). Managers are more likely to practice EM especially when 
users are poorly informed and do not have access to the company information (Man 
and Wong, 2013). Voluntary disclosure is known to be the most appropriate solution 
in decreasing agency costs (Gisbert and Navallas, 2013). Increasing voluntary 
disclosure could, therefore, solve the EM problem because it reduces information 
asymmetry and, thus, decreases EM practices. 
3.6.2 Signalling Theory                 
Signaling theory was advocated as a possible treatment for information asymmetry, 
whereby a party with more information signals to the other party with lesser 
information and thus reduces the information gap (Morris, 1987; Riahi & Mounira, 
2011). According to An et al., (2011), managers have more information than users 
with regard to the operation of the company (e.g. expected profits, risk exposure or 
viability of a project) and should use this information to the firm’s advantage through 
appropriate signaling. However, due to information asymmetry issue, bank managers 
are motivated to signal some information, not only to avoid showing poor 
performance of the bank and decrease the probability of being audited by bank 
regulatory agencies, but also to increase the managers’ compensation since it is based 
on reported earnings.  
In this context, bank managers have incentives to engage in EM  (Caprio & Levine, 
2002; Healy & Wahlen, 1999; Kanagaretnam et al., 2004). Watts and Zimmerman 
(1978) indicated that managers could lessen or avoid asymmetric information issue 
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through disclosing (signaling) private information voluntarily to investors and the 
market. Credible and relevant voluntary disclosure is considered as vital element in 
decreasing asymmetric information (Hughes, 1989). The signal can take different 
forms but must indicate quality and be beneficial to the party that sends the signal (An 
et al., 2011). EM literature (Ahmed et al., 1999; Beaver et al., 1989; Beaver & Engel, 
1996; Wahlen, 1994) illustrated that bank managers used LLPs as a signaling device 
to communicate their private information to shareholders and to give a signal about 
their financial strength. Signaling theory suggests that bank managers raise LLPs to 
signal good news about the banks’ future earnings. Specifically, great LLPs convey a 
signal of confidence and conservatism that managers can withstand to earnings 
(Ahmed & Courtis, 1999). Managers of higher quality companies have a desire to 
distinguish themselves from poor quality companies through extending reliable 
information voluntarily (Gray 2005). Managers should use credible (high quality) 
signals in order to communicate successfully (Eccles et al., 2002).  
In addition, Morris (1987, p. 51) claimed that to assure the signalled information by 
the firm is credible and can effectively decrease asymmetric information, the 
asymmetry costs “must be borne by the company's manager (agent), so he has an 
incentive to signal truthfully”. This suggests that company's manager will behave in a 
responsible manner when voluntarily disclosing more credible information. 
Nevertheless, Abhayawansa and Abeysekera, (2009) argue that there is no guarantee 
that firms will disclose credible information, because managers’ decision to disclose 
is effected by the marginal benefits to be achieved through decreasing asymmetric 
information in the market. 
Given that managers’ ability to disclose information voluntarily will decrease the 
frequency of EM practices, since credible voluntary disclosure is likely to decrease 
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information asymmetry (Glosten and Milgrom, 1985), and, thus, reduce EM practices 
(Trueman and Titman, 1988). This is in line with EM and voluntary disclosure 
literature which states that voluntary disclosure has a negative relationship with EM 
practices (e.g. Brown and Hillegeist 2007; Petersen and Plenborg 2006).  
3.6.3 Stakeholder Theory  
This theory illustrates the association between the disclosed information by the firm 
and their stakeholders. Hill and Jones, (1992) indicated that managers are considered 
as the agent of both the owners and other stakeholders. There are two different groups 
of stakeholders includes; the primary (powerful) group and the secondary group  
(Clarkson, Kao & Richardson, 1994). Shareholders, suppliers, government, 
employees and creditors are considered as a powerful group, while media and 
environmentalists are considered as secondary group. The literature on the 
stakeholders’ theory (e.g. Parmar et al., 2010; Wagner Mainardes, Alves & Raposo, 
2011) contended that managers should take into consideration the interest of all 
stakeholders rather than only the powerful stakeholders.  
There are three perspectives of stakeholder theory: instrumental power, descriptive 
accuracy, and managerial perspective (Donaldson & Preston, 1995). The instrumental 
power and descriptive accuracy perspectives are both in line with the suggestion that 
the company management should manage the influential stakeholders through 
categorizing them with the self-interest of the company, whereas the managerial 
perspective presumes that managers should take into account the interest of all 
stakeholder groups (Donaldson and Preston,1995). According to the first two 
perspectives (instrumental power and descriptive accuracy), managers may use 
voluntary disclosure as an instrument to manage the perception only towards their 
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own powerful stakeholders who play an influential role in the continuity and survival 
of the company business, rather than for accountability purposes (Deegan & 
Blomquist, 2006; Ullmann, 1985). In the same vein, Friedman and Miles, (2002) 
indicated that powerful stakeholders groups have a stronger impact on companies 
compared to other minority shareholders. Consequently, managers have strong 
incentives to employ voluntary disclosure to manipulate stakeholders in order to 
obtain their approval and support or to distract their opposition and disapproval 
(Deegan & Blomquist, 2006). In line with this notion, the voluntary disclosure is 
perceived as a part of the dialogue among the corporation and its powerful 
stakeholders. On the other hand, managerial perspective focuses on the 
responsibilities of companies' management to diverse stakeholders, which increases 
the need for the company to disclose more information voluntarily to relevant 
stakeholders in order to assure greater accountability (Guay, Kothari & Watts, 1996; 
Kakabadse, Rozuel & Lee-Davies, 2005).  Managerial perspective gives substantial 
rights to all stakeholders and involves managers in activities that is useful to protect 
all stakeholders (Deegan & Samkin, 2008).  
In general, the perspective of stakeholder theory is that organization should be 
positively accountable to all stakeholders groups for strategic purposes. The voluntary 
disclosure can be considered as important path for banks to discharge their 
accountability, which leads to decrease in asymmetric information and building a 
good relationship with stakeholders (An, Davey & Eggleton, 2011). Although, 
managers may have more incentives to utilize their discretion to extend the level of 
reported information in order to avoid the risk of being dismissed (Sun et al., (2010), 
voluntary disclosure increases the transparency of information, which in turn 
strengthen the association between the stakeholders and the business (An et al., 2011). 
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This discussion leads to voluntary disclosure which endeavours to support the demand 
for more credibility and transparency, which in turn establishes long-term 
relationships with stakeholders  (Garcia-Meca & Sánchez-Ballesta, 2010). The 
viewpoint of the long-term relationship is utilised to demonstrate VDQ and recognises 
the stakeholders’ significance in the provision of high financial returns. The current 
study follows the integrated theoretical framework proposed by An et al. (2011) (See 
figure 3.1). 
 
Figure 3. 1 The Integrated Theoretical Framework  
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Source: An et al., (2011, p. 580). 
3.7 Disclosure from the Islamic Perspective  
The Islamic religion has more impact on the level of corporate disclosure since the 
perspective of Islam focuses on appropriate disclosure. In this regard, there are two 
common requirements of Islamic accounting in the Islamic perspective of disclosure: 
the full disclosure concept and the concept of social accountability (Haniffa & 
Hudaib, 2002; Abdulrahman, Anam & Fatima, 2010). Voluntary disclosure is affected 
by managerial decisions; bank managers have more flexibility in reporting additional 
information than they have when reporting other types of disclosure, such as 
compulsory disclosure (Wang et al., 2016). Therefore, the current study takes into 
account VDQ as it is considered to be important on minimising information 
asymmetry.   
Voluntary disclosure is a critical element of the accountability between IBs and their 
stakeholders. Haniffa & Hudaib, (2007) indicated that IBs are more likely to disclose 
high level of truthful and comprehensive information voluntarily to meet the needs of 
their stakeholders, society, and others. 
Muslims believe there is only one ultimate creator who has absolute ownership, and 
human beings are merely trustees of this world. Maali et al., (2006) indicated that 
Muslims are responsible and accountable for their actions in the hereafter. In addition, 
Baydoun and Willett, (1998) emphasise that in Islamic accounting, managers are 
accountable to the society, thus they should disclose information, which can help 
discharge this accountability. The concept of social accountability has generated the 
concept of full disclosure, as Muslims and non-Muslim communities have the rights 
to be informed about the firms' activities and operations in their society. Thus, the 
conservatism concept of disclosing information in Islamic accounting does not exist 
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(Alam, 1998). Baydoun and Willett (2000) and Haniffa and Hudaib (2002), argued 
that full disclosure means to report high quality information in order to assist 
investors to make the right decision as well as helping managers to fulfil their 
accountability to society. 
Islamic institutions which adopt AAOIFI standards disclose more reliable financial 
and non-financial information in order to create confidence among investors (Sarea & 
Hanefah, 2013; Nadzri & Aida, 2009). IBs are required to disclose truthful 
information voluntarily, irrespective of their local standards, due to the importance of 
accountability in Islamic society (Maali et al., 2003). This entails disclosing all 
necessary information regarding their activities to assist prospective investors and to 
make sure that these activities are in line with Islamic principles, which NIBs are not 
required to report (AAOIFI, 2005; Baydoun & Willett, 2000; Haniffa & Hudaib, 
2002; Maali et al., 2006). Additionally, voluntary disclosure literature emphasises that 
Islamic institutions report high level of credible (high quality) information, which 
embodies the Islamic principles of full disclosure and accountability, when compared 
to NIBs (Abdul Rahman, 2012; Aribi and Gao 2010). Therefore, voluntary disclosure 
quality (VDQ) is expected to be higher in IBs than NIBs. 
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3.8 Summary of the Chapter  
This chapter provides a literature review, which indicated that, as yet, there is no 
study has investigated the relationship between EM and VDQ in the banking industry, 
specifically in Islamic banks. It provides a review of definitions, benefits, and 
determinants of voluntary disclosure. It also covers theories that explain the 
relationship between the relevant variables. Two different perspectives on the 
association between EM and VDQ were provided including: long-term perspectives 
and managerial opportunism.  
The long-term perspective suggests that firms provide voluntary disclosure in order to 
raise current profits, executives' wealth and to enhance and build a solid future 
relationship with stockholders. This view is linked to both agency and signaling 
theories, as they suggest that managers tend to report more information voluntarily to 
users in order to reduce asymmetric information and boost the confidence of owners 
about the company’s current and future performance (Uyar et al., 2013). This 
perspective suggests a negative relationship between EM and VDQ (Iatridis & 
Kadorinis, 2009; Katmun, 2012; Lobo & Zhou, 2001; Tariverdi et al., 2012), whereas 
managerial opportunism indicates that company managers may disclose more 
information voluntarily in order to cover their opportunistic behaviour of EM (Li et 
al., 2012). This view is supported by the legitimacy theory, which suggests that 
“actions of individual are strongly linked to their self-interest and each individual will 
increase their wealth by behaving in an opportunistic manner” (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). This perspective suggests a positive association between EM and VDQ 
(Kasznik, 1999; Muttakin et al., 2015; Patten & Trompeter, 2003; Prior et al., 2008). 
According to the different perspectives discussed in EM and voluntary disclosure 
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literature, the current study anticipates that managers of both IBs and NIBs in MENA 
countries apply the long-term perspective, suggesting a negative impact of VDQ on 
EM. 
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Chapter Four: Research Methodology 
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter aims to provide a brief outline of the research methodology used in this 
study. It shows the research philosophy, strategy and approaches adopted to answer 
the research questions, and is organised as follows. Section 4.2 presents the 
hypothesis development. Section 4.3 illuminates the methodology underlying the 
research, while section 4.4 describes the sample and data collection. In sections 4.5 
and 4.6 the study dependent and independent variables' measurements are presented. 
Section 4.7 presents the control variables used in this research. Section 4.8 provides 
the empirical research model to be used in this study, section 4.9 deals with the 
practical research procedures for data analysis and, finally, section 4.10 summarises 
the chapter. 
4.2 Hypothesis Development  
This section discusses the study hypothesis development with the aim of addressing 
three main research questions. To obtain the first objective, the following research 
question is as follows: 
Q1: Is there any difference in EM practices between IBs and NIBs? 
Signalling theory suggests that bank managers used LLPs as a signalling device to 
communicate their private information to shareholders and to give a signal about their 
financial strength (Ahmed et al., 1999; Beaver et al., 1989; Beaver & Engel, 1996; 
Wahlen, 1994). This theory illustrates that bank managers raise LLPs to signal good 
news about a banks’ future earnings. Specifically, high LLPs may convey a signal of 
confidence and conservatism (Ahmed & Courtis, 1999). Banks with low performance 
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may engage in EM through decreasing LLPs in order to increase their earnings. This, 
in turn, will minimise the possibility of being audited by regulatory agencies and 
increase the management compensation, as it is often based on disclosed earnings. 
These arguments suggest that bank managers might signal false information regarding 
increased / decreased LLPs in order to meet their target (Ashraf et al., 2014; Ahmed et 
al., 1999). 
 
However, EM practice is considered as an opportunistic behaviour of managers to 
mislead shareholders and influence the contractual outcomes (Healy & Wahlen, 1999; 
Siregar & Utama, 2008). This opportunistic behaviour is prohibited and immoral in 
IBs, and is condemned by Islam (Hamdi & Zarai, 2013). In this sense, Shari'ah law 
establishes the ethical codes for appropriate behaviour and conduct in order to ensure 
fairness (Hamdi and Zarai, 2013), whereas opportunistic behaviour may be more 
likely in NIBs (Missman and Ahmed 2011). However, managers of institutions with 
religious affiliation usually follow certain socially acceptable norms, which are 
related to anti-manipulative behaviour. Thus, religion is seen as an institutionalised 
mechanism of control that influences individual and corporate attitudes (Dyreng et al., 
2012). A study by McGuire et al., (2011) stated that there is a considerable 
relationship between companies with religious affiliation and lower irregularities in 
financial reporting. They are also less likely to engage in EM or grant excessive 
compensation packages to their managers. Moreover, McCullough and Willoughby 
(2009) and Vitell (2009) discovered that managers who have strong religious values 
are more likely to refuse business decisions that are morally questionable.  
More importantly, Taktak et al. (2010), and Farouk et al. (2012), illustrate that IBs 
and NIBs follow different provisioning practices. The AAOIFI standard that is 
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employed by most IBs demands the utilisation of dynamic provisioning. This is a 
macro-prudential instrument applied to minimise the procyclicality of IBs’ default 
(Ben Othman et al., 2014). This dynamic provisioning principle is based on long-run 
anticipated yearly losses, which is made each financial year. The AAOIFI’s standard 
(11) identifies provisions as “setting aside certain amount from income as expenses to 
revaluate receivables, financing and investment assets”. The AAOIFI’s standard (11) 
calls for the recognition of both specific and general provisions. The specific 
provisions are recorded when the bank’s assets are impaired to reduce its amount to 
its net realisable value, whereas, general provisions in IBs are recognised to cover 
potential losses that are related to bank assets. These features of provisioning policy, 
which are applied by IBs, are more developed compared to NIBs, as it takes into 
account both the actual and expected future losses (Ben Othman et al., 2014; 
Quttainah, 2011).  
Additionally, IBs must adhere to Islamic Law (Shari’ah), which provides the religious 
guidelines that are considered as the primary source of ethical behaviour for Islamic 
banks. Beside the Shari’ah and AAOIFI standards, IBs are monitored by another 
supervisory board beyond the general monitoring system for all banks, which is the 
Shari’ah Supervisory Board (SSB). This SSB works as a further tier of the 
governance system (Ashraf et al., 2014). EM literature on IBs suggests that IBs may 
show lower signs of EM, because they are subjected to Shari’ah Supervisory Boards 
(SSB), which do not apply to NIBs (e.g. Ashraf et al., 2014; Missman and Ahmed 
2011). Therefore, adhering to all these obligations may mitigate the level of risk 
taking and prevent managers from manipulating earnings. Thus, we expect that 
managers of IBs are less involved in EM practices compared with their competitors, 
the NIBs, due to the moral and ethical values that Islamic law Shari’ah places upon 
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them. Accordingly, this study hypothesises that: 
H1: EM practice differs among IBs and NIBs, and it is expected to be 
lower in IBs compared to NIBs.  
The second objective of this study is to investigate VDQ in both IBs and NIBs in 
MENA countries. To achieve the second objective, the following question is 
employed:  
Q2: Is there any difference in terms of VDQ between IBs and NIBs?  
Management disclosure decisions rely on several factors, such as disclosure related 
costs, proprietary costs (Ali et al., 1994; Verrecchia, 1983) information asymmetries 
(Hughes, 1989) and agency costs (Wei & Chunyan, 2010). Corporate disclosure is 
considered as an important control mechanism that makes capital markets more 
efficient and protects shareholders (Chakroun & Hussainey, 2014). The most 
influential factors, which enable investors to make the right decision are the relevant, 
accurate and appropriately disclosed information. Enhanced disclosure quality plays a 
crucial part in reducing asymmetric information and lowering its capital cost, because 
greater transparency improves the stock market's liquidity and decreases costs of 
transactions for the company's stock (Chakroun & Hussainey, 2014; Francis et al., 
2008; Leuz & Verrecchia, 2000).   
The underlying premise of the agency relationship is the assumption that both agent 
and principal are opportunistically inclined and have the sole intention of maximising 
their self-interest. This theory concentrates on resolving the conflict of interest that 
may occur in an agency relationship. This occurs because the agents have full access 
to the information in the company, while the principal, who is funding the company, 
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has limited access to this information compared to the agent. From the agency theory 
perspective, bank managers are encouraged to report more information voluntarily to 
convince stakeholder's that they are behaving optimally on the stakeholder's behalf. 
Voluntary disclosure is known to be the most appropriate solution in decreasing 
agency costs (Gisbert and Navallas, 2013). Increasing voluntary disclosure could, 
therefore, solve the issue of information asymmetry.  
In addition, signalling theory was advocated as a possible treatment for information 
asymmetry, whereby a party with more information signals to the other party with 
lesser information and thus reduces the information gap (Morris, 1987; Riahi & 
Mounira, 2011). However, due to the information asymmetry issue, bank managers 
are motivated to signal some information to avoid showing the bank is performing 
poorly. Watts and Zimmerman (1978) indicated that managers could lessen or avoid 
the asymmetric information issue through disclosing (signalling) private information 
voluntarily to investors and the market. On the other hand, stakeholder theory 
demonstrates the managers' decisions as to whether or not to report certain 
information voluntarily. This theory indicated that managers would not report more 
information voluntarily if those who demand such information were not considered as 
powerful and influential stakeholders by the organisation (Wagner Mainardes et al., 
2011). 
In the IBs context, Islamic ethical values are in line with the adoption of Islamic law: 
Justice, public interest, accountability and transparency. These ethical values 
theoretically distinguish IBs from NIBs. The Islamic law acts as an internal control 
over IBs, which makes IBs more sensitive towards VDQ and promotes greater 
economic equity compared to their competitors, the NIBs (Maali, et al, 2006). 
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Therefore, IBs are expected to disclose more information voluntarily compared to 
NIBs, as IBs’ activities are in line with the purpose of Islamic law (Aribi & Arun, 
2014; Maali, et al, 2006). 
Islamic institutions that adopt AAOIFI standards disclose more reliable financial and 
non-financial information in order to create confidence among investors (Sarea & 
Hanefah, 2013; Nadzri & Aida, 2009). In addition, the perspective of disclosure in 
IBs is based on both the concept of accountability and the full disclosure. This entails 
disclosing all necessary information regarding their activities to assist expected 
investors and to make sure that these activities are in line with Islamic principles 
(Baydoun & Willett, 2000; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2002; Maali et al., 2006). IBs are 
required to disclose truthful information voluntarily, irrespective of their local 
standards, due to the importance of accountability in Islamic society (Maali et al., 
2003).  
In addition, the ethical values of IBs as well as AAOIFI standards ensure that all 
disclosed information should be reliable and relevant in their annual reports (Hamdi 
and Zarai, 2013; Maali et al., 2006). In this context, Martínez‐Ferrero et al., (2015) 
indicated that ethical firms have incentives to be more conservative and their financial 
reports tends to be of high quality. Additionally, Aribi and Gao (2010) and Anuar et 
al., (2004) provided evidence, which supports the perspective that Islamic law has an 
impact on financial reporting. They found that Islamic institutions report higher level 
of social and environmental information compared to non-Islamic institutions. This 
emphasis that Islamic institutions report credible (high quality) information, which 
embodies the Islamic principles of full disclosure and accountability compared to 
their competitors (Abdul Rahman, 2012; Aribi and Gao 2010). Beside the Islamic 
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ethical values, Shari’ah, AAOIFI standards and the SSB, IBs are required to follow 
the full disclosure concepts and accountability, which are not demanded of NIBs 
(Ashraf et al., 2014). Therefore, adhering to all these obligations, the voluntary 
disclosure quality (VDQ) is expected to be higher in IBs compared to NIBs. 
H2: The VDQ in annual reports differs among IBs and NIBs, and it is 
expected to be greater in IBs compared to NIBs.  
The final objective of the present study, is to investigate whether VDQ affects EM 
practices in IBs and NIBs in MENA countries. The final research question is as 
follows:  
Q3: What is the effect of the VDQ on EM practices in both IBs and NIBs 
in MENA countries?  
Manager’s responsibility is to make useful decisions on behalf of shareholders in 
order to increase the shareholders wealth (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Nevertheless, 
regarding managers’ and shareholders’ separation in an agency relationship, as well 
as the existence of asymmetric information, the possibility of managerial opportunism 
and their self-centered behaviour will be greater (Prior et al., 2008). Thus, managers 
tend to practice EM to maximise their benefits and to disadvantage other stakeholders 
(Healy & Wahlen, 1999). EM is viewed in the literature as a type of agency cost, 
since bank managers attempt to maximise their personal interests through LLPs, 
which does not give an accurate image of the bank’s circumstances (Abdelsalam et 
al., 2016; Prior et al., 2008). On the other hand, corporate disclosure is seen as 
monitoring tool, which assists investors and other stakeholders to reduce the 
information asymmetry issue (Huang & Zhang, 2011). Voluntary disclosure literature 
shows that voluntary disclosure is inversely related to asymmetric information 
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(Brown et al., 2004; Brown & Hillegeist, 2007; Coller & Yohn, 1997; Heflin et al., 
2005; Welker, 1995). In this context, VDQ is considered as important path for banks 
to discharge their accountability, which leads to decrease in asymmetric information 
and raise the confidence of stockholders (An, Davey & Eggleton, 2011).  
Based on the literature, there are two points of view with regards to the association 
between EM and VDQ: these are long-term perspectives and managerial opportunism. 
The long-term perspective indicates that the main concern of firms that provide great 
voluntary disclosure is not only to raise current profits and executives' wealth but also 
to enhance and build a robust future relationship with their stockholders. With this 
regard, Qu et al., (2015) suggested that voluntary disclosure provides stockholders 
and other outside users with credible and relevant information, which, in turn, 
facilitates them to make more accurate and informed decisions. Since the asymmetry 
costs is borne by the company's manager, signalling theory suggests that managers 
will behave in a responsible manner when voluntarily signalling truthful information. 
The long-term perspective is consistent with the EM and voluntary disclosure 
literature (Hunton et al., 2006; Iatridis & Kadorinis, 2009; Katmun, 2012; Lobo & 
Zhou, 2001; Tariverdi et al., 2012), which indicated that voluntary disclosure is 
negatively linked to EM behaviour.  
From another viewpoint, the perspective of managerial opportunism suggests that 
company managers may disclose more information voluntarily in order to lid their 
opportunistic behaviour of EM (Li et al., 2012). This perspective is in line with the 
legitimacy theory, which suggests that “actions of individual are strongly linked to 
their self-interest and each individual will increase their wealth by behaving in an 
opportunistic manner” (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In this regard, managers employ 
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poor voluntary disclosure as an important tool to cover their opportunistic behaviour 
and to protect themselves against any possible reaction and attention from 
stockholders. This argument is supported by Martínez-Ferrero, et al., (2015) and 
Francis et al., (2008), who indicated that the relationship between EM and VDQ could 
be substitutive in the sense that firms might report poor- quality voluntary disclosure 
as a mechanism of legitimacy to substitute the lack of good VDQ. The perspective of 
managerial opportunism is consistent with several studies (Kasznik, 1999; Muttakin et 
al., 2015; Patten & Trompeter, 2003; Prior et al., 2008), which indicated that 
voluntary disclosure is positively related to EM behaviour. 
In this regard, both agency and signaling theories suggest that managers tend to report 
more information voluntarily to concerned groups in order to reduce asymmetric 
information and boost the confidence of owners about the company’s current and 
future performance (Uyar et al., 2013). In the same vein, firms that report high VDQ 
tend to be more conservative in their accounting and less inclined to carry out 
unethical practices (EM) (Eng & Mak, 2003; Lang & Lundholm, 2000; Martínez‐
Ferrero et al., 2015). This research expects a negative association between VDQ and 
EM practices in both IBs and NIBs in MENA countries. The following hypothesis is 
developed:  
H3: There is a negative relationship between VDQ and EM practices.  
4.3 Research Methodology  
The terms ‘‘method’’ and ‘‘methodology” are often confusing (Mingers, 2001, p. 
242). ‘Methodology’ is defined as the “overall approach to the research process, from 
the theoretical underpinning to the collection and analysis of the data” (Collis and 
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Hussey 2013, p. 55), while Saunders et al., (2007, p. 2) have explained the 
methodology as “the theory of how research should be undertaken”. Silverman (2006) 
indicated that methodology is related to the case study selected made by the 
researcher, data collection methods and procedures of the data analysis etc. Fisher 
(2010) described research methodology as a study of methods that raises 
philosophical questions about what the researchers want to know, and how valid their 
assertions about knowledge might be. In this context, the main point of methodology 
can be described as how a particular problem can be studied (Eriksson & Kovalainen, 
2008).   
On the other hand, Hussey and Hussey, (1997, p. 54) describe the term ‘methods’ as 
the procedures of how data can be gathered and analysed. Moreover, Silverman 
(2006, p. 15) describes ‘methods’ as particular research techniques that contain 
quantitative and qualitative methods like (statistical correlation and interviewing and 
audio recording). The phrase “methods” can be defined as techniques and instruments 
employed in order to achieve and analyse the data of the study (Saunders, 2003, p. 2). 
In addition, Jankowicz (2000, p. 209) argues that method should be systematic and 
orderly in relation to data collection and analysis, in order to obtain useful 
information from the research data. In this regard, both phrases, “methodology” and 
“method”, are often used to refer to different meanings or interchangeably by some 
scholars (Collis & Hussey, 2013; Hussey & Hussey, 1997). It may, therefore, be 
difficult to accurately determine boundaries between methodology and method 
(Mingers, 2001, p. 242).  
In regards to the research methodology context, a positivist or interpretivist paradigm 
can be employed in order to achieve the study aims and objectives. Thus, choosing an 
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appropriate research methodology relies on the research assumption and the nature of 
the study that is conducted by the researcher. Punch (2013) suggested that an 
appropriate research approach has to be established to examine a particular study's 
issues. Prior literature (Babbie, 2015; Berg et al., 2004; Burns, 2000; Collis & 
Hussey, 2013b; Kumar, 2005; Punch, 2013) shows that there are two kinds of 
approach, which are the qualitative “interpretivism” and quantitative “positivism” 
approaches. Berg et al., (2004) proposed that the qualitative approach is a ‘non-
numeric descriptive method’ for collecting related data to assist in realising the 
phenomenon. Babbie (2015) argued that the qualitative approach is extremely 
beneficial for studying slight nuances in both behaviour and attitude, and is a flexible 
way to examine changes in social processes over time. However, the qualitative 
method has disadvantages, which are as follows: (1) it will not explain the whole 
population (study sample) and mostly uses a small sample size (Hakim, 1987) (2) Its 
absence of reliability and transparency (Berg et al., 2004) makes it impossible to 
generalise its results. (3) It might not be efficient in obtaining satisfactory 
explanations since it is very time-consuming (Berg et al., 2004).  
On the other hand, quantitative analysis covers several statistical analysis forms, 
which improve the accuracy and reliability during the measurement of research 
variables, but also, the ability to generalise the research findings (Berg et al., 2004; 
Bryman, 2015; Collis & Hussey, 2013). In addition, Berg et al., (2004) stated that 
using the quantitative method would enhance the generalisability of the study results 
by employing a longer period and larger sample size. It is also able to produce 
causality statements, through the use of controlled experiments.  
The current research adopts the positivist’s approach as it is not only considered an 
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appropriate method for the establishment of the study’s hypotheses, but also enables 
the researcher to evaluate the outcomes without personal value judgments. Qualitative 
research is considered inappropriate for the current study. This is due to the 
difficulties of gathering the study data through interviews with different banks in 
different countries, and the possibility of getting a low rate of response from these 
banks, which will hinder the accuracy and generalisation of the study’s findings. 
Correspondingly, the positivism “quantitative” approach seeks to explore the EM 
practices in both IBs and NIBs. In the study design, the causal relationship between 
EM practices and VDQ, in both IBs and NIBs that are listed in MENA countries, is 
explored. These MENA countries have been chosen in order to enhance the 
observation and causality analysis. Therefore, the deductive method is considered 
more suitable for the current research. This method starts with a general premise then 
builds to a more specific one based on the empirical evidences (Collis & Hussey, 
2013).  
4.4 Sample and Data Collection  
In this section, the sample size and data collection method, which is used for the 
purpose of this study, will be discussed.  
4.4.1 Sample Size  
In this study, the whole population of all 149 listed IBs and NIBs in MENA countries 
over a 10-year period (from 2006 to 2015) is used as the initial sample size to ensure 
full representation. MENA consists of 20 countries (The World Bank Group, 2013). 
Due to the exclusion of banks established after 2006 and missing data, this study used 
the final sample of 106 (see table 4.1). 
  
 
92 
Table 4. 1 Sample Size 
 
IBs NIBs Total Percentage 
Initial sample 42 107 149 %100 
Excluded:. . . ... . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . .   
Banks established after 2006  (8) (4) (12) %8 
Missing annual reports  (5) (26) (31) %21 
Final sample  29 77 106 %71 
 
Source: Bank Focus and OSIRIS databases. 
 
 
The study adopted a 10-year period to ensure adequate and consistent observation. 
The study started from 2006 because of the limited number of IBs founded before that 
year, and also because of the adoption of IFRS by IBs in 2006 (Elnahass et al., 2014). 
The reason for choosing MENA is that $1.3 trillion of worldwide assets are owned by 
IBs, and the majority of developed IBs are found in MENA countries (Nazim & 
Bennie, 2012). In addition, both IBs and NIBs in MENA countries adopt the same 
accounting standards; this allows the researcher to outline a comparative study 
between them (Maha & Hakim, 2013). Table 4.2 illustrates the banks’ specialisation 
by countries. The countries for which data are not available are excluded, for example 
Algeria, Djibouti, and Libya. This left a final sample of 29 IBs and 77 NIBs from 17 
MENA countries. United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Jordan registered the highest 
percentage of banks' numbers listed in their market overall in the study sample; 17% 
12%, and 11% respectively. Yemen, Iraq, Iran, and Lebanon, represent the lowest 
portion of banks' number listed in their market with 1%, 2%, 2%, and 2% 
respectively. On the other hand, Bahrain represents the highest percentage of IBs (8) 
listed in their market. Additionally, all IBs in the study sample apply the AAOIFI 
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standards except for four banks, which employ the IFRS instead (see table 4.2). 
Furthermore, figure 4.1 shows the regulatory frameworks for both IBs and NIBs 
which operate in the MENA region.  
Table 4. 2 Banks’ Specialisation by Countries  
No Country  
IBs NIBs Total number 
of banks 
%  
No Accounting standard  No Accounting standard  
1 Algeria 0  0  0 %0.00 
2 Bahrain 8 AAOIFI 5 IFRS 13 %12.3 
3 Djibouti 0  0  0 %0.00 
4 Egypt 1 AAOIFI 4 IFRS 5 %4.7 
5 Iraq 0  2 IFRS 2 %1.9 
6 Iran 2 AAOIFI 0  2 %1.9 
7 Israel 0  3 IFRS 3 %2.8 
8 Jordan 2 AAOIFI 10 IFRS 12 %11.3 
9 Kuwait 4 AAOIFI 4 IFRS 8 %7.6 
10 Lebanon 0  2 IFRS 2 %1.9 
11 Libya 0  0  0 %0.00 
12 Morocco 0  4 IFRS 4 %3.7 
13 Oman 0  4 IFRS 4 %3.7 
14 Qatar 1 AAOIFI 5 IFRS 6 %5.7 
15 Saudi Arabia 4 2 IFRS / 2 AAOIFI 5 IFRS 9 %8.5 
16 Syria 0  6 IFRS 6 %5.7 
17 Tunisia 0  7 IFRS 7 %6.6 
18 UEA 4 2 IFRS / 2 AAOIFI 14 IFRS 18 %17 
19 West Bank and Gaza 2 AAOIFI 2 IFRS 4 %3.7 
20 Yemen 1 IFRS 0  1 %1 
Total 29 77 106 %100 
AAOIFI= Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions, IFRS= International Financial Reporting Standard. 
 
 
Source: Bank Focus and OSIRIS databases. 
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Figure 4. 1 Regulatory Framework in IBs and NIBs 
 
 
 
Source: The researcher's development 
 
4.4.2 Data Collection  
To explore the current context, this study requires both quantitative and qualitative 
data. This is because quantitative data is related to EM, whereas qualitative data is 
connected to VDQ. This study uses secondary data based on banks’ annual reports for 
the qualitative data because it provides the most comprehensive, pertinent data on an 
annual basis. Moreover, annual reports are considered to be a major source of 
voluntary disclosure to users (Neu et al., 1998). EM data was collected from the Orbis 
Bank Focus database, OSIRIS database and Bloomberg database.  
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4.5. Measurement of Dependent Variable (EM) 
The current study has employed two-stage model and modified Jones model in 
accordance with the empirical work of Kanagaretnam et al., (2004) and Yasuda et al., 
(2004),  respectively to measure EM. The former is employed as a major model while 
the latter is used as an alternative model to capture EM. In general, these models are 
the most suitable models for capturing the value of discretionary accruals in the 
banking industry (Abdelsalam et al., 2016; Elnahass et al., 2014; Kwak et al., 2009). 
The justifications of choosing these models, among all measurements models 
mentioned in EM literature, are as follows:  
1. Adopting more than one method to measure the EM will ensure the robustness 
and validity of the study results (Beattie et al., 2004).  
2. These models enable the researchers to differentiate between discretionary 
accruals (DLLPs) and non-discretionary accruals (NDLLPs). 
3. Employing the two-stage model will provide valid evidence of EM practices 
in both IBs and NIBs (Elnahass et al., 2014), because the main variable in this 
model is LLPs, which represents the largest portion of accruals in the banking 
industry (Beatty et al., 2002; Lobo & Zhou, 2001). They play a major role in 
the manager's decision with regards to accounting manipulation (Beaver & 
Engel, 1996), provide more direct evidence of EM (Beatty et al., 2002; Lobo 
& Zhou, 2001), and increase the reliability of the empirical analyses 
(Kanagaretnam et al., 2010).  
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4.5.1 Two-stage Model  
The two-stage model of Kanagaretnam et al., (2004) works with variables that explain 
the non-discretionary behaviour of LLPs, which is estimated in the first stage. The 
non-discretionary element of LLPs is a part of total accruals, which is detectable, 
through changes in a bank’s business situation, due to the impossibility of capturing 
NDLLPs directly. The estimation is achievable using variables that reflect the level of 
loan loss portfolio. In a similar manner, Kanagaretnam et al., (2004) and Kwal et al., 
(2009) have estimated the element of NDLLPs through a set of informational 
variables. These informational variables include changes in non-performing loans, 
total loans and non-performing loans. NDLLP is estimated using equation (1) and was 
evaluated using the predicted coefficient (β0 β1 β2 β3) from equation (1). The 
DLLPs, however, are made up of the LLPs’ estimation error predicted through the 
residual gained from equation (1).  
The final step is to calculate the DLLPs through the difference between total LLPs 
and the estimated NDLLP. Beatty et al., (2002) and Grougiou et al., (2014) indicated 
that the DLLP is relevant for decisions about the possibility of over-estimation of 
earnings through underestimation of LLPs. In this manner, the DLLPs constitute 
measurements of, what is pointed out by EM literature on non-financial companies as, 
“abnormal accruals”. Thus, DLLP represents EM (Grougiou et al., 2014).  
Empirical Two-stage Model  
LLPsit = β0 + β1 NPLit-1+ β2 ∆ NPLit+ β3 ∆ TLit+ εit            (1)  
NDLLPit = β0ˆ+ β1ˆ NPLit -1 + β2ˆ ∆NPLit + β3ˆ ∆TLit         (2)  
DLLPit = LLPit – NDLLPit.                                                    (3)  
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Where:  
LLPsit = Total loan loss provisions for bank i at the year t, divided by beginning total 
loans. 
NPLit-1 = the beginning balance of non-performing loan for bank i at the year t divided 
by beginning total loans.  
∆ NPLit = Change in the value of non-performing loan for bank i at the year t, divided 
by beginning total loans.  
∆ TLit = Change in the value of total loan, for bank i at the year t, divided by 
beginning total loans.  
NDLLPit = Non-discretionary loan loss provisions, for bank i at the year t.  
DLLPit = Discretionary loan loss provisions, for bank i at the year t.  
4.5.2 Modified Jones Model  
This research uses the Jones model (1991) that was modified by Yasuda et al., (2004) 
for financial sectors, as an alternative model to measure EM. Following Yasuda et al. 
(2004) and Abdelsalam et al., (2016) this research describes total accruals (TAC) as 
the difference between net income and operation cash flows.  
TACit = NIit – OCFit 
 
Following EM studies (Abdelsalam et al., 2016; DeFond & Jiambalvo, 1994; 
Subramanyam, 1996; Yasuda et al., 2004), the current study employed cross-sectional 
variations of the adjusted Jones model. The cross-sectional variation is estimated 
using data from banks matched by year, which controls the influence of the year and 
type of industry classification. Yasuda et al., (2004) suggest that the non-discretionary 
accruals are captured through the changes in bank business conditions (operating 
  
 
98 
income) and non-discretionary depreciation expense of premises and equipment. 
Therefore, in order to achieve the discretionary portion from the total accruals for 
both IBs and NIBs, the residual from equation (A) is indicated as the discretionary 
accrual portion (DA) of total accruals, which relies on management discretion. This 
portion of DA is the primary variable of interest in this research. To reduce 
heteroscedasticity, all variables in this equation are divided by lagged total assets 
(Abdelsalam et al., 2016; Yasuda et al., 2004).  
(TACit  / TA t-1) =  β0  (1 / TA t-1) + β1 (∆ OIit / TA t-1) + β2  ( BPEit / TA t-1 ) + εit         (A) 
Where:  
TAC = is the total accruals that estimated from the difference between net income and 
operation cash flows.  
TA= Total assets. 
∆ OI= Change in operating income between t-1 to t.  
BPE= Bank’s premises and equipment.  
4.6 Measurement of Independent Variable VDQ 
Empirical studies have used several methods to measure VDQ. For instance, AIMR 
rating, which is available only for specific firms in the US, was used by Lobo and 
Zhau (2001) as proxy for VDQ, while other research focussed on disclosure indices 
that measures only the level of information disclosed without paying attention to the 
richness of these information (Al-Janadi et al., 2013; Alotaibi & Hussainey, 2016; 
Alturki, 2015; Habbash et al., 2016; Lapointe-Antunes et al., 2006). In addition, 
voluntary disclosure empirical researches, which specialise on the quality of 
disclosure measurements, have provided general frameworks, which are applicable to 
several types of information (e.g. Anis, Fraser & Hussainey, 2012; Beattie, McInnes 
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& Fearnley, 2004; Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004; Beretta & Bozzolan, 2008; Braam & 
van Beest, 2013). These frameworks were based on the dimension of quantity and 
other several dimensions such as spread, financial orientation, time orientation, 
quantitative orientation, economic sign, coverage and dispersion of information. 
However, Beretta & Bozzolan (2008) argued that disclosure quality is not only linked 
to the level of information disclosed but also to what is disclosed and the variety of 
topics disclosed. Additionally, Botosan (2004) argued that the notion of VDQ should 
be based on the conceptual frameworks created by the standard setters (FASB and 
IASB). This reflects a generally accepted interpretation of disclosure quality, and lead 
to high quality information that is useful for decision-making (IFRS, 2010).  
Consequently, the current study measure differs from existing measures because it 
takes into account the recommendations of both Beretta & Bozzolan (2008) and 
Botosan (2004). It does this by developing a comprehensive framework that considers 
both the quantity and richness of disclosed information, with a focus on satisfying the 
conceptual frameworks of both FASB 21  and IASB 22  when measuring VDQ. The 
quantity dimension provides users with the relative amount of information disclosed 
voluntarily (how much is disclosed). However, the richness dimension consists of two 
sub-dimensions, which are the width and depth. The width of disclosure considers the 
topics included in the disclosure index for the classification and identification of 
disclosure items. The width captures the coverage and concentration of disclosed 
information. This sub-dimension offers investors more general overview of the 
business alongside its aim to focus on relevant issues. On the other hand, the sub-
dimension of depth takes into account the information usefulness to users as defined 
                                                        
21 - FASB requirements: A) identifies the aspects of the company’s business that are especially important to the company’s success. These are the 
critical success factors for the company. B) Identify management’s strategies and plans for managing those critical success factors in the past and 
going forward. (Width means that the wider and variety of topics disclosed the better).  
22 IASB frameworks (understandability, relevance, reliability, comparability and timelines). 
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in the conceptual framework of the IASB (2010). For information to be useful, it must 
be relevant, understandable, comparable and faithfully represent what it purports to 
represent (IASB, 2010). Figure 4.1 illustrates the dimensions utilized in the 
framework.  As a result, two different disclosure indices were used in this frame to 
measure VDQ. The first index is utilised to measure the main quantity dimension and 
the sub-dimension of width (see appendix 4.1), whereas the second index is used to 
measure the sub-dimension of depth (see appendix 4.2).  
 
Figure 4. 2 Measurement Framework of Voluntary Disclosure Quality.  
 
Source: The researcher's development 
 
Following voluntary disclosure literature, the present study adopted both content 
analysis and disclosure index methods to capture VDQ (e.g. Aljifri, 2007; Alotaibi & 
Hussainey, 2016; Aribi & Gao, 2010; Beattie et al., 2004; Braam & van Beest, 2013; 
Measurement framework of VDQ 
Quantity Dimension 
Richness Dimension 
Width 
Coverage Concentration 
Depth 
1. Relevance 
2. Faithful representation 
3. Understandability 
4. Comparability, and  
5. Timelines. 
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Grassa et al., 2017; Hassan & Syafri Harahap, 2010; Aribi & Gao, 2011; Mathuva, 
2012; Menicucci, 2013; Salama, 2009; Weber, 1990). These methods are used widely 
in voluntary disclosure literature as a powerful instrument for analysing corporate 
disclosures, they allow both qualitative and quantitative analyses, and they are simple 
to apply (Aribi & Gao, 2011). They give the researcher another point of view from 
which to analyse the content, and thus provide beneficial historical insights (Aribi & 
Gao, 2010). They also consider the main aspect of VDQ while concentrating on texts 
(Hussainey et al., 2011; Mathuva, 2012). Content analysis is a replicable and 
systematic method that allows researchers to codify many words of text into a low 
number of content groups, based on clear principles of coding (Stemler, 2001; Weber, 
1990). Content analysis and disclosure index techniques require employing several 
steps in order to measure VDQ (Krippendorff, 1980; Wolfe, 1991). These steps are as 
follows:  
1. Choice of Document(s) to be Analysed: 
The choice of document(s) which should be analysed is considered an essential phase 
(Krippendorff, 1980). The current study uses a secondary data based on banks’ annual 
reports for the qualitative data because, not only are they providing the most 
comprehensive pertinent data on an annual basis (Abd-Elsalam, 1999), but they are 
also considered to be a major source of voluntary disclosure to users (Abd-Elsalam, 
1999; Aribi & Gao, 2010; Aribi & Gao, 2011; Maali et al., 2006; Neu et al., 1998). 
Furthermore, banks’ annual reports are publicly published as a response to the 
requirements stated by regulatory bodies (Stanton & Stanton, 2002). However, the 
present study analysed the narrative sections that are related only to voluntary 
disclosure in each bank's annual reports. 
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2. Selection of Disclosure Indexes Categories and Items  
A study by Urquiza et al., (2009) states that there is no common theory or consensus 
regarding the categories and items that should be selected to investigate the level of 
disclosure. Furthermore, Hossain & Hammami, (2009) indicate that how disclosure 
items are selected may be based on a subjective judgment. It relies on the context and 
the nature of the industry and country context. Thus, the main disclosure categories 
and items were chosen based on VDQ literature (Abd-Elsalam, 1999; Aribi & Gao, 
2010; Aribi & Gao, 2011; Maali et al., 2006; Menicucci, 2013; Neu et al., 1998). 
 
3. Selection of Recorded Units 
The second phase is required to employ a selection of recorded units, which refers to 
“certain part of content that has the characteristic of being placed into a certain 
category” (Holsti, 1969, p. 116).  Haniffa et al., (2005) and Khan, (2010) have 
indicated that the selection of recording units and categories are considered to be a 
vital part of this approach. Additionally, Unerman (2000) states that content analysis 
is required to employ a selection of recorded units: these include words, sentences, 
numbers of lines, pages, or a mix of these units. The current study has selected words 
as a recording unit in order to measure the VDQ. The justification of using words as a 
recording unit is as follows: 
1 Words are considered to be the smallest recording unit and the most robust 
method of assessing the VDQ (Campbell, 2004; Zeghal & Ahmed, 1990).   
2 Using words as a recording unit will increase the reliability of content analysis 
(Aribi & Gao, 2010). 
3 Utilising words as a recording unit enables researchers to record the volume of 
quality disclosure in more detail (Deegan & Gordon, 1996).  
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4. Checking the Validity and Reliability  
This study applied the method used by Botosan (1997) in order to validate the study's 
categories and items and to ensure that this study covered most of the items used in 
VDQ literature. Since MENA countries have not developed a specific set of financial 
reporting standards, banks in the MENA region follow the IFRSs. Therefore, all 
banks in MENA countries are committed to employing IFRS 7, which requires 
disclosure of the information to the market (Abdallah et al., 2015). However, the 
voluntary disclosure might vary across IBs and NIBs, because the majority of IBs 
employed AAOIFI standards due to differences in their regulatory frameworks. 
Therefore, the current study develops a valid and reliable comprehensive framework 
that measures both the quantity and the richness of information disclosed voluntarily 
which is applicable to both IBs and NIBs. The following points are used to validate 
the disclosure items: 
1. Reviewing related studies that used content analysis to measure VDQ. 
2. Reading a random sample of 20 banks’ annual reports (10 related to IBs and 
10 for NIBs). 
3. Creating an initial list of disclosure items. 
4. Some modifications being made to the initial list based on: 
 Eliminating compulsory items and elements that are formally required 
by AAOIFI to ensure only VDQ items remain (AAOIFI, 2010).  
 Adding other VDQ items from other studies (Hassanein & Hussainey, 
2015; Wang & Hussainey, 2013).  
 Reviewing the index with four specialised academics in the area of 
accounting disclosure and with two professional bank analysts to 
enhance the index. 
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According to Krippendorff, (1980) and Weber, (1990) the reliability of VDQ items 
should be assessed to avoid the ambiguity of meanings of the words. Two kinds of 
reliability should be evaluated: stability and reproducibility. When the same 
researcher codes a particular unit more than once, stability can be assured and will 
ensure ‘stable result of content classification over the time’. Furthermore, 
reproducibility can be ensured by coding the same unit more than once by more than 
one researcher, meaning "results should be the same." The following steps have been 
adopted to secure reliability: 
1. Preparing a set of specified and accurate coding tools to reduce contrast and 
achieve objectivity (Aribi & Gao, 2010). 
2. In the assessment of the reproducibility, four financial annual reports have 
been examined by several coders to guarantee that all coders adopt the same 
coding procedures, and to ensure the differences between coders are few and 
are then resolved (Aribi & Gao, 2010; Hussainey, 2004).  
3. The results were compared to identify possible disagreements to ensure 
consistency and to assess reliability. 
 
 
5. Manual and Computerised Techniques  
Empirical VDQ studies (Beattie et al., 2002a; Hussainey et al., 2003; Kothari et al., 
2009) indicated that there are different ways, which can be used in order to conduct 
VDQ, including: manual technique, computerised technique or both techniques 
(manual and automatic). Since these two techniques are widely used in voluntary 
disclosure studies (Grassa et al., 2017; Hussainey et al., 2003; La Rosa & Liberatore, 
2014; Merkley, 2013; Zeghal et al., 2007), the present study utilised both 
computerised and manual techniques in order to measure VDQ. QSR NVivo software 
is used in the current study to manage, classify and make sense of unstructured 
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information for the quantity index, while the manual technique is used for the depth 
index. The justifications for using both computerised and manual content analysis are 
as follows: 
1. Computerised content analysis is considered to be more flexible and it is 
extremely cost-effective compared to manual content analysis (Deumes, 2008)  
2. Employing the manual content analysis technique allows the quantitative 
assessment of achieving reliability and validity, which could better evaluate 
the meaning of phrases and words within the context (Beattie et al., 2004; 
Linsley & Shrives, 2006).  
3. Computerised content analysis allows the researcher to identify keywords, 
analyse data, and develop meaningful conclusions about the text (Abed, 2010).  
 
6. Steps for Measuring Each Dimension used in the Frame 
a. Quantity Dimension: 
The quantity dimension is measured through a number of disclosure items that are 
adjusted for size and type of industry. Beattie et al., (2001; 2002a; 2002b; 2004) 
proposed that a good proxy of disclosure quantity can be obtained from the 
standardised residuals of an “ordinary least squares (OLS) regression” where size 
and type of industry are employed as independent variables. According to Ahmed & 
Courtis (1999); Cooke (1989; 1992) and Beretta & Bozzolan (2008) pointed out that 
size and type of industry have a significant effect on disclosure quantity. The 
following is the standardised STRQI equation: 
STRQIit =    1 −  
𝐦𝐚𝐱 𝐑𝐐𝐈𝐢𝐭 −  𝐑𝐐𝐈𝐢𝐭
𝐦𝐚𝐱 𝐑𝐐𝐈𝐢𝐭 −  𝐦𝐢𝐧 𝐑𝐐𝐈𝐢𝐭
     
Where: 
STRQIit = standardised relative quantity index for the company i at year t. 
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RQIit = is the relative quantity index, which is the residual for the company i at year t 
that obtained after controlling the bank size and type.  
 
b. Richness Dimension (RICH): 
Following Beretta and Bozzolan, (2008) the current study measures the richness 
dimension by combining both width (WID) and depth (DEP) of voluntary disclosure.  
1. Width (WID): 
WID relies on both coverage (COV) and concentration (CON) of voluntary disclosure 
across different items in the disclosure index.  
A. COV is the ratio of the number of items that are disclosed for the bank i in 
year t over the total number of disclosure items “does the bank distribute 
wider information?” This part of the frame focuses on whether the bank 
discloses information at least once on each of the items included in the index. 
The quality of voluntary disclosure is considered high when the COV is great. 
The following is the COV equation: 
 
a) COV =  
1
NI
 ∑ INF𝑁𝐼𝑗=1  
Where:  
INF = a dummy variable that equals 1 if bank i discloses information about the item j 
in the annual report, and 0 otherwise.  
NI = total number of disclosure index items.  
J= disclosure item. 
 
B. The concentration (CON) is a ratio of the focus of disclosed information 
among disclosure index items “the dispersion of information on items 
disclosed”. The lowest value of CON is 0 when disclosed information is 
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located in one item of the disclosure index. On the other hand, the greater the 
value of CON the higher the spread of information disclosed among the index 
items. Thus, the quality of voluntary disclosure is considered to be high when 
the value of CON is great and vice versa. Therefore, the CON is measured as 
follows:  
 
b)  CON =  1 − ∑  𝑛 𝑗=1   Pj
2 
Where: 
Pj = ratio of disclosed item i.  
J= disclosure item. 
 
The width is the mean of both COV and CON, which is measured as follows: 
WID =  
1
2
 (COV + CON) 
 
2. Depth:  
Following empirical voluntary disclosure studies (e.g. Alotaibi & Hussainey, 2016; 
Botosan, 2004; Chakroun & Hussainey, 2014; Van Beest et al., 2009), the current 
study utilised multiple items, which are related to the concept of qualitative 
characteristics of accounting information “faithful representation, relevance, 
comparability, timeliness and understandability” in order to measure the depth of 
voluntary disclosure. Rating scales with five points were used to evaluate each item’s 
scores, except for timeliness, where the natural logarithm was employed in the 
measurement of timeliness of the number of days between the year-end and the 
auditors’ signature on the report post year-end calculation (see appendix 4.2). The 
following is the equation of depth:  
Depth=  
1
I
 ∑ (QCS
𝐼
𝑗=1
/5) 
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Where: 
QCS = Qualitative characteristics (faithful representation, relevance, 
comparability, timeliness and understandability) score between 1 and 5 if bank i 
discloses information about the qualitative characteristics item j in the annual report. 
I = total number of qualitative characteristics index items.  
J= disclosure item. 
Richness (RICH) is the average value of both WID and depth: 
                                                    RICH  =  
1
2
 (WID + DEP) 
 
Finally, the overall voluntary disclosure quality is the average of RICH and the 
STRQI.  
   The Quality Index i = 
1
2
 (STRQIi + RICHi) 
 
7. Validity of the Multidimensional Framework 
Based on IASB, the purpose of VDQ is to provide outsiders with a better 
understanding of the information contained in the annual reports (Board, 2010; 
Council, 2007), and thus reduce information asymmetry problems. Disclosing high 
quality information raises the company's value and lessens the uncertainty regarding 
the firm’s performance, and thus assists investors to make a better valuation of a firm 
(Al-Maghzom et al., 2016; Beyer et al., 2010; Elzahar et al., 2015; Leuz & Wysocki, 
2008). VDQ literature has indicated a positive and significant association between 
high VDQ and capital market reaction on the information disclosed by the company 
(Cahan et al., 2016; Jiao, 2011; Nekhili et al., 2017). As a result, the current study 
argues that information disclosed by both IBs and NIBs is considered to be high 
quality when it is positively linked to market reaction and vice versa. In order to 
validate the VDQ framework, the current study investigate the relationship between 
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VDQ and market reaction, after controlling for factors that might affect information 
disclosure such as size, leverage, profitability, growth and liquidity (Ahmed & 
Courtis, 1999). Following prior literature (Battaglia & Gallo, 2015; Sharma at al., 
2016; Zaki et al., 2014), this study employs the market-based value (MBV) as an 
indicator for market reaction, which is measured by using the aggregate of both 
Tobin’s Q and earnings per-share. The former is measured as the market value of 
equity to book value of equity, whereas, earnings per-share is measured as net income 
to outstanding ordinary shares23. 
4.7. Measurement of Control Variables 
This research has applied a number of control variables in order to be consistent with 
the EM and VDQ literature and to control for other possible factors that might affect 
both EM and VDQ. The control variables are divided into bank characteristics and 
corporate governance. The control variables are summarised as follows: 
4.7.1 Independence of the Board 
Corporate governance and EM literature notes that the independence of board 
members is positively correlated with the effectiveness of the company’s governance, 
and there is a negative association with regards to discretionary accruals and fraud 
(Abdelsalam et al., 2008; Beasley, 1996; Bradbury et al., 2006; Dimitropoulos & 
Asteriou, 2010; Jaggi et al., 2009; Klein, 2002; Marrakchi Chtourou et al., 2001; 
Peasnell et al, 2000; Waweru & Riro, 2013). In regards to the boards’ independence 
and firms’ voluntary disclosure, several studies (Hossain & Hammami, 2009; 
O’Sullivan et al., 2008; Qu et al., 2015) documented evidence of a positive 
                                                        
23 The validity of the multidimensional framework result is presented in chapter 6, section 6.8. 
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relationship between voluntary disclosure and the independence of the board. In line 
with corporate governance literature, this research employs the Independence of 
Board of directors (IBD) as a control variable, which is calculated as the number of 
independent non-executive directors divided by the total number of the bank’s board 
of directors. 
4.7.2 Board Size 
From the agency theory perspective, board size has a positive influence on its 
alertness for agency related issues, since a higher number of experienced directors are 
able to observe managerial behaviour (Kiel & Nicholson, 2003). In the same vein, 
Lipton and Lorsch (1992) indicated that a larger board is likely to spend more time 
and effort in monitoring managers, whereas this level of monitoring may be difficult 
for smaller board. Thus, the board size may have a reasonable influence on the bank’s 
EM practices. Corporate governance and EM literature (Dâvila & Watkins, 2009; 
González & García-Meca, 2014; Peasnell et al., 2005) found that larger boards, with a 
variety of expertise, have a strong relationship with lower levels of EM. On the other 
hand, the majority of empirical voluntary disclosure studies have emphasised that a 
larger board with a variety of backgrounds enhances transparency, encourages 
voluntary disclosure and assures better supervision of managers’ behaviour (Adams & 
Mehran, 2008; Al-Najjar & Abed, 2014; Cheng & Courtenay, 2006; Gandía, 2008; 
Sartawi et al., 2014). Following corporate governance literature, Board Size is 
measured by the total number of board members. 
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4.7.3 Board Experience 
Corporate governance literature has suggested that an expert board member has the 
ability to efficiently communicate financial information to the market participants, to 
bring independent judgments of how the company should run, and to assist them in 
acquiring resources (Custódio & Metzger, 2014; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002). In this 
context, several empirical studies indicated that more experienced and independent 
directors are positively associated with the quality of companies’ financial reporting 
and earnings quality (Custódio et al., 2013; Custódio & Metzger, 2014; Georgakakis 
et al., 2016; Gul & Leung, 2004; Trainor & Finnegan, 2013; Westphal & Milton, 
2000; Xie et al., 2003). Additionally, Trainor et al., (2013) and Larmou and Vafeas 
(2010) proposed that the expertise and independence of individual board members are 
considered to be vital elements in mitigating the tendency of managers to manipulate 
earnings, and in reducing the information conflicts between inside and outside 
investors. Following Gul & Leung, (2004); Kosnik, (1987) and Thiruvadi, (2012), this 
study defined financial expertise as: the board of directors should hold a professional 
qualification from one of the professional accountancy bodies such as ACCA, CIMA, 
or have at least 3 years of financial experience (i.e. have experience as a principal 
financial or accounting officer, or public accountant or auditor) or a membership of 
one of the accounting institutions. This is because it draws on their expertise in 
observing the management and their wider experience to be better-performing board 
members. Following corporate governance studies (e.g. Akhtaruddin et al., 2009; 
Chiu et al., 2012; Ismail & Rahman, 2011) the current study used a percentage 
measure to ensure a more comparable method of measurement. Thus, the board of 
director’s expertise is measured as a proportion of experienced board members on the 
board. 
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4.7.4 Duality in Position 
The chairman’s role involves monitoring the chief executive officer (CEO) and other 
board members. However, if the chairman is, at the same time, the CEO (duality), 
then the CEO can manipulate the accounting information without the knowledge of 
other members of the board, which impedes the effectiveness of control (Jensen, 
1993). Therefore, the existence of an independent chairman leads to a higher level of 
managerial monitoring (Dechow et al., 1996). Corporate governance studies argue 
that effective board monitoring and control of the CEO can be achieved if the 
chairman is not the same person as the CEO (Abbott et al., 2004; Fama & Jensen, 
1983). Consequently, duality in a board position leads to less activity for monitoring 
purposes, which in turn makes it more likely that the management may engage in EM 
practices (Abbott et al., 2004; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Visvanathan, 2008). Thus, 
separating the power of the CEO leads to more efficient monitoring (Cornett et al., 
2008). On the other hand, combining both the duties of chairman and the CEO 
(duality) lowers the level of voluntary disclosure (Donnelly & Mulcahy, 2008), 
because concentration of power lessens the monitoring effectiveness of the board, and 
thus reduces the level of transparency and increases the asymmetric information 
(Allegrini & Greco, 2013; Cerbioni & Parbonetti, 2007; Gul & Leung, 2004). 
Empirical Voluntary disclosure studies (Allegrini & Greco, 2013; Donnelly & 
Mulcahy, 2008; Gul & Leung, 2004; Ho & Wong, 2001) found a negative 
relationship between voluntary disclosure and CEO duality.  The current study 
measures the duality of board directors as a dummy variable, which is equal to one if 
the CEO has more than a role and zero otherwise.  
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4.7.5 Board Gender Diversity 
Diversity of gender on the board of directors is considered as a vital characteristic that 
affects the board’s effectiveness (Liao et al., 2015; Terjesen et al., 2009). Corporate 
governance literature (e.g. Carter et al., 2003; Ntim, 2015; Terjesen et al., 2009) 
suggested that the existence of a female on the board of directors raises the board’s 
independence and enhances the management monitoring process, thus leading to a 
lower level of EM and a higher level of voluntary disclosure. For instance, Krishnan 
and Parsons (2008) and Cumming et al., (2015) have indicated that companies with 
more female directors on the board have lower levels of EM than those with fewer 
females on their boards. On the other hand, the existence of female board members 
signifies not only the relevance of board diversity from an ethical perspective, but 
also leads to improved board effectiveness (Bear et al., 2010), quality of board 
deliberations and better supervision of the company’s disclosures (Liao, Luo & Tang, 
2015), which in turn increases the likelihood of voluntary disclosure (Ben-Amar, 
Chang & McIlkenny, 2017). In addition, Hoang et al., (2016) and Liao, et al., (2016) 
pointed out that the existence of female directors has a positive effect on voluntary 
disclosure. Following corporate governance studies (e.g. Terjesen, Couto & 
Francisco, 2016; Titova & Titova, 2016; Ujunwa, Okoyeuzu & Nwakoby, 2012), the 
current study measures the board gender diversity as percentage of female directors 
on the board. 
4.7.6 Board Meetings 
Board meetings is considered to be a vital element in assessing the effectiveness of 
the board, since the frequency of meetings will allow the board members to discuss in 
detail various issues that the company is facing (Carcello & Neal, 2000; Letendre, 
  
 
114 
2004; Vafeas, 1999). Active boards improve the level of monitoring, resulting in 
enhanced financial reporting quality. In line with the frequency of board meetings, the 
board may show effective monitoring through adequate preparation before meetings, 
attentiveness and participation during meetings and post-meeting follow-up (Beasley 
et al., 2000). Sun et al., (2010) and Qu et al., (2015), pointed out that, through regular 
meetings, the boards have greater opportunities to perform their duty to protect the 
interests of stockholders, which enables them to control EM practices, conflicts of 
interest and raise the integrity of financial reporting. Additionally, Lara et al., (2009) 
and González et al., (2014) indicated that the active board (one which meets 
regularly) is considered as a good proxy for directors' effective monitoring to 
safeguard the quality of financial information, which in turn reduces EM practices. 
On the other hand, Kanagaretnam et al., (2007) and Lipton and Lorsch (1992) 
indicated that board of directors need to meet frequently to enable them perform their 
duties effectively, which leads them to show greater interest in reporting information 
and thus keep investors informed of their efforts. In the same context, several studies 
found a positive association between voluntary disclosure and board meetings (Jizi et 
al., 2014; Kent & Stewart, 2008a; Kent & Stewart, 2008). Following corporate 
literature (Beasley et al., 2000; Carcello & Neal, 2000; Vafeas, 1999), the present 
study measures board meetings as the number of meetings held in each financial year 
by a firm’s board of directors.   
4.7.7 Independence of the Audit Committee  
The independence of the audit committee from the company's management enables 
them to examine the integrity of financial reports, which reduces the opportunistic 
behaviour of managers. The low level of audit committee independence may have a 
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negative effect on the credibility and quality of financial reports (Siddiqui & Podder, 
2002). Choi et al., (2004) and Vicknair et al., (1993) argued that the audit committee’s 
independence ensures the effectiveness of their control and enhances their duty of 
preventing managerial EM practices. Corporate governance and EM literature 
documented evidence that audit committee independence is linked to high audit 
quality and negatively affects EM practices (Beasley, 1996; Bradbury et al., 2006; 
DeFond & Jiambalvo, 1991; Peasnell et al., 2005). On the other hand, Madi et al., 
(2014) and Nekhili et al., (2016) indicated that audit committee independence is 
considered one of the most important corporate governance mechanisms that 
positively affect the quality of voluntary disclosure. In line with the corporate 
governance literature, the audit committee size varies from one company to another, a 
percentage measure ensures a more comparable method of measurement (Nekhili et 
al., 2016). Thus, the current study measures the independence of audit committee as 
the number of independent non-executive directors on the audit committee divided by 
the total number of audit committee members.  
4.7.8 Audit Committee Size 
A considerable number of audit committee members can increase its power and status 
within the institution and can lead to a higher quality of auditing (Kalbers & Fogarty, 
1993). A larger audit committee size would enable directors of the committee to 
discover potential issues and to enhance their monitoring process through an increase 
in resources. Bédard et al., (2004) suggested that it is essential to establish a large 
enough audit committee in order to achieve effective observation, but not so large as 
to negatively affect the process of decision-making. Corporate governance and EM 
literature provides mixed results of the influence of audit committee size on EM 
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practices. Abbott et al., (2004); Xie et al., (2003); and Bédard et al., (2004), for 
instance, indicated that there is no significant relationship between audit committee 
size and EM practices, whereas Lin and Yang (2006) found a significant and negative 
relationship between audit committee size and EM practices. In respect to corporate 
disclosure, Madi et al., (2014) and Li et al., (2011) found that audit committee size, is 
more likely to positively affect voluntary disclosure. In line with the corporate 
governance literature, the audit committee size (ACS) is measured by the current 
study as the total number of audit committee members.  
4.7.9 Audit Committee Meetings  
Being an active committee is essential for monitoring the auditing and reporting 
process effectively. Thus, the frequency of meetings is considered to a sign of an 
active and effective audit committee (Menon & Williams, 1994). An active audit 
committee will decrease the chance of EM practices (Beasley et al., 2000; DeZoort & 
Salterio, 2001). The increased frequency of audit committee meetings has negative 
association with EM practices, which signifies the effective monitoring of an active 
audit committees (Xie, 2001). In addition, Abbott et al., (2000); Ebrahim (2007) and 
Lin et al., (2006) found that EM practices have not only a negative association with 
the independence of both the board and the audit committee, but also with more active 
audit committees. Regarding voluntary disclosure, both Allegrini and Greco (2013) 
and Li et al., (2012) documented that active audit committees that meet at least four 
times a year have a significant and positive influence on voluntary disclosure. 
Following corporate governance studies, audit committee meetings (ACM) is 
measured by the number of audit committee meetings held during the year. 
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4.7.10 Audit Committee Expertise 
Corporate governance studies (e.g. Davidson et al., 2004; DeFond et al., 2005; 
Raghunandan et al., 2001) indicated that members of the audit committee who are 
financially knowledgeable could perform their monitoring roles more effectively in 
reporting the financial performance of the company “detecting material 
misstatements”. In contrast, members who lack financial expertise may be unable to 
guarantee the quality of the audit (DeZoort & Salterio, 2001; Knapp, 1987; Turley & 
Zaman, 2004). Dhaliwal et al., (2010) indicated that the presence of expert member in 
the audit committee is essential to enhance their monitoring role, which in turn 
promote the quality of corporate disclosure. In the same vein, Bedard et al., (2004) 
and Mangena and Pike, (2005), found that higher quality financial reporting is 
positively linked to the expertise of audit committee members and negatively 
associated with EM practices. Following Gul & Leung, (2004) and Thiruvadi, (2012), 
this study defined financial expertise as, the audit committee member should have a 
professional qualification, a membership with one of the accounting institutions, or 
having at least 3 years of financial experience. This research controls for the effect of 
audit committee expertise on both EM and VDQ. In line with Harjoto, Laksmana & 
Lee, (2015) and Thiruvadi, (2012),  audit committee expertise (ACEX) is measured as 
proportion of experienced audit members on the total members of audit committee. 
4.7.11 Audit Firms (Big 4) 
Audit firm (Big 4) plays a major role in deterrence of EM practices (Cotter, 2012). It 
is considered a good indicator when banks use the services of one of the Big 4 
auditing firms, since this improves the financial reporting quality (Gul et al., 2006; 
Park & Pincus, 2001). It is argued that banks audited by the Big 4 audit firms have 
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higher levels of LLPs relative to NPLs, which indicates a higher level of conservatism 
(Leventis et al., 2013). Furthermore, Frankel et al., (2002) and Sun and Liu (2012) 
indicated that the audit firm’s size (Big4) has a negative influence on EM practices. 
Becker et al., (1998) found that EM practices are higher in companies that are not 
audited by Big 6 audit firms and vice versa. In respect to voluntary disclosure, it is 
widely known that companies need one of the audit firms to certify that the 
information disclosed in the companies’ annual report is valid (Adelopo, 2011). The 
audit firm’s size (Big 4) is expected to affect the role of the external auditor in 
decreasing the issue of information asymmetry (Haniffa & Cooke, 2005). Owusu-
Ansah, (1998) and Uang et al., (2006) have suggested that Big 4 firms have enough 
experience and superior resources, thus, they are less likely to be sensitive to pressure 
from clients in conflict situations. Consequently, a positive association has been 
reported between companies that are audited by Big 4 firms and voluntary disclosure 
(Adelopo, 2011; Ahmed & Nicholls, 1994; Jallow et al., 2012; Kent & Stewart, 2008; 
McNally et al., 1982; Omar & Simon, 2011; Waweru, 2014). In line with corporate 
governance studies, the current study measured the Big 4 as a dummy variable that 
takes the value of 1 if the bank is audited by Big 4 and 0 if otherwise.  
4.7.12 Audit Committee Gender Diversity 
It has been argued that a firm’s external governance and its auditing practice could be 
strengthened through increased gender diversity among audit committee members 
(Thiruvadi & Huang, 2011). In the same vein, Burgess and Tharenou (2002) and 
Grosvold et al., (2007) found that the presence of females on the audit committee 
decreases corporate failure and greatly benefits all shareholders. EM empirical studies 
provide evidence that companies with female members in their audit committee are 
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less likely to involve in EM practices compared to those without female members 
(Barua et al., 2010; Shawver et al., 2006; Yu et al., 2010). On the other hand, 
voluntary disclosure literature demonstrate that the presence of female audit 
committee members promotes voluntary disclosure (Bear et al., 2010; Frias‐Aceituno 
et al., 2013; Webb, 2004). Following Harjoto, Laksmana & Lee, (2015) and 
Thiruvadi, (2012), the current study measures the audit committee gender diversity as 
the percentage of female members on the audit committee. 
4.7.13 Managerial Ownership 
From the perspective of agency theory, if managers do not own a great proportion of 
the company, their behaviour will be affected by self-interest and not oriented to 
maximise the company’s value, which may lead to their involvement in EM practices 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In contrast, if managers own a considerable percentage of 
the company shares that they manage, they are more likely to harmonise their shares 
with those of other investors (Mehran, 1995). Therefore, managerial ownership is 
considered as a major incentive mechanism and instrument to reduce EM practices. 
Several studies suggested that, when a substantial number of shares are owned by 
inside directors, it leads to a suitable alignment of interest between managers and 
other shareholders (e.g. Peasnell et al., 2005; Warfield et al., 1995), and provides 
managers with high levels of incentives to maximise the performance of the company 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  
In the same vein, empirical corporate governance and EM studies have found that, as 
managerial ownership increases, company performance rises and EM practices 
decrease monotonically (e.g. Darrough et al., 1998; Lennox, 2005; Teshima & Shuto, 
2008). On the other hand, companies with a greater level of managerial ownership are 
  
 
120 
more likely to report additional valuable information to investors in order to maximise 
the company value (Warfield et al., 1995). Empirical Corporate governance and 
voluntary disclosure studies (e.g. Botosan & Plumlee, 2002; Gelb & Zarowin, 2002; 
Sengupta, 1998) have found that the level of managerial holdings is positively related 
to voluntary disclosure. Thus, this study employed the managerial ownership to 
control for its impact on both EM and VDQ. The current study measures managerial 
ownership as a percentage of the total number of shares held by managers to the total 
number of outstanding shares. 
4.7.14 Ownership Concentration (Blockholders)  
One of the important forms of ownership includes individual investors, fund 
managers, private equity firms, mutual funds, banks and trusts and pension funds 
(Cronqvist & Fahlenbrach, 2009; Habbash, 2010). Person, (2006) and Zhong et al., 
(2007) stated that blockholders can observe and voice their objections and concerns 
since they have a large voting rights, and thus, they influences the composition of 
board of directors. Shleifer and Vishny, (1986) indicated that the concentration of 
ownership could increase the monitoring mechanisms and, thus, decrease 
opportunistic activities. Corporate governance and EM literature (Iqbal & Strong, 
2010; Jensen, 1993; Persons, 2006; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986) found that there is a 
negative relationship between large blockholders and EM practices.  
In the same context, Iqbal et al., (2006) found that companies with more than 10 per 
cent of share ownership are unlikely to manipulate earnings. In regards to 
blockholders and their relationship with voluntary disclosure, the literature provided 
mixed results. For instance, McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993); Mitchell et al., 
(1995); Schadewitz and Blevins (1998) showed a negative relationship between 
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blockholders and voluntary disclosure, whereas, Huafang and Jianguo (2007) and 
O’Sullivan et al., (2008) have found that blockholders have a positive relationship 
with VDQ. However, ownership concentration is known as the proportion of the 
firm’s equity held by substantial shareholders. This proportion is identified as 5% or 
more (Eng & Mak, 2003; Huafang & Jianguo, 2007). Thus, the current study 
measured blockholders (BH) as the ratio of outside stockholders owning 5% or more 
of the outstanding shares. 
4.7.15 Bank Size  
EM and voluntary disclosure literature found that company size is considered a 
relevant explanatory variable in explaining both EM practices and voluntary 
disclosure (Al-Najjar & Abed, 2014; Becker et al., 1998; Hussainey & Al-Najjar, 
2011; Lobo & Zhou, 2001; Pincus & Rajgopal, 2002; Salama et al., 2012; Sun & 
Rath, 2010; Watts & Zimmerman, 1986; Xie et al., 2003). However, a mixed result 
has been reported regarding the relationship between company size and EM practices. 
For instance, Kim et al., (2012); Pyo & Lee, (2013) and Leventis and Dimitropoulos, 
(2012), indicated that large banks are subjected to higher market pressure because 
larger banks are closely monitored by financial analysts and owners (i.e shareholders), 
and are thus less likely to involve in EM practices.  
In contrast, Pincus and Rajgopal (2002) suggested that political cost is more likely to 
be higher in larger companies that often engage in EM practices. Therefore, large 
companies tend to use the flexibility available in the GAAP to manipulate earnings. 
With regards to voluntary disclosures, the majority of voluntary disclosure studies 
have often provided evidence of a positive relationship between the voluntary 
disclosure level and company size (Al-Najjar & Abed, 2014; Barako et al., 2006; 
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Cooke, 1989; Depoers, 2000; Hossain et al., 1995; Jizi et al., 2014; McNally et al., 
1982; Qu et al., 2015; Raffournier, 1995; Salama et al., 2012; Watson et al., 2002). In 
contrast, studies by Nor et al., (2010) and Nekhili et al., (2016) indicated that a 
negative relationship between company size and R&D voluntary disclosure exists. 
Other empirical studies found an insignificant relationship between them (Entwistle, 
1999; Jones, 2007; Mak, 1991). In line with empirical EM and VDQ studies (Gul et 
al., 2013; Leventis et al., 2012; Sartawi et al., 2014), bank size is measured as the 
natural logarithm of total assets at the year-end. 
4.7.16 Bank Growth  
Empirical EM and voluntary disclosure studies have considered company growth as 
an influential factor in both EM practices and voluntary disclosure. For example, 
Carcello et al., (2004); Abbott et al., (2004) and Dimitropoulos and Asteriou, (2010) 
indicated that controlling the company's developmental pace is fundamental, because 
of the company’s experience of pressure either to maintain or to exceed expected 
growth rate, during a fast growth period. This pressure may create an incentive for 
managerial EM practices (Carcello & Nagy, 2004). Skinner and Sloan  (2002) found 
that companies that grow rapidly have greater incentives to avoid negative earnings 
surprises. In addition, Haniffa et al.,  (2006); Huang et al., (2009) and Dimitropoulos 
and Asteriou (2010) document that fast growing companies are more likely to involve 
in EM. 
In respect to voluntary disclosure, it is argued that higher growth companies are 
predicted to have higher asymmetric information between managers and investors, 
which stimulate them to report more information voluntarily to decrease this gap 
(Gaver & Gaver, 1993; Gul & Leung, 2004; Smith & Watts, 1992). Companies tend 
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to increase voluntary disclosure to enhance their ability to access financing at a lower 
cost and attract more investors (Collett & Hrasky, 2005; Hossain, Ahmed & Godfrey, 
2005; Khurana et al., 2006). Several empirical studies provided evidence that 
companies with higher growth opportunities are more likely to disclose information 
voluntarily compared to low growth companies due to their need for external finance 
(Hyytinen & Pajarinen, 2005; Laidroo, 2009; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013; Ntim & 
Soobaroyen, 2013). Following EM and VDQ studies (Pilotte, 1992; Yu, 2008), bank 
growth is measured as the change of total assets divided by the lagged total assets. 
4.7.17 Bank Leverage  
Leverage is used in numerous studies as a proxy for debt covenant violation, because 
it shows the financial structure of the company and is used in evaluating its financial 
risk (Dimitropoulos & Asteriou, 2010; Elayan et al., 2008). Leventis and 
Dimitropoulos, (2012) indicated that riskier banks may boost their earnings to meet 
the capital adequacy requirements and regulatory scrutiny. Management may 
overstate assets or understate liabilities in order to avoid debt covenant violations 
(Gavious et al., 2012). EM empirical studies (Ali et al., 2010; Habbash et al., 2014; 
Jiang et al., 2008; Wasiuzzaman et al., 2015) have argued that managers are more 
motivated to manipulate accounting earnings if their company has a high debt ratio, in 
order to satisfy covenant debt criteria; thus, a positive association between leverage 
and EM practices were found. 
With regards to voluntary disclosure, it is suggested that firms with greater leverage 
ratios are facing higher monitoring costs (Huafang & Jianguo, 2007), and, therefore, 
managers are willing to utilise voluntary disclosure as an instrument in order to 
decrease the monitoring costs for creditors (Depoers, 2000; García‐Meca & Sánchez‐
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Ballesta, 2009; Raffournier, 1995). In addition, managers of highly leveraged firms 
are likely to disclose more information voluntarily in order to send a signal to 
creditors that the company is capable of meeting its debt requirements as well as 
attracting investors (Elzahar & Hussainey, 2012). Several studies have proven that 
leverage has a positive effect on voluntary disclosure (Ahmed & Courtis, 1999; Al-
Najjar & Abed, 2014; Basiddiq & Hussainey, 2012; Merkley, 2013). Following Du et 
al., (2015) and Ming-Feng & Shiow-Ying, (2015), Leverage (LEV) is measured as the 
total liabilities divided by total asset.  
4.7.18 Profitability  
Companies attempt to manipulate earnings when the actual profitability is high/ low, 
in order to decrease/ increase (smooth) their income and give a signal to the investors 
about their earnings growth (Prencipe, Markarian & Pozza, 2008). EM literature 
documented that companies with greater profitability are less inclined to manipulate 
their accounting earnings (Kiattikulwattana, 2014; Wu et al., 2016). For instance, 
Yang et al., (2013); Boulila Taktak and Mbarki (2014); Kiattikulwattana (2014);  Sun 
et al., (2014) have documented a negative and significant association between a 
company’s profitability and EM practices. However, a few studies have found that a 
company's profitability has a positive influence on EM practices (Gavious et al., 
2012; Hsiao et al., 2016).  
In respect to voluntary disclosure, it is argued that, in highly profitable firms, 
managers are motivated to disclose information voluntarily. This is because it boosts 
the confidence of investors and raises managers’ compensations (Rouf & Al Harun, 
2011). In this context, Cormier and Magnan, (1999) show that companies in a perfect 
financial condition tend to disclose information comprehensively compared to 
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companies in a bad financial condition. However, empirical EM and VDQ studies 
measure profitability by using return on assets “ROA” as an indicator of a firm’s 
profitability, because ROA is highly significant in explaining the company's value 
(Carter et al., 2003; Kothari et al., 2005). Following empirical EM and VDQ studies 
(Doukakis, 2014; Filip & Raffournier, 2014), the current study uses “ROA” to control 
for the effect of banks’ financial profitability on EM and VDQ. Profitability “ROA” is 
measured by net income divided by lagged total assets. 
4.7.19 Liquidity 
Liquidity ratio is an important factor that motivates bank managers to manipulate 
earnings in order to prove their ability to meet the bank’s current obligations 
(Ascioglu et al., 2012; Elzahar & Hussainey, 2012). In the same context, Iatridis & 
Kadorinis (2009) and Lambert (2001) found that company managers are more likely to 
manipulate earnings figures in an effort to enhance their liquidity and profitability, as 
well as to strengthen their financial market picture. Several empirical studies (e.g. 
Ascioglu et al., 2012; Chung et al., 2009; Van Tendeloo & Vanstraelen, 2005) found 
that banks that involve in EM are more likely to suffer from a lower liquidity ratio. 
With regards to voluntary disclosure, Elzahar & Hussainey, (2012) and Wallace and 
Naser, (1994) found that firms with high liquidity ratios are more willing to 
voluntarily disclose information, as evidence of their ability to meet their short-term 
obligations, compared to their competitors with poor liquidity ratios.  
VDQ literature provided mixed results with regards to the relationship between 
voluntary disclosure and liquidity ratio. Owusu-Ansah, (2005) and Alsaeed, (2006), 
for instance, show that corporate disclosure level is positively associated to liquidity. 
Wallace et al., (1994), however, document a negative and significant relationship 
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between disclosure level and liquidity. Notably, Nor et al., (2010) fail to find a 
significant relationship between voluntary disclosure level and liquidity. The current 
study uses the bank liquidity to control for its effect on EM and VDQ. Following 
empirical EM and VDQ studies, the bank liquidity position is measured as the ratio of 
current assets divided by current liabilities at the end of the financial year. 
4.8 Empirical Research Model 
In order to achieve the aim and objectives of the current study, the following 
regression model is used (Key in table 4.3)24;  
1. EMLLPit= β0 + β1 VDQit + β2 IBDit + β3 BZit + β4 BDEXit + β5 DUit + β6 BGDit 
+ β7 BMit + β8 IACit + β9 ACZit + β10 ACMit + β11 ACEXit + β12 Big4it + β13 
ACGit + β14 MOSit + β15 BHit + β16 Bank-Zit + β17 Growthit + β18 LEVERit + β19 
PROFTit + β20 LIQit + εit        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
24
 The differences in economic growth, accounting rules and bank-specific variables among countries are more likely to have a 
potential effect on managers’ ability to manipulate earnings and disclosure (Leuz et al., 2003 and Abdelsalam et al., 2016). For 
instance, a few IBs listed in MENA countries such, as Egypt and Kuwait do not apply the AAOIFI’s standards. In this context, 
IBs have to follow the accounting standards applicable in the country of operation and that can be different from the AAOIFI 
standards (Sarea, 2012). Therefore, it becomes necessary to examine the effect of employing AAOIFI standards and country 
specific variables on both EM and VDQ. However, in order to avoid multicollinearity problems, the current study omitted the 
AAOIFI standards and country specific variables, since they have a high level of correlation and low level of tolerance with an 
insignificant association with the dependent variable.  
Furthermore, due to unavailability of data, other certain bank-specific variables, which may influence the model, were excluded 
(e.g. cost-income ratio, cash-deposit ratio). 
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Table 4. 3 Study Variables’ Definitions and Measurements. 
Label Variable Description 
Dependent Variables. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. . . .  
EMLLPs  
Earnings management 
The absolute value of discretionary accruals 
estimated using: Two-stage model 
(Kanagaretnam et al., 2004). 
EMDA The absolute value of discretionary accruals 
estimated using modified Jones model by 
Yasuda et al., (2004). 
Independent Variables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .   
VDQ Voluntary Disclosure Quality The voluntary disclosure quality is measured by 
developing a multidimensional framework of 
Beretta & Bozzolan, (2008). 
Control Variables: . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . 
       1- Corporate Governance (Board of directors characteristics). . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . 
 
IBD Independence of Board of Directors Measured as the number of independent non-
executive directors divided by total number of 
bank board of directors. 
 
BZ Board Size Measured as the total numbers of board 
members  
 
BDEX Board of director’s expertise Measured as the proportion of experienced 
board members on the board. 
DU Duality A dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the 
Chief executive officer has more than one role 
and zero otherwise.  
BGD Board Gender Diversity Measured as the percentage of female directors 
on the board. 
BM 
 
Board Meeting Measured as the number of meetings held in 
each financial year by the firm’s board of 
directors. 
2- Corporate Governance (Audit committee characteristics). . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . 
IAC Independence of Audit Committee Measured as the number of independent non-
executive directors on the audit committee 
divided by the total number of audit committee 
members 
ACZ 
 
Audit committee size Measured by the total numbers of audit 
committee members.  
ACM 
 
Audit committee meetings Measured by the number of audit committee 
meetings held during the year. 
ACEX Audit committee expertise Measured as proportion of experienced audit 
members on the audit committee. 
 
Big4 External Audit committee A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if 
the bank is audited by Big 4 and 0 if otherwise.  
ACG Audit committee gender diversity Measured as the percentage of female members 
on the audit committee. 
3- Corporate Governance (Ownership Structure) . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . 
MOS Managerial Ownership Measured as a percentage of the total number of 
shares held by managers to total number of 
outstanding shares. 
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BH 
 
Block holders Measured by the ratio of outside stockholders 
owning 5% or more of outstanding shares within 
the bank. 
4- Bank characteristics  . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . 
 
Bank-Z 
 
Bank Size Measured by the Logarithm of total assets at the 
year-end. 
Growth 
 
Bank’s Growth 
 
Measured as the change of total assets 
divided by the lagged of total assets. 
LEVER 
 
Bank Leverage 
 
Measured by total liabilities to total assets at the 
end of the financial year. 
PROFT Profitability (ROA= Return on Assets) Measured by net income to lagged total assets at 
the end of the financial year. 
LIQ Bank Liquidity  Measured by current assets divided by current 
liabilities at the end of the financial year. 
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4.9 Empirical Procedures of Data Analysis  
In this section three phases of data analysis used in this study, the preliminary 
analysis, the multivariate analysis and robustness tests are illustrated.  
4.9.1 Preliminary Analysis 
Preliminary analysis is divided into two-analysis techniques, which are descriptive 
statistics and correlation matrix. The Descriptive statistical technique is adopted in 
order to illustrate and summarise the used data in terms of shape of distribution for 
each variable and to test central tendency. It describes the mean, median, minimum 
and maximum values of each variable, and also the standard deviation. With a view to 
explaining the correlation level between explanatory variables used in the current 
study, the correlation matrix test and the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) method are 
employed (Gujarati & Porter, 2011). The empirical studies emphasised that the higher 
the level of correlation coefficients between explanatory variables, the greater the 
multicollinearity problem (Grewal et al., 2004; Gujarati, 2008; Harris & Raviv, 2008). 
A small correlation coefficient indicates the absence of multicollinearity and vice 
versa. Although different measures to study multicollinearity have been suggested by 
several studies, Gujarati (2008) and Harris and Raviv (2008) indicated that ± 80% is 
the cut-off point of a serious multicollinearity problem that would influence the 
regression outcomes. Additionally, Gujarati, (2009) and Echambadi and Hess, (2007) 
stated that a multicollinearity issue exists if the VIF value is greater than 10. 
4.9.2 Multivariate Analysis 
The Multivariate analysis technique is classified in two groups, parametric and non-
parametric methods. With regards to the current study, the choice of analysis 
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technique is based on the characteristics and nature of the sample. However, there are 
three essential assumptions to be examined before selecting the type of multivariate 
analysis technique, which are normality, linearity and heteroscedasticity (Gujarati, 
2003).   
Normality assumes that the data set distribution is normal. Linearity presumes that 
there is a linear relationship between the explanatory variables and the dependent 
variable, whereas, heteroscedasticity is based on the assumption that no constant 
change exists in the dependent variables. Therefore, to choose between the parametric 
or non-parametric tests and decide which is more appropriate to be utilised in the 
current study, these different tests have been adopted. Firstly, in order to check the 
normality problem, the histogram test is used. Secondly, the Quantile-Quantile (Q-Q 
plot) test is used to examine the linearity problem. Finally, in order to test the 
heteroscedasticity, Breusch-Pagan / Cook- Weisberg and White’s general tests are 
utilised.  
4.9.2.1 Panel Data Regression Analysis 
In order to achieve a positivist understanding of how the methodological process 
should be conducted, the current study utilised regression analysis as a primary 
instrument to examine the study hypotheses (Näslund & Hafsa, 2016). It is presumed 
that a single metric variable of the study is related to more than one independent 
variable, which is included in the research problem (Hair, 2007). However, two types 
of regressions could be applied to this study, which are panel data regression and 
pooled regression.  The main difference between panel and pooled regression is that 
panel regression can distinguish between the cross-sectional and time series. This 
allows researchers to remove any unobservable heterogeneity in the sample, thus it is 
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a significant technique to examine the linear information. In contrast, the pooled 
regression cannot distinguish between the various companies and times (Himmelberg 
et al., 1999). Moreover, panel data regression has considerable advantages in 
measuring non-observable individual effects, which decreases the reliability problem 
of independent variables to explain the dependent variable (Serrasqueiro & Nunes, 
2008). Haniffa & Cooke, (2002); Chih et al., (2008) and Sun et al., (2010) indicated 
that panel data regression covers a great number of observations, which enhances the 
efficiency of the statistics and boosts the degree of freedom.  
In addition to the above-mentioned benefits of panel data regression, there are several 
other advantages, which are as follows:  (1) if the source of information is different, 
panel data is considered as the primary method of longitudinal data analysis, since 
panel data regression provides diverse procedures that may assist in examining 
variations over time when considering certain cross-sectional unit types. (2) Through 
combining cross-sectional and time-series in panel data analysis, more instructive 
information concerning the data and extra variability is provided. Furthermore, this 
combination provides a greater degree of effectiveness and flexibility, and decreases 
co-linearity between variables. (3) It is capable of measuring and distinguishing non-
observable effects when utilising the analysis of time-series or cross-sectional data. 
(4) Panel data is able to analyse behavioural models that are seen as complicated 
models and likely to be achieved by using both cross-sectional and time-series. In line 
with EM and VDQ studies, the current study uses panel data in its regression analysis 
in order to examine the relationship among its variables due to the above- mentioned 
advantages (Abdelsalam et al., 2016; Ali et al., 2015; Ben Othman & Mersni, 2014; 
Chih et al., 2008; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Sun et al., 2010; Wang & Hussainey, 
2013).   
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4.9.3 Robustness Tests 
In order to confirm the robustness of the study outcomes to diverse estimators and 
measurements, this study conducted further sensitivity analysis. For instance, EM was 
measured by adopting an alternative model, which is the Jones’ Model, modified by 
Yasuda et al.,  (2004) for banking institutions. Nevertheless, the current study used a 
lagged value of VDQ as instrumental variables to control for the endogeneity 
problem. In addition, several tests have been adopted to support the primary findings, 
such as re-running the t-test using different sub-samples of banks to understand EM 
and VDQ incentives. 
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4.10 Summary of the Chapter 
In this chapter, the research hypothesis developments, approaches and methods of the 
current study were demonstrated and justified in relation to the study objectives. The 
two-stage model and Jones model, modified by Yasuda et al., (2004), are used as 
major and alternative models to measure EM, respectively. The current study 
develops the multidimensional framework of Beretta & Bozzolan, (2008) and uses it 
to measure VDQ in both IBs and NIBs. In addition, several proxies of corporate 
governance and bank characteristics are employed as control variables.  
Three essential assumptions were investigated before selecting the type of 
multivariate analysis technique, which are normality, linearity and heteroscedasticity. 
In addition, the data analysis is achieved through panel data regression (random effect 
models), on 1,060 company-year observations (29 IBs and 77 NIBs over a 10-year 
period, from 2006 to 2015). 
The following chapters will highlight and analyse the influence of VDQ on EM 
practices in both IBs and NIBs in MENA countries. Chapter five will provide an 
empirical result on EM in both types of banks. Chapter six will present the findings of 
VDQ in both types of banks. Finally, chapter seven will provide the analysis and 
discussion of the results for the main aim of the current study, which is the 
relationship between EM and VDQ in IBs and NIBs in MENA countries.  
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Chapter Five: Results and Discussion of EM in Islamic and non-Islamic Banks 
operating in MENA Countries 
5.1 Introduction  
This chapter illustrates the analyses that are performed to achieve the first research 
objective, which is “to investigate and compare EM practices in IBs and NIBs in 
MENA countries”. In order to fairly analyse the data, two empirical research models 
were utilised to investigate EM in both IBs and NIBs (see chapter 4). This chapter is 
structured as follows. Section 5.2 shows the descriptive statistics of EM level based 
on the entire sample, across years and across countries, respectively. Section 5.3 
presents the descriptive statistics and t-teat analyses of EM level for IBs in 
comparison to NIBs. While sections 5.4 and 5.5 present the additional and robustness 
analyses of EM level, respectively. Section 5.6 provides the chapter’s summary. 
5.2 Descriptive Analysis of EM Level Based on the Entire Sample, Across Years 
and Across Countries 
This section provides summary statistics for EM level over a10-year period, from 
2006 to 2015. EMLLPs25 and EMDA26 represent the EM achieved from the two-stage 
and modified Jones models, respectively. The followings are the descriptive statistics 
for EM level based on the entire sample, across years and across countries, 
respectively. 
                                                        
25 EMLLPs represent the earnings management that was obtained from the two-stage model of Kanagaretnam et 
al. (2004). 
26 EMDA represents the earnings management, which was obtained from the Jones model (1991) that was 
modified by Yasuda et al. (2004) for financial sectors. 
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5.2.1 EM Level Based on the Entire Sample  
Table 5.1 illustrates that the mean values of EMLLPs for the entire sample is 0.1115 
with minimum and maximum values of 0.0004 and 0.9970 respectively. In addition, 
the median value of EMLLPs is 0.1025 with a standard deviation of 0.1299. This 
finding indicates that the average absolute value of EMLLP in all banks listed in 
MENA countries is 11.15 per cent with a large rate of dispersion. This result is similar 
to the findings of De Medeiros et al., (2012) and Iannotta and Kwan, (2013), who 
found that the mean absolute values of EM among US and Brazilian banks are around 
9.6 and 16.8 per cent, respectively. Nevertheless, this outcome indicates that the value 
of EMLLP in all banks listed in MENA countries may be greater than those reported 
by Abdelsalam et al., (2016), who show that banks in MENA countries have an 
average EM value of 0.002. This may be attributed to the difference in measuring the 
EM (discretionary accruals). This study used the absolute value of EM, whereas 
Abdelsalam et al., (2016) utilised the signed value of discretionary accruals achieved 
from the difference between the discretionary elements of both LLPs and realised 
security gains and losses.  
It has been shown that the mean value of EMDA is 0.0155 with minimum and 
maximum values of 0 and 0.5020 respectively. This result suggests that the average 
absolute value of EMDA is 1.5 per cent in both IBs and NIBs in MENA countries 
with a high degree of dispersion. Additionally, the median value of EMDA is 0.0026 
with a standard deviation of 0.0507. This result is consistent with the findings of 
Cohen et al., (2014) who reported that the average value of EM in US banks between 
the periods 1997 to 2009 is around 1.4 per cent. Nevertheless, the aforementioned 
results are below the findings of Elleuch et al., (2015), who demonstrated that the 
average value of EM among Tunisian banks from1998 to 2007 is 1.08 per cent. The 
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findings indicate that both types of banks engage in EM and are in line with both 
agency and signalling theories.  
The agency theory suggested that actions of individuals are strongly linked to their 
self-interest, and each individual will increase their wealth by behaving in an 
opportunistic manner (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Therefore, bank managers tend to 
manipulate earnings by using accounting choice or accruals in order to reach their 
earnings target (e.g. avoiding earnings volatility, showing good performance, 
decreasing the probability of being audited by regulatory agencies and meeting the 
minimum capital requirements) (Collins et al., 1995; Leventis et al., 2011). This 
opportunistic behaviour allows bank managers greater freedom to manipulate 
earnings (Black & Shevlin, 1999). On the other hand, the signalling theory proposes 
that bank managers may involve in EM practices to transmit signals to the market to 
conceal undesirable value-related information, to convey a good signal of the bank’s 
financial strength and, thus, to maintain the financial stability of the economy (Ronen 
and Yaari, 2008). 
 
Table 5. 1: Descriptive Analysis of EM for the Entire Sample 
 Obs EMLLPs EMDA 
Mean 1060 0.1115 0.0155 
Median 1060 0.1025 0.0026 
S.D 1060 0.1299 0.0507 
Min 1060 0.0004 0 
Max 1060 0.9970 0.5020 
Note: EMLLPs= earnings management obtained from two-stage model, EMDA= 
earnings management achieved from modified Jones model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
 
5.2.2 EM Level for the Entire Sample Across Years 
Table 5.2 illustrates the descriptive statistics of EM for the entire sample (IBs and 
NIBs) across years, starting from 2006 to 2015. Based on EMLLPs, table 5.2 shows 
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that the highest mean value of EMLLPs was in 2006, which is 0.1181 with minimum 
and maximum values of 0.0039 and 0.9800 respectively. In addition, the median 
value of EMLLPs in 2006 is 0.1045 with a standard deviation of 0.1486. Furthermore, 
the lowest mean value of EMLLPs was 0.1004 in 2012 with median, minimum and 
maximum values of 0.1027, 0.0034 and 0.9914 respectively. 
Table 5.2, on the other hand, illustrates that the greatest mean value of EMDA, which 
is 0.0230, was in 2011, with median, minimum and maximum values of 0.0057, 0 and 
0.4736 respectively. However, the lowest average value of EMDA was 0.0079 in 
2012 with considerable dispersion. Furthermore, the median of EMDA in 2012 is 
0.0015 with a standard deviation of 0.0153. Comparing the average value of both 
EMLLPs and EMDA across years, table 5.2 shows that the average values of 
EMLLPs across years are higher than those of EMDA. This result indicates that bank 
managers are more likely to manipulate earnings through LLPs. This is consistent 
with the arguments of several studies, that LLPs represent the largest portion of 
accruals in the banking system and are considered to be the primary source, which 
creates the conditions for potential accounting manipulations (Abdelsalam et al., 
2016; Alali & Jaggi, 2011; Belal et al., 2015; Gray & Clarke, 2004; Kanagaretnam et 
al., 2004; Kwak et al., 2009).  
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Table 5. 2: Descriptive Analysis of EM for the Entire Sample Across Years 
 
 EMLLPs EMDA 
 Obs Mean Median S.D Min Max Mean Median S.D Min Max 
2006 106 0.1181 0.1045 0.1486 0.0039 0.9800 0.0191 0.0048 0.0560 0 0.4500 
2007 106 0.1100 0.1009 0.1271 0.0044 0.9882 0.0118 0.0019 0.0477 0 0.4500 
2008 106 0.1172 0.1025 0.1294 0.0096 0.9890 0.0124 0.0029 0.0202 0 0.0925 
2009 106 0.1125 0.0989 0.1485 0.0013 0.9905 0.0220 0.0078 0.0614 0 0.4892 
2010 106 0.1175 0.1009 0.1528 0.0016 0.9905 0.0168 0.0037 0.0462 0 0.3806 
2011 106 0.1096 0.1030 0.1264 0.0004 0.9958 0.0230 0.0057 0.0606 0 0.4736 
2012 106 0.1004 0.1027 0.0913 0.0034 0.9914 0.0079 0.0015 0.0153 0 0.0970 
2013 106 0.1096 0.1030 0.1264 0.0099 0.9970 0.0124 0.0023 0.0595 0 0.5020 
2014 106 0.1102 0.1038 0.1237 0.0105 0.9905 0.0108 0.0015 0.0430 0 0.3901 
2015 106 0.1100 0.1038 0.1201 0.0100 0.9800 0.0194 0.0001 0.0701 0 0.3922 
Note: EMLLPs= earnings management obtained from two-stage model, EMDA= earnings management achieved from modified Jones model. . . . . . . . .    . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
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5.2.3 EM Level for the Entire Sample Across Countries 
This section provides a descriptive statistic of EM for the entire sample (IBs and 
NIBs) across MENA countries over a 10-year period from 2006 to 2015. Based on 
both EMLLPs and EMDA, table 5.3 illustrates that the highest mean values of 
EMLLPs and EMDA were 0.5360 and 0.1515 respectively in banks listed on the Iraqi 
stock market, with a high degree of dispersion. This result suggests that banks that 
operate in Iraq are more likely to engage in EM compared to those banks listed in 
other MENA countries, which could be attributed to their early stage of economic 
development and the economic vulnerability due to political instability (El-Chaarani, 
2014; Issa, Hussein, & Hussein, 2015; Piesse, Strange & Toonsi, 2012). This result is 
in line with Hassan (2017) who found that companies listed on the Iraqi stock market 
reported the highest mean value of EM, signifying that Iraqi firms have poor earnings 
quality.  
The lowest mean values of EMLLPs were 0.0617, 0.0700, 0.0901, 0.0958 and 0.0993, 
which are reported by banks listed in Kuwait, Bahrain, Jordan, Oman and the UAE, 
respectively. In addition, the smallest average values of EMDA were 0.0037 and 
0.0049, which were reported by banks operating in both Bahrain and Kuwait 
respectively. This result implies that the majority of banks operating in Gulf 
cooperation council countries (GCC) have lower level of EM compared to those of 
other countries within the MENA region. This result could be attributed to the 
enhanced corporate governance system that is applied in these countries compared to 
other countries in the MENA region (Baydoun, Maguire, Ryan & Willett, 2012).   
In respect to other countries in the MENA region, the mean values of both EMLLPs 
and EMDA fluctuated between 0.1010 to 0.4799 and 0.0054 to 0.0268 respectively, 
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suggesting a considerable variation in mean of both EMLLPs and EMDA across 
countries. 
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Table 5. 3: Descriptive Analysis of EM for the Entire Sample Across Countries 
Countries 
 
 EMLLPs EMDA 
Obs Mean Median S.D Min Max Mean Median S.D Min Max 
Bahrain 130 0.0700 0.0771 0.0594 0.0004 0.5939 0.0037 0.0022 0.0052 0 0.0293 
Egypt 50 0.1018 0.1053 0 .0073 0.0875 0.1264 0.0126 0.0015 0.0487 0 0.2934 
Iran 20 0.1071 0.1071 1.71e-07 0.1071 0.1281 0.0054 0.0035 0.0056 0 0.0212 
Iraq 20 0.5360 0.5003 0.4501 0.0928 0.9970 0.1515 0.0348 0.0910 0 0.3589 
Israel 30 0.1010 0.1056 0.0069 0.0886 0.1067 0.0068 0.0024 0.0104 0 0.0360 
Jordan 120 0.0901 0.0923 0.0177 0.0066 0.1246 0.0147 0.0065 0.0480 0 0.4892 
Kuwait 80 0.0617 0.0593 0.0399 0.0016 0.2083 0.0049 0.0030 0.0046 0 0.0206 
Lebanon 20 0.4799 0.1040 0.4660 0.0034 0.9958 0.0743 0.0108 0.1937 0 0.5020 
Morocco 40 0.1162 0.1039 0.1442 0.0200 0.9655 0.0127 0.0041 0.0239 0 0.1736 
Oman 40 0.0958 0.0966 0.0157 0.0504 0.1518 0.0099 0.0011 0.0218 0 0.1235 
Palestinian 
Territories 
40 0.1070 0.1071 0.0136 0.0756 0.1553 0.0138 0.0041 0.0244 0 0.1125 
Qatar 60 0.1061 0.1064 0.0015 0.0979 0.1090 0.0056 0.0013 0.0247 0 0.1920 
Saudi Arabia 90 0.1048 0.1057 0.0026 0.0935 0.1100 0.0074 0.0019 0.0286 0 0.239 
Syrian Arab 
Republic 
60 0.1354 0.1070 0.1601 0.0846 0.9905 0.0268 0.0071 0.0720 0 0.4500 
Tunisia 70 0.1011 0.1010 0.0117 0.0549 0.1592 0.0191 0.0071 0.0422 0 0.3000 
United Arab 
Emirates 
180 0.0993 0.1029 0.0136 0.0039 0.1095 0.0104 0.0018 0.0412 0 0.4500 
Yemen 10 0.1070 0.1070 0.0001 0.1068 0.1071 0.0054 0.0024 0.0084 0 0.0283 
Note: EMLLPs= earnings management obtained from two-stage model, EMDA= earnings management achieved from modified Jones model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
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5.3 EM for IBs in Comparison to NIBs 
This section attempts to provide wider understanding of EM level for IBs in 
comparison to NIBs that operate in MENA countries. A descriptive statistic and t-test 
analyses of EM are presented.  
5.3.1 Descriptive Analysis of EM for IBs in Comparison to NIBs  
This section focuses on comparing the mean values of EM between both IBs and 
NIBs listed in MENA countries. Table 5.4 shows that the mean values of EMLLPs 
and EMDA in IBs are 0.0938 and 0.0099 respectively, with a high degree of 
dispersion. This result indicates that EMLLPs are higher than EMDA by 8%, which 
signifies that IBs use discretionary accruals from LLPs more considerably to 
manipulate earnings, compared to the discretionary accruals from net income and 
operating cash flow. The result of EMLLPs is close to the findings of De Medeiros et 
al., (2012) who found that the mean absolute value of discretionary accruals among 
US banks is around 9.6 per cent. For EMDA, the result is similar to that of 
Abdelsalam et al., (2016) who show that the average value of discretionary accruals in 
IBs is 0.002.  
The mean values of EMLLPs and EMDA in NIBs are 0.1181 and 0.0176 respectively, 
with a high degree of dispersion. This suggests that NIBs have, likewise, used more 
discretionary accruals from LLPs to manipulate earnings compared to the 
discretionary accruals from net income and operating cash flow. This result is close to 
the findings of Cohen et al., (2014), who reported that the mean value of EM in US 
banks from 1997 to 2009 is around 0.014. Nevertheless, the aforementioned results 
are below the findings of Elleuch et al., (2015) who demonstrated that the mean value 
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of EM among Tunisian banks over a 9-year period, from 1998 to 2007, is 1.08. In 
addition, table 5.4 shows that the average values of both EMLLP and EMDA in IBs 
are lower than those provided by NIBs, suggesting that IBs are less likely to be 
involved in EM compared to NIBs. 
 
Table 5. 4: Descriptive Analysis of EM Across Bank Types (IBs and NIBs) 
 Obs EMLLPs EMDA 
Bank-type IBs NIBs IBs NIBs IBs NIBs 
Mean 290 770 0.0938 0.1181 0.0099 0.0176 
Median 290 770 0.1030 0.1023 0.0042 0.0023 
S.D 290 770 0.0387 0.1500 0.0237 0.0576 
Min 290 770 0.0117 0.0004 0 0 
Max 290 770 0.5939 0.9970 0.3000 0.5020 
Note: EMLLPs= earnings management obtained from two-stage model, EMDA= earnings management achieved from 
modified Jones model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
 
5.3.2 Analyses of EM for IBs in Comparison to NIBs 
A more detailed account of EM is given in this section, which examines whether the 
level of EM obtained from both the two-stage model and adjusted Jones model by 
Yasuda et al., (2004) differ significantly in IBs and NIBs across individual years 
(from 2006 to 2015) and entire sample. The current study divided the sample into two 
sub-samples of data with regards to bank types (IBs and NIBs) for each year 
separately. The t-test is employed in order to investigate whether the mean values of 
EM for each year is significantly different in IBs and NIBs. Table 5.5 illustrates the t-
test results of EM levels based on each year and bank type for both models. 
Furthermore, bar charts of the mean values of EM across bank types are provided in 
order to support the t-test result (see figures 5.1 and 5.2). 
Based on the EMLLPs, it can be seen that in the years 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010 
the mean values of EMLLPs in IBs and NIBs are 0.0946-0.1410, 0.0967- 0.1261, 
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0.1134- 0.1451, 0.0856-0.1028 and 0.0859-0.1096 respectively. Besides the lower 
mean values of EMLLPs in IBs compared to NIBs during these years (from 2006 to 
2010), the t-test reveals that there is a significant difference in EMLLPs reported 
between IBs and NIBs at 5%, 10%, 10%, 10%, and 5% level respectively. This 
signifies that the level of EMLLPs in the banking sector in MENA countries is 
different based on the bank type, and EMLLPs in IBs is low compared to NIBs. Table 
5.5 illustrates that the average values of EMLLPs during 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014 and 
2015 in both IBs and NIBs are 0.0930-0.1158, 0.0906-0.1042, 0.0884-0.1075, 0.0946-
0.1162 and 0.0947- 0.1160 respectively. Although the t-test does not show any 
significant differences in mean values with regards to EMLLPs during these years 
(2011 to 2015), the mean values of EMLLPs in IBs are still lower than those of NIBs, 
which implies that IBs are less likely to engage in EM compared to NIBs.  
In respect to EMDA, table 5.5 demonstrates that the mean values of EMDA during 
2006, 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2011 in both IBs and NIBs are 0.0104-0.0281, 0.0045- 
0.0190, 0.0171- 0.0221, 0.0115-0.0390, and 0.0077-0.0286 respectively. The t-test 
reveals that there is a significant difference in terms of EMDA between IBs and NIBs 
at 10%, 10%, 10%, 5%, and 5% level respectively, with lower mean values of EMDA 
in IBs compared to NIBs during these years. This result implies that IBs and NIBs 
behave differently in terms of EMDA in these five years, and IBs are less likely to 
involve in EMDA compared with NIBs. Furthermore, table 5.5 shows that the average 
values of EMDA during 2010, 2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015 in both IBs and NIBs are 
0.0110-0.0191, 0.0102-0.0069, 0.0059-0.0090, 0.0100-0.0111 and 0.0106-0.0224 
respectively. The t-test does not show any significant differences in mean values with 
regards to EMDA during the above-mentioned years. Nevertheless, the mean values 
of EMDA in IBs are lower than those of NIBs, except for the year 2012.  
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With regards to the entire sample, table 5.5 reports that the mean values of EMLLPs 
and EMDA in IBs and NIBs are 0.0938-0.1181 and 0.0099-0.0176 respectively. The 
t-test shows that there is a high significant difference in terms of EMLLPs and EMDA 
between IBs and NIBs at 1% level; these findings imply that IBs and NIBs do not 
behave in the same manner when dealing with EM. These results are consistent with 
those obtained by Misman and Ahmed (2011) and Elnahass et al., (2014) and Farooq 
and AbdelBari (2015) who reported that both IBs and NIBs are engaged in EM and 
IBs seemed more controlled and engaged less in EM compared to NIBs.    
Besides the statistical test, the current study utilised a graphic approach to provide 
visual evidence of EM practices. McNichols (2001) indicated that a graphic approach 
could strongly assist researchers to predict the frequency of earnings realisations, 
which is likely to be linked to discretionary accruals. Consequently, both figures (5.1 
and 5.2) show that the mean value of EM is noticeably different in IBs compared to 
NIBs, which indicates that NIBs are more likely to engage in EM compared to IBs. 
These findings are in line with the primary results provided previously in table 5.5.  
In light of the above, the findings of the t-test across the entire sample confirms the 
significant difference between IBs and NIBs with regards to EM practices. This 
suggests that IBs behave differently and they are less involved in EM compared to 
NIBs. These findings support the first hypothesis (H1).  
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Table 5. 5 Univariate test of EM Level 
 
Two-stage model (EMLLPs) Jones model (EMDA) 
Year 
Obs Bank type 
T-test 
Bank type 
T-test IBs NIBs IBs NIBs IBs NIBs 
  Mean Mean 
2006 29 77 0.0946 0.1410 0.0468** 0.0104 0.0281 0.0930* 
2007 29 77 0.0967 0.1261 0.0604* 0.0045 0.0190 0.0918* 
2008 29 77 0.1134 0.1451 0.0693* 0.0171 0.0221 0.0610* 
2009 29 77 0.0856 0.1028 0.0737* 0.0115 0.0390 0.0350** 
2010 29 77 0.0859 0.1096 0.0419** 0.0110 0.0191 0.2079 
2011 29 77 0.0930 0.1158 0.1926 0.0077 0.0286 0.0134** 
2012 29 77 0.0906 0.1042 0.2910 0.0102 0.0069 0.3602 
2013 29 77 0.0884 0.1075 0.1119 0.0059 0.0090 0.2685 
2014 29 77 0.0946 0.1162 0.2129 0.0100 0.0111 0.9001 
2015 29 77 0.0947 0.1160 0.2116 0.0106 0.0224 0.3789 
Entire 
sample 
290 770 0.0938 0.1181 0.001*** 0.0099 0.0176 0.002*** 
***, **and * indicates the significance of difference at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels respectively.  Note: EMLLPs= earnings 
management obtained from two-stage model, EMDA= earnings management achieved from modified Jones model. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
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Figure 5. 1 EM Based on the Two- stage Model (EMLLP)27 Across Bank 
Types. 
 
 
 
Figure 5. 2 EM Based on the Modified Jones Model (EMDA)28 Across Bank 
Types. 
 
 
                                                        
27 EMLLPs represent the earnings management that was obtained from the two-stage model of Kanagaretnam et 
al., (2004). 
28 EMDA represent the earnings management, which was obtained from the Jones model (1991) that was 
modified by Yasuda et al. (2004) for financial sectors. (0 and 1) A dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the 
bank is Islamic and 0 if it is Non-Islamic bank. 
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5.4 Additional Analysis 
In order to support the above results, and examine EM practices of IBs in comparison 
to NIBs over a 10-year period from 2006 to 2015, the current study follows Yoon 
(2005) by employing a regression analysis that included the main explanatory 
variables with a dummy variable of bank type. A statistically significant coefficient 
for the dummy represents the difference in EM practices between IBs and NIBs. 
Since the operation cash flows (OCF) and Earnings before taxes and provisions 
(EBTP) are considered as vital explanatory variables that affect accruals for both the 
Jones model and the two-stage model respectively (Ben Othman & Mersni, 2014; 
Misman & Ahmad, 2011; Yoon, 2005), with leverage and growth assumed to have a 
strong influence on the choice of accounting policies (Dimitropoulos & Asteriou, 
2010; Huang, Zhang, Deis & Moffitt, 2009), the current study uses the following 
regression models to examine EM practices of IBs in comparison to NIBs; 
EMLLPit = β0 + β1 EBTPit + β2 Growthit  + β3 LEVERit + β4 Bank-typeit  + εit         (1). 
EMDAit = β0 + β1 OCFit + β2 Growthit  + β3 LEVERit + β4 Bank-typeit  + εit             (2). 
Table 5.6 shows that the coefficients of bank type are negatively and significantly 
linked to both EMLLPs and EMDA at 10% and 1% levels respectively. This result 
confirms the outcomes provided in table 5.5, which is that IBs and NIBs behave 
differently when involving in earnings manipulation and is consistent with the 
findings of Yoon (2005), and Misman and Ahmed (2011). Besides the above-
mentioned results, table 5.6 illustrates that the coefficient of EBTP has a positive and 
significant relationship with discretionary accruals (EMLLP) at a level of 10%. This 
result emphasised that LLPs are increased by bank managers in a good financial year 
to use it as available reserves for the coming bad years, suggesting that both IBs and 
NIBs are involved in EM practices. This result is in line with the results of Zoubi and 
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Al-Khazali (2007); Taktak et al., (2010). In addition, the coefficient of OCF has a 
negative and significant relationship with EMDA at a level of 1%. This finding 
implies that OCF has a great impact on discretionary accruals, which could be used by 
bank managers to manipulate earnings. This result is similar to those reported by 
Yoon, (2005).  
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Table 5. 6 The Regression Result of EM Practices of IBs in Comparison to NIBs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Two-stage model (EMLLPs) 
Panel A 
Jones model (EMDA) 
Panel B 
 Obs Coef. Std. Err t P>|t| 
 
Obs Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| 
EBTP 1060 0.0017 0.0010 1.71 0.08* OCF 1060 -1.30e-0 1.61e-0 -8.08 0.001*** 
Growth 1060 -0.1626 0.0416 -3.91 0.00*** Growth 1060 0.0093 0.0159 0.59 0.550 
LEVER 1060 0.0196 0.0354 0.55 0.58 LEVER 1060 -0.0170 0.0135 -1.26 0.201 
Bank-type 1060 -0.0146 0.0090 -1.61 0.10* Bank-type 1060 -0.0089 0.0034 -2.59 0.010*** 
_Cons 1060 0.1221 0.0340 3.59 0.001 _Cons 1060 0.0310 0.0130 2.39 0.011 
Random-effect method GLS regression,  
R-sq: 0.2801,  Prob > Chi2: 0.0001  
Random-effect method GLS regression,  
R-sq: 0.2505,  Prob > Chi2: 0.0001 
***, **and * indicate the significance of coefficient at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels respectively.   
EBTP= Earnings before taxes and provisions normalised by total assets, Growth= Measured by the growth in total assets from the beginning to the 
end of year t, LEVER= Measured by total liabilities to total assets at the end of the financial year, Bank-type= A dummy variable encoded 1 if the 
bank is Islamic, and 0 otherwise. 
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5.5 Robustness Analysis of EM Levels 
In order to ensure that the main results provided in table 5.5 are robust, the current 
study re-runs the t-test using different sub-samples of banks with relatively strong 
incentives to engage in EM. Following empirical EM studies (Abdelsalam et al., 
2016; Doukakis, 2014; Ipino & Parbonetti, 2017), several sub-samples were examined 
by using the t-test to investigate whether there is any difference of EM level between 
IBs and NIBs in each sub-sample separately. 
Following Abdelsalam (2016), who argues that political problems are more prevalent 
in particular MENA countries, including these countries in the study sample may have 
a wider impact on other MENA countries. Thus, the current study controlled for the 
influence of the political issues that occurred in some MENA countries and examined 
whether its wider effect on other stable countries in the same region was more 
pronounced. Therefore, the current study re-runs the t-test on four samples based on 
period and countries29. Table 5.7 illustrates that there is a significant difference in EM 
levels between IBs and NIBs at a level of 1% after controlling for both period and 
countries that have political issues. This confirms that IBs are less involved in EM 
compared to NIBs. These results support the primary findings in table 5.5. 
According to the argument of empirical EM studies, it is very difficult for big 
companies to manipulate earnings because they are more closely followed by 
investors and regulators than small companies (Albrecht & Richardson, 1990; 
Bhattacharya, 2001; Lee & Choi, 2002; Siregar & Utama, 2008). Furthermore, small 
companies are inclined to engage in EM more frequently to avoid losses compared to 
big companies (Albrecht & Richardson, 1990b; Lee & Choi, 2002). Consequently, the 
                                                        
29 Period: before the occurrence of political issues (2006-2010), and after the political issues was occurred (2011-2015). 
Countries: banks listed in countries that have political issues and banks listed in countries that are politically stable.  
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current study re-runs the t-test for the observation of small-sized banks by using the 
median as a cut-off point. Table 5.7 shows that there is a significant difference at 1% 
level between IBs and NIBs in terms of EM. This result is in line with the primary 
findings in table 5.5.   
Based on the argument of EM research that managers tend to manipulate accounting 
figures to avoid earnings losses and to avoid earnings decreases (Burgstahler & 
Dichev, 1997; Dechow, Ge & Schrand, 2010; Hamdi & Zarai, 2012), the current 
study re-runs the t-test on two sub-samples, based on banks with strong levels of 
incentives to avoid earnings losses and decreases 30 . The outcomes in table 5.7 
provided similar findings to those presented in table 5.5, suggesting that IBs are less 
likely to manipulate earnings compared to NIBs.   
According to the argument that managers of companies with high leverage have 
strong incentives to manipulate earnings to avoid debt covenant violation (Doukakis, 
2014; Wongsunwai, 2013), the current study re-runs the t-test on highly leveraged 
banks, defined as banks-years that are above the median ratio of total liabilities to the 
total assets. The findings in table 5.7 confirmed the main results presented in table 
5.5, which supports the hypothesis that there is a significant difference at 1% level 
between IBs and NIBs in terms of EM. It also proves that IBs are less likely to engage 
in EM compared to their counterparts. 
Empirical EM studies argued that managers of low growth companies have more 
incentives to use discretionary accruals in order to increase the appearance of 
sustainable growth, shares value and attract more investors to meet their capital needs 
(e.g. Collins, Pungaliya & Vijh, 2012; Summers & Sweeney, 1998; Zang, 2011). The 
current study, therefore, re-runs the t-test on low growth banks, defined as banks-
                                                        
30 The first sub-sample include bank-years with net income over lagged total assets (ROA) in the interval between (0, 
0.005), while the second sub-sample include bank-years with change in net income over lagged total assets (CROA) in the 
interval between (0, 0.005). 
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years that are below the median ratio of the change of total assets divided by the 
lagged total assets. The result is consistent with the main findings provided in table 
5.5. 
In conclusion, it can be seen that the above results support the first hypothesis (H1) 
that IBs behave differently with regards to EM compared to NIBs. It also confirmed 
that IBs are less likely to engage in EM compared to their competitors. 
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Table 5. 7 Robustness Analysis of EM Level 
 
Two-stage model (EMLLPs) Jones model (EMDA) 
Sub-sample 
Obs Bank type 
T-test 
Bank type 
T-test IBs NIBs IBs NIBs IBs NIBs 
 Mean Mean 
BPT 530 530 0.0952 0.1224 0.003*** 0.0108 0.0184 0.015*** 
APT 530 530 0.0923 0.1138 0.035*** 0.0089 0.0167 0.0471** 
PTC 20 191 0.1058 0.1621 0.001*** 0.0039 0.0238 0.001*** 
NPTC 270 579 0.0929 0.1036 0.0440** 0.0103 0.0155 0.0532** 
SBZ 125 405 0.1041 0.1486 0.001*** 0.0050 0.0229 0.001*** 
ROA 188 624 0.0973 0.1138 0.01*** 0.0080 0.0189 0.001*** 
CROA 130 461 0.0952 0.1147 0.005*** 0.0066 0.0179 0.001*** 
H-leverage 139 391 0.0923 0.1409 0.01*** 0.0063 0.0193 0.002*** 
L-GRO 131 399 0.0924 0.1378 0.001*** 0.0074 0.0178 0.001*** 
***, **and * indicates the significance of difference at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels respectively.  Note: NGCC= subsample for all banks 
listed in non Gulf cooperation Council, BPT= subsample for all banks before the occurrence of the political issues in some MENA countries 
(2006-2010), APT= subsample for all banks after the occurrence of the political issues in some MENA countries (2011-2015), 
PTC=subsample for banks listed in countries that have political issues (Egypt, Syria, Tunisia, Yemen and Iraq), NPTC= subsample for 
banks listed in countries that are politically stable, SBZ= subsample for small banks size, ROA= subsample for banks with return on assets 
in the interval between (0, 0.005), CROA= subsample for banks with change in return on assets in the interval between (0, 0.005) H-
leverage= subsample for banks with high leverage, L-GRO= subsamples for banks with low growth. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
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5.6 Summary of the Chapter 
This chapter aims to measure EM in both types of banks (IBs and NIBs) in MENA 
countries by using two different models: the two-stage model and the modified Jones 
model. The former is employed as a major model while the latter used as an 
alternative model to capture EM. It also aims to examine whether the level of EM 
differs significantly between IBs and NIBs. This chapter provides a descriptive 
analysis of EM for the entire sample, across years and across countries for 106 banks 
listed in MENA countries over a 10-year period, from 2006 to 2015. The descriptive 
analysis illustrates that the mean values of EMLLPs and EMDA for the entire sample 
are 0.1115 and 0.0155. These findings are in line with both agency and signalling 
theories, since both theories support the argument that bank managers engage in EM 
by using accounting choice or accruals in order to transmit signals to the market about 
their financial strength and to reach their earnings target.   
Furthermore, the descriptive analysis across years indicates that the highest mean 
values of EMLLPs and EMDA were in the years 2006 and 2011 respectively, whilst 
the lowest EMLLPs and EMDA were in 2012. In addition, the average values of 
EMLLPs across years are higher than those of EMDA. Comparing EM across 
countries, Iraqi banks reported the highest mean values of EM compared to those of 
other MENA countries. 
Based on the descriptive analysis and univariate analyses (t-test) of EM for IBs in 
comparison to NIBs, the result indicates that IBs and NIBs are significantly different 
with regards to EM levels in the years 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011. These 
findings indicate that IBs are less likely to engage in EM compared to NIBs. In the 
years 2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015, however, the t-test shows insignificant differences 
between IBs and NIBs with regards to EM. Although the t-test provides mixed results 
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on the difference in EM practices of IBs and NIBs based on years, the full sample 
confirms that the mean values of EM in IBs are less than in NIBs and the t-test shows 
a significant difference at 1% level. This confirms that IBs are behaving differently 
compared to NIBs with regards to EM and IBs are less likely to manipulate earnings 
compared to NIBs. Moreover, the additional test has supported these findings by 
using a regression analysis of four explanatory variables of EM including bank type. 
The robustness analysis is additionally employed in this chapter in order to examine 
whether the primary findings are in line with the main results. Thus, the current study 
re-investigated several sub-samples of banks with relatively strong incentives to 
engage in EM. The results of all sub-samples provided similar findings to the primary 
results. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
157 
Chapter Six: Results and Discussion of VDQ in Islamic and non-
Islamic Banks Operating in MENA Countries 
6.1 Introduction  
The main purpose of this chapter is to obtain the study’s second objective, namely; 
“to investigate and compare the VDQ in IBs and NIBs in MENA countries over a 
ten–year period from 2006 to 2015”. The multidimensional framework was developed 
to measure VDQ. This chapter is organised as follows: Section 6.2 shows the 
descriptive statistics of the multidimensional framework based on the entire sample, 
across years and across countries, respectively. Section 6.3 presents the descriptive 
statistics and t-teat analyses of VDQ for IBs in comparison to NIBs. In sections 6.4 
and 6.5, the validity of the multidimensional framework and the summary of the 
chapter are provided. 
6.2 Descriptive Statistics of Multidimensional Framework Based on the Entire 
Sample, Across Years and Across Countries 
This section provides a boarder discussion of the multidimensional framework that 
developed by the current study to measure VDQ in both IBs and NIBs. The 
descriptive statistics for the main dimensions (STRQI31, RICHNESS32) are presented 
based on the entire sample, across years and across countries.  
                                                        
31 The quantity dimension (STRQI) provides users with the relative amount of information disclosed voluntarily (how much is 
disclosed).  
32 Richness dimension consists of two sub-dimensions, which are the width and depth. The width of disclosure considers the 
topics included in the disclosure index for the classification and identification of disclosure items, which offers investors more 
general overview of the business alongside its aim to focus on relevant issues. The sub-dimension of depth takes into account the 
information usefulness to users as defined in the conceptual framework of the IASB (2010). 
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6.2.1 VDQ Based on the Entire Sample 
This section provides summary statistics for the dimensions used in the VDQ’ 
framework over a 10-year period, from 2006 to 2015. Table 6.1 shows the mean, 
median, standard deviation, minimum and maximum values of STRQI, RICHNESS 
and VDQ, which represent the main dimensions of the framework.  
Table 6.1 illustrates that the mean value of VDQ for the entire sample is 0.5774 with 
minimum and maximum values of 0.2380 and 0.7679 respectively. This result is 
slightly higher than that of Beretta and Bozzolan (2008), and Urquiza et al., (2009), 
who found that the mean values of forward-looking information quality are 44% and 
45% respectively. This comparison indicates that both IBs and NIBs listed in MENA 
countries have a greater level of VDQ compared to companies, which are listed in the 
Spanish and Italian stock markets. The high level of VDQ found in the current study 
could be attributed to the difference in measuring the depth of disclosed information 
as well as the use of different sectors. This finding is in line with that of Lim et al.,  
(2017) and Michelon et al., (2015), who found that the average value of voluntary 
disclosure quality in companies listed in Australian and UK stock markets are about 
57% and 56% respectively. 
These findings are in line with agency, signalling and stakeholder theories which 
suggest that VDQ is the most appropriate solution in decreasing agency costs as it 
takes into consideration the interests of all stakeholders rather than only the more 
powerful ones (Alves & Raposo, 2011; Gisbert and Navallas, 2013). Increasing VDQ 
could, therefore, solve the problem of information asymmetry. Additionally, bank 
managers could lessen or avoid asymmetric information through disclosing 
(signalling) private information voluntarily to investors and the market. Credible and 
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relevant voluntary disclosure is considered to be a vital element in decreasing 
asymmetric information (Hughes, 1989).  
 
In addition, table 6.1 shows that the mean value of the quantity dimension of 
disclosure, which is represented by STRQI, is 0.6382 with median, minimum and 
maximum values of 0.6951, 0 and 1 respectively. This result implies that the mean 
value of quantity disclosure for the entire sample is 63%, which is higher than that of 
Beretta and Bozzolan, (2008), who reported that the mean value of STRQI among 85 
Italian non-financial firms from 1999 to 2001 is about 50%. This may be attributed to 
the difference in items included in the disclosure index compared to the one used in 
this study, low observation and type of firms investigated. In addition, their study is 
limited to the quality of forward-looking information only, whereas this study focuses 
on voluntary disclosure quality in general.  
 
In respect of the Richness dimension, which is represented the average of the sub-
dimensions of both Width and Depth33. Table 6.1 illustrates that the average value of 
RICHNESS is 0.5575 with minimum and maximum values of 0.3566 and 0.7283 
respectively. This finding indicates that the average value of combining both WID 
and DEPTH together in both types of banks is about 56%, suggesting that banks in 
MENA countries disclosed variety of information voluntarily that match the 
qualitative characteristics of corporate disclosure suggested by the IFRS (relevance, 
faithful representation, understandability, comparability and timeliness). This result is 
in line with Beretta et al., (2008) who show that the average value of DEPTH is 55%.  
 
 
                                                        
33 The width of disclosure considers the topics included in the disclosure index for the classification and identification of 
disclosure items, which offers investors more general overview of the business alongside its aim to focus on relevant issues. The 
sub-dimension of depth takes into account the information usefulness to users as defined in the conceptual framework of the 
IASB (2010). 
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Table 6. 1 Descriptive Analyses of Multidimensional Framework for the Entire 
Sample 
 Obs STRQI RICHNESS VDQ 
Mean  1060 0.6382 0.5575 0.5774 
Median 1060 0.6951 0.5513 0.5759 
S.D 1060 0.2048 0.0678 0.0530 
Min 1060 0 0.3566 0.2380 
Max 1060 1 0.7283 0.7679 
Note:  STRQI= standardised relative quantity index, RICHNESS= is 
the average value of both WID and depth, VDQ= is the voluntary 
disclosure quality ratio (measured as the average value of both STRQI 
and RICHNESS). 
 
6.2.2 VDQ for the Entire Sample Across Years 
This section attempts to show the VDQ trend during the study period. The descriptive 
statistics of the multidimensional framework for the entire sample (IBs and NIBs) 
across years, from 2006 to 2015 is presented in table 6.2. With regards to the VDQ, 
table 6.2 demonstrates that the highest and lowest mean values of VDQ are 0.6465 
and 0.5352 in 2015 and 2012 respectively. In addition, the mean value of VDQ was 
not consistent as it increases and decreases over the study period; this could be 
attributed to the fluctuation in the STRQI as the quantity dimension represents half 
(50%) of VDQ. 
Based on the STRQI dimension, table 6.2 shows that the highest mean value of 
STRQI, which is 0.7822 was in 2006, with minimum and maximum values of 0.6015 
and 1 respectively. In addition, the median value of STRQI in the year 2006 is 0.7887 
with a standard deviation of 0.0858. The lowest mean value of STRQI, however, was 
0.5221 in the year 2014 with median, minimum and maximum values of 0.6846, 0 
and 0.8102 respectively. In addition, it can be seen that the level of mean values of 
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STRQI started decreasing dramatically from 0.7822 in 2006 to 0.5928 in 2009. The 
decline in the level of the information disclosed voluntarily by banks listed in MENA 
countries may be attributed to the financial crisis that occurred during the same 
period. In respect of the Richness dimension, table 6.2 illustrates that the greatest and 
smallest average values of RICHNESS are 0.6072 and 0.5031 in 2015 and 2006 
respectively. According to the findings presented in table 6.2, the average value of 
combining both WID and DEPTH together in both types of banks listed in MENA 
countries increased significantly over the study period, suggesting that those banks 
are disclosing more valuable information voluntarily each year.  
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Table 6. 2 Descriptive Statistics of the Multidimensional Framework for the Entire Sample Across Years 
Dimensions   2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
STRQI 
Obs  106 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 
Mean  0.7822 0.7216 0.6643 0.5928 0.6457 0.6183 0.5316 0.5399 0.5221 0.7637 
Median 0.7887 0.7407 0.7782 0.6401 0.7002 0.6951 0.5972 0.6929 0.6846 0.8392 
S.D 0.0858 0.0904 0.2241 0.1418 0.1307 0.1928 0.1462 0.2791 0.2909 0.1302 
Min 0.6015 0.5066 0.1702 0.0458 0.1129 0.1022 0.2573 0.0032 0 0.2624 
Max 1 0.9006 0.8848 0.8528 0.8352 0.8878 0.7399 0.8158 0.8102 0.8625 
RICHNESS 
Mean  0.5031 0.5101 0.5224 0.5417 0.5532 0.5649 0.5781 0.5901 0.6040 0.6072 
Median 0.4944 0.5091 0.5210 0.5386 0.5480 0.5632 0.5794 0.5921 0.6053 0.6116 
S.D 0.0573 0.0534 0.0545 0.0529 0.0527 0.0550 0.0608 0.0611 0.0635 0.0646 
Min 0.3566 0.3637 0.3710 0.4303 0.4397 0.4406 0.4202 0.4479 0.4485 0.4507 
Max 0.6365 0.6438 0.6599 0.6621 0.6863 0.6932 0.7000 0.7184 0.7230 0.7283 
VDQ 
Mean  0.5958 0.5739 0.5874 0.5400 0.5696 0.5747 0.5352 0.5751 0.5759 0.6465 
Median 0.5889 0.5696 0.5866 0.5396 0.5689 0.5732 0.5372 0.5817 0.5792 0.6491 
S.D 0.0456 0.0419 0.0308 0.0576 0.0468 0.0493 0.0341 0.0447 0.0455 0.0432 
Min 0.5317 0.5146 0.4714 0.2380 0.2735 0.2726 0.4520 0.2898 0.2902 0.3634 
Max 0.7679 0.7679 0.6940 0.6876 0.7398 0.7339 0.6414 0.6505 0.6502 0.7679 
Note:  STRQI= standardised relative quantity index, RICHNESS= is the average value of both WID and depth, VDQ= is the voluntary disclosure quality ratio 
(measured as the average value of both STRQI and RICHNESS). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
163 
6.2.3 VDQ for the Entire Sample Across Countries 
This section provides an overview of the VDQ and its main dimensions among different 
MENA countries. The descriptive statistics of the multidimensional framework for the 
entire sample (IBs and NIBs) across countries is demonstrated in table 6.3. With regards 
to VDQ, table 6.3 illustrates that the highest mean value of VDQ is 0.6063 in banks 
listed in Kuwait, with minimum and maximum values of 0.4491 and 0.7679 
respectively, whereas the lowest mean value of VDQ is 0.5278 in banks listed in Iraq, 
with minimum and maximum values of 0.2380 and 0.6665 respectively. This result 
suggests that banks operating in the Kuwaiti stock market provide more valuable and 
high quality information compared to those operating in other MENA countries’ stock 
markets. In addition, banks listed in Kuwait stock market, however, have higher VDQ 
and Iraqi banks have lower VDQ among all banks in the study sample. This result could 
be attributed to the enhanced corporate governance system that is applied in Kuwait 
compared to other countries in the MENA region (Baydoun, Maguire, Ryan & Willett, 
2012). Whereas, Iraq is in very early stages of economic development with stock 
markets still at a rudimentary stage and economically vulnerable due to political 
instability (Barth, Caprio Jr & Levine, 2013; Piesse, Strange & Toonsi, 2012). 
Additionally, this result could lead the researcher to expect a negative association 
between EM and VDQ as banks that report high quality information voluntarily are less 
likely to engage in EM.  
Based on the STRQI dimension, table 6.3 shows that the highest mean value of STRQI 
is 0.8018 in banks listed in Oman with minimum and maximum values of 0.6790 and 
0.9314 respectively. The lowest mean value of STRQI is 0.3195 in banks listed in Iran, 
however, with minimum and maximum values of 0.0032 and 0.6015 respectively. This 
result may be attributed to the appropriate economic and financial policies employed in 
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Oman, which enhances the efficiency of the banking sector. Oman and other GCC plan 
to transform their economies into international financial and trade centres (Al-Musalli & 
Ismail, 2012; Al-Obaidan, 2008). While, the low mean value of STRQI in Iranian banks 
may be due to the stock market volatility (Zanjirdar & Kabiribalajadeh, 2011).  
According to the RICHNESS dimension, table 6.3 demonstrates that the highest and 
lowest mean values are 0.6119 and 0.4783 in banks operating in Bahrain and Palestine 
respectively. This result implies that banks listed in Bahrain stock market are more 
likely to disclose variety of information voluntarily that match the qualitative 
characteristics of corporate disclosure suggested by the IFRS compared to other banks 
listed in different MENA countries. This result could be attributed to that Bahrain is a 
hub for the financial sector in MENA region. It provides global best-practice standards 
and a good business environment that makes investors feel more secured by investing in 
transparent, safe and consistent market (Najjar, 2012). 
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Table 6. 3 Descriptive Statistics of the Multidimensional Framework for the Entire 
Sample Across Countries 
 
Countries Obs Dimensions  Mean Median S.D Min Max 
Bahrain 130 
STRQI 0.5635 0.6035 0.2386 0.0319 0.9230 
RICHNESS 0.6119 0.6166 0.0631 0.4766 0.7283 
VDQ 0.5985 0.5902 0.0497 0.4810 0.7679 
Egypt 50 
STRQI 0.6325 0. 6860 0.1876 0.0161 0.8383 
RICHNESS 0.5717 0. 5636 0.0486 0.4771 0.6803 
VDQ 0.5777 0. 5743 0.0348 0.5155 0.6635 
 
Iran 
20 
 
STRQI 0.3195 0.3321 0.1999 0.0032 0.6015 
RICHNESS 0.5970 0.5818 0.0451 0.5351 0.6803 
VDQ 0.5814 0.5775 0.0416 0.5114 0.6894 
Iraq 20 
STRQI 0.5686 0.6470 0.2363 0.0543 0.8593 
RICHNESS 0.5198 0.5150 0.0377 0.4607 0.5949 
VDQ 0.5278 0.5601 0.1085 0.2380 0.6665 
 
Israel 
30 
 
STRQI 0.7173 0.6992 0.0695 0.5969 0.8396 
RICHNESS 0.5442 0.5494 0.0499 0.4159 0.6288 
VDQ 0.5597 0.5559 0.0376 0.4924 0.6605 
Jordan 120 
STRQI 0.6954 0.7324 0.1672 0.0595 0.8771 
RICHNESS 0.5423 0.5443 0.0644 0.3566 0.6816 
VDQ 0.5791 0.5768 0.0425 0.4831 0.6715 
Kuwait 80 
STRQI 0.6738 0.7865 0.2418 0 1 
RICHNESS 0.5744 0.5778 0.0662 0.3594 0.7049 
VDQ 0.6063 0.5920 0.0620 0.4491 0.7679 
 
Lebanon 
20 
 
STRQI 0.5550 0.7198 0.2996 0.0458 0.8450 
RICHNESS 0.4970 0.4974 0.0336 0.4430 0.5465 
VDQ 0.5551 0.5459 0.0476 0.4746 0.6718 
Morocco 40 
STRQI 0.7082 0.6898 0.0707 0.5893 0.8381 
RICHNESS 0.4792 0.4800 0.0282 0.4217 0.5164 
VDQ 0.5937 0.5922 0.0360 0.5169 0.6894 
 
Oman 
40 
 
STRQI 0.8018 0.7993 0.0602 0.6790 0.9314 
RICHNESS 0.5200 0.5161 0.0263 0.4761 0.5782 
VDQ 0.5582 0.5528 0.0419 0.4686 0.6439 
Palestinian 40 
STRQI 0.7024 0.6846 0.0727 0.5841 0.8371 
RICHNESS 0.4783 0.4779 0.0289 0.4269 0.5369 
VDQ 0.5495 0.5535 0.0349 0.4831 0.6240 
 
Qatar 
60 
 
STRQI 0.6541 0.6950 0.1738 0.0339 0.8398 
RICHNESS 0.5789 0.5808 0.0583 0.4723 0.6860 
VDQ 0.5864 0.5912 0.0362 0.5006 0.6790 
 
Saudi 
Arabia 
90 
 
 
STRQI 0.5502 0.6361 0.2345 0.0292 0.8398 
RICHNESS 0.5634 0.5683 0.0660 0.4016 0.6945 
VDQ 0.5649 0.5652 0.0379 0.4801 0.6630 
 
Syrian 
60 
STRQI 0.6930 0.6848 0.1104 0.0461 0.8371 
RICHNESS 0.4981 0.4987 0.0404 0.4202 0.5724 
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Arab Rep VDQ 0.5506 0.5530 0.0407 0.4520 0.6423 
Tunisia 70 
STRQI 0.7230 0.7066 0.0677 0.6039 0.8405 
RICHNESS 0.5058 0.5182 0.0390 0.4227 0.5909 
VDQ 0.5576 0.5548 0.0353 0.4900 0.6623 
 
UAE 
 
180 
STRQI 0.6330 0.6936 0.1912 0.0305 0.8397 
RICHNESS 0.5972 0.5958 0.0593 0.4277 0.7230 
VDQ 0.5866 0.5850 0.0499 0.2499 0.6917 
Yemen 10 
STRQI 0.3200 0.3325 0.2054 0.0039 0.6020 
RICHNESS 0.5821 0.5867 0.0472 0.5124 0.6526 
VDQ 0.5991 0.6125 0.1221 0.4178 0.7679 
Note:  STRQI= standardised relative quantity index, RICHNESS= is the average value of both WID and depth, VDQ= is the 
voluntary disclosure quality ratio (measured as the average value of both STRQI and RICHNESS). 
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6.3 VDQ for IBs in Comparison to NIBs 
This section concentrate on the VDQ and its dimensions based on the bank type (IBs 
and NIBs). It provides broader understanding of VDQ in comparison between both IBs 
and NIBs. Therefore, descriptive statistics and t-test analyses of VDQ for IBs in 
comparison to NIBs are provided. 
6.3.1 The Descriptive Statistics of VDQ for IBs in Comparison to NIBs 
The descriptive statistics of the multidimensional framework for IBs in comparison to 
NIBs is presented in table 6.4. The mean and median values of VDQ in both IBs and 
NIBs are 0.5878- 0.5793 and 0.5735- 0.5333 respectively. In addition, the maximum 
values of VDQ in IBs and NIBs are 0.7679 and 0.6917, respectively. Taking the median 
values of VDQ as a cut-off point, the VDQ in IBs is 5% higher compared to NIBs. This 
result is consistent with the findings of Nugraheni and Azlan Anuar, (2014), who found 
that Shari’ah- and non–Shari’ah compliant companies differ significantly concerning 
their voluntary disclosure quality, and Shari’ah compliant companies are more likely to 
provide high voluntary disclosure quality compared with its competitors. The high VDQ 
in IBs may be attributed to that, IBs increased VDQ in an attempt to raise the level of 
investors' confidence and reduce the asymmetric information gap, as IBs are expected to 
be more transparent. Therefore, reporting wider variety of information voluntarily that 
match the qualitative characteristics of corporate disclosure could have been used as a 
tool to reduce information asymmetry and raise investors’ confidence (Nugraheni & 
Azlan Anuar, 2014).  
With regards to the STRQI dimension, table 6.4 shows that the mean value of STRQI in 
IBs is 49%, whereas, the mean value of STRQI in NIBs is 73%. This result indicates 
that NIBs are more likely to disclose a greater quantity of information compared to IBs. 
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In respect to the RICHNESS dimension, table 6.4 documents that the mean values of 
RICHNESS in IBs and NIBs are 61% and 53% respectively. This result implies that IBs 
are more likely to disclose valuable information voluntarily compared to NIBs. 
 
Table 6. 4 Descriptive Statistics of the Multidimensional Framework for IBs in 
comparison to NIBs 
 IBs NIBs IBs NIBs 
Obs STRQI RICHNESS VDQ STRQI RICHNESS VDQ 
Mean  290 770 0.4919 0.6111 0.5878 0.7310 0.5373 0.5735 
Median 290 770 0.4214 0.6126 0.5793 0.7276 0.5316 0.5333 
S.D 290 770 0.2118 0.0615 0.0575 0.0969 0.0584 0.0507 
Min 290 770 0 0.3571 0.4178 0.0458 0.3566 0.2380 
Max 290 770 0.8646 0.7283 0.7679 1 0.6926 0.6917 
Note:  STRQI= standardised relative quantity index, RICHNESS= is the average value of both WID and 
depth, VDQ= is the voluntary disclosure quality ratio (measured as the average value of both STRQI 
and  RICHNESS). 
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6.3.2 Analyses of VDQ for IBs in Comparison to NIBs  
The comparison of multidimensional framework dimensions across years and bank 
type will be explained in the following section. The present study divided the sample 
into two separate sub-samples of data with regards to bank types (IBs and NIBs) each 
year. The t-test is employed in order to investigate whether the mean values of VDQ 
and each dimension (STRQI and RICHNESS), which are separately included in the 
multidimensional framework for each year, significantly differ in IBs and NIBs. Table 
6.5 illustrates the t-test results of each dimension based on each year and bank type. 
Furthermore, bar charts of the mean values of each dimension across bank types are 
provided in order to support the primary results of the t-test (see figures 6.1, 6.2 and 
6.3). 
Table 6.5 shows that the mean values of VDQ for the entire sample in both IBs and 
NIBs are 0.5878 and 0.5735 respectively. In addition, the t-test indicates that there is a 
significant difference at the 1% level. Since the mean values of VDQ in IBs is higher 
than NIBs, These outcomes imply that IBs and NIBs do not behave in the same 
manner in terms of VDQ, confirming the second hypothesis that VDQ is greater in IBs 
than NIBs. Consequently, the current study accepts the second hypothesis (H2). These 
findings are consistent with that reported by Albassam et al., (2017) and Nugraheni 
and Azlan Anuar, (2014), who found that the quality of voluntary disclosure is 
statistically and significantly different between Shariah- and non–Shariah compliant 
firms listed in Saudi and Indonesia stock exchange respectively. Furthermore, Shariah 
compliant firms are more likely to provide high VDQ compared with its competitors. 
This finding could be attributed to that IBs increased VDQ in an attempt to meet the 
requirements of Islamic accounting in the Islamic perspective of disclosure, which are 
the full disclosure concept and the concept of social accountability (Haniffa & Hudaib, 
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2002; Abdulrahman, Anam & Fatima, 2010). Therefore, IBs are expected to be more 
transparent by reporting relevant, reliable and variety of information voluntarily, 
which in turn raise the level of investors' confidence and reduce the asymmetric 
information gap as well as helping managers to fulfil their accountability to society 
(Haniffa & Hudaib, 2002; Nugraheni & Azlan Anuar, 2014).  
With respect to the VDQ during each year, table 6.5 illustrates the t-test result of the 
difference in mean values of VDQ in both IBs and NIBs during the study period. 
Although the t-tests during 2006, 2008, 2013 and 2014 demonstrate insignificant 
difference between IBs and NIBs, the mean values of VDQ in IBs are higher 
compared to NIBs. On the other hand, during 2007, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2015 
the mean values of VDQ in IBs are also greater compared to NIBs. In addition, the t-
test shows that there is a significant difference in means concerning VDQ during these 
years, between both IBs and NIBs, at 10%, 5%, 5%, 10%, 10%, 1% levels 
respectively. This result indicated that VDQ in the banking sector in MENA countries 
is different based on the bank’s type, confirming that IBs are more likely to disclose 
high quality information voluntarily compared with NIBs.  
With respect to the STRQI dimension, table 6.5 documents that the mean values of 
STRQI in NIBs are higher than those of IBs in every year during the study period. 
Moreover, the t-test shows that there is a significant difference at the 1% level. As 
regards to the entire sample, the mean values of STRQI in both IBs and NIBs are 
0.4919 and 0.7310 respectively. In addition, the t-test shows that there is a significant 
difference between IBs and NIBs in terms of STRQI at the 1% level. These results 
signify that NIBs disclose greater quantity information compared to IBs and behave 
differently in terms of the quantity of information disclosed. 
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Regarding the RICHNESS dimension, table 6.5 illustrates that the mean values of 
RICHNESS in IBs across years and for the entire sample are greater compared to 
NIBs. In addition, the t-test shows significant differences between IBs and NIBs at the 
1% level across years and for the entire sample, suggesting that IBs are disclosing 
more valuable and reliable information voluntarily compared with NIBs. 
Conversely, the bar charts of the mean values of each dimension for the entire sample 
support the above findings (see figures 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3). For instance, it can be seen 
that figure 6.1 shows a slight difference between VDQ in both types of banks, and IBs 
are disclosing high quality information voluntarily compared to NIBs. Figure 6.2 
shows that NIBs disclose a greater quantity of information compared to IBs. In 
addition, RICHNESS dimension confirm the significant difference between IBs and 
NIBs and that IBs are more likely to disclose varied and reliable information 
voluntarily compared with their competitors.  
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Table 6. 5 Univariate Test of Multidimensional Framework Dimensions 
(Comparison Across Years and Bank Types) 
 
 VDQ STRQI RICHNESS 
 Obs IBs NIBs T-test IBs NIBs T-test IBs NIBs T-test 
 IBs NIBs Mean  Mean  Mean  
2006 29 77 0.6086 0.5909 0.1652 0 .6849 0 .8188 0.01*** 0.5487 0.4860 0.01*** 
2007 29 77 0 .5893 0.5681 0.084* 0.6124 0.7628 0.01*** 0.5528 0.4940 0.01*** 
2008 29 77 0.5924 0.5855 0.4257 0.3207 0.7937 0.01*** 0.5730 0.5033 0.01*** 
2009 29 77 0.5559 0.5341 0.05** 0.4257 0.6557 0.01*** 0.5904 0.5233 0.01*** 
2010 29 77 0.5866 0.5632 0.03** 0.4689 0 .7123 0.01*** 0.6026 0.5346 0.01*** 
2011 29 77 0.5881 0.5700 0.09* 0.3603 0.7155 0.01*** 0.6170 0.5453 0.01*** 
2012 29 77 0.5452 0.5314 0.08* 0.3027 0.6178 0.01*** 0.6357 0.5564 0.01*** 
2013 29 77 0.5752 0.5750 0.9878 0.1663 0.7032 0.01*** 0.6474 0.5685 0.01*** 
2014 29 77 0.5766 5740 0.7890 0.6627 0.6951 0.01*** 0.6692 0.5795 0.01*** 
2015 29 77 0.6638 0.6401 0.01*** 0.6627 0.6945 0.01*** 0.6682 0.5765 0.01*** 
Entire 
sample  
290 770 0.5878 0.5735 0.01*** 0.4919 0.7310 0.01*** 0.6111 0.5373 0.01*** 
***, **and * indicate the significance of difference at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels respectively. 
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Figure 6. 1 VDQ34 for IBs in Comparison to NIBs 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. 2 STRD35 for IBs in comparison to NIBs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
34 VDQ: voluntary disclosure quality.  (0 and 1) A dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the bank is 
Islamic and 0 if it is Non-Islamic bank.  
35 STRQI: is the quantity dimension, which provides users with the relative amount of information disclosed voluntarily (how 
much is disclosed).  
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Figure 6. 3 RICHNESS36 for IBs in Comparison to NIBs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
36 Richness is the second dimension of the VDQ framework and consists of two sub-dimensions: width and depth. The width 
of disclosure considers the topics included in the disclosure index for the classification and identification of disclosure items, 
which offers investors a more general overview of the business alongside its aim to focus on relevant issues. The sub-dimension 
of depth takes into account the information’s usefulness to users as defined in the conceptual framework of the IASB (2010). (0 
and 1) A dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the bank is Islamic and 0 if it is Non-Islamic bank. 
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6.4 Validity of the Multidimensional Framework 
According to IASB, the purpose of VDQ is to provide investors with a better 
understanding of the information contained in the annual reports (Board, 2010; 
Council, 2007), and thus reduce information asymmetry problems. Disclosing high 
quality information raises the company's value and lessens the uncertainty regarding 
the firm’s performance, and thus assists investors to make a better valuation of a firm 
(Al-Maghzom et al., 2016; Beyer, Cohen, Lys & Walther, 2010; Elzahar, Hussainey, 
Mazzi & Tsalavoutas, 2015; Leuz & Wysocki, 2008). Several empirical studies have 
indicated a positive and significant association between high VDQ and capital market 
reaction on the information disclosed by the company (Cahan, De Villiers, Jeter, 
Naiker & Van Staden, 2016; Jiao, 2011; Nekhili, Nagati, Chtioui & Rebolledo, 2017). 
Consequently, the current study argues that information disclosed by both IBs and 
NIBs is considered to be high quality when it is positively linked to market reaction 
and vice versa. In order to validate the VDQ framework, the current study investigate 
the relationship between VDQ and market reaction, after controlling for factors that 
might affect information disclosure such as size, leverage, profitability, growth and 
liquidity (Ahmed & Courtis, 1999).  
Following prior literature (Battaglia & Gallo, 2015; Sharma, Shebalkov & 
Yukhanaev, 2016; Zaki, Sholihin & Barokah, 2014), this study employs the market-
based value (MBV) as an indicator for market reaction, which is measured by using 
the aggregate of both Tobin’s Q and earnings per-share. The former is measured as 
the market value of equity to book value of equity, whereas, earnings per-share is 
measured as net income to outstanding ordinary shares. Consequently, the current 
study used MBV and VDQ as dependent and independent variables respectively, 
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while size, leverage, profitability, growth and liquidity are utilised as control variables 
(Ahmed & Courtis, 1999; Beretta & Bozzolan, 2008).  
Before proceeding to examine the association between MBV and VDQ based on 
panel data analysis, the correlation coefficients matrix test was employed in order to 
check for the existence of collinearity problems. Tables 6.6 and 6.7 provide the level 
of correlation in both IBs and NIBs. The highest level of correlation was 36% and 
38% between growth and leverage in IBs and NIBs respectively. Based on the 
argument of Alghamdi and Ali, (2012) and Harris and Raviv, (2008) that the cut-off 
points of high levels of correlation between the explanatory variables in the 
correlation coefficients matrix is ±80%. This suggests that there are low correlation 
coefficients among the independent variables.  
Following Samimi et al., (2012) and Usman and Tandelilin, (2014) the current study 
applied the Chow test in order to compare between pooled and panel regression. The 
result of the Chow test shows that the F statistics have a high level of significance (F= 
0.001 and F=0.001) for both IBs and NIBs respectively, indicating that panel data is 
more appropriate (see appendices, 6.1 and 6.2). In addition, the Hausman 
specification test is used to compare between random and fixed effects. The result of 
the Hausman tests are (Prob > Chi2 = 0.1090 and 0.1029) in IBs and NIBs 
respectively, confirms that the random effect model is the more appropriate model 
(see appendices, 6.3 and 6.4). 
 
Table 6.8 provides the results of the relationship between MBV and VDQ in both IBs 
and NIBs. The R2 of the model in both IBs and NIBs samples are 0.1809 and 0.1421 
respectively, suggesting that 18% and 14% of the variation in the dependent variable 
is explained by the study’s explanatory variables. In addition, table 6.8 shows that the 
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p-value of the regression model is highly significant at the 1% level. This result 
indicates that the model has a valid explanatory power and can be compared with EM 
and VDQ empirical studies (Beretta & Bozzolan, 2008; Pyo & Lee, 2013).  
Based on the result reported in table 6.8 the coefficients of VDQ are positively and 
significantly associated with MBV at 1 % level in both types of banks (IBs and 
NIBs). This result emphasises that the VDQ assists investors with high quality of 
information that reduced information asymmetry gap, and thus, increased the 
company's value and the market react positively to these information. In addition, this 
result indicates that the characteristics of corporate disclosure that are considered by 
the developed framework to measure the VDQ are useful and have captured the 
quality of voluntary disclosure. Therefore, the positive relationship between MBV 
and VDQ provides an empirical evidence for the validity of the developed framework 
used in the current study. Furthermore, this finding is in line with those results 
reported by Beretta and Bozzolan, (2008); Cahan et al., (2016); Jiao, (2011); Nekhili 
et al., (2017) who found that VDQ has a positive and significant association with 
capital market reaction. 
With regards to the control variables, table 6.8 shows that the coefficient of leverage 
is negatively and significantly associated with MBV at 1% level in both IBs and 
NIBs. This finding suggests that capital market react negatively to those banks that 
have higher leverage as it's linked with greater risk. This result is consistent with 
Grove et al., (2011). Furthermore, table 6.8 shows that the coefficient of profitability 
is positively and significantly associated with MBV at 5% level in NIBs, while it has 
insignificant relationship with IBs. 
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Table 6. 6 Correlation Matrices Analysis for IBs 
 VDQ Bank-size Growth LEVER PROFT LIQ 
VDQ 1.0000      
Bank-size 0.3215*** 1.0000     
Growth 0.0012 0.0018 1.0000    
LEVER -0.0564 -0.0459 -0.3680*** 1.0000   
PROFT 0.0531 -0.0625 -0.0335 -0.0214 1.0000  
LIQ 0.0334 0.0403 0.0612 -0.3713*** -0.1725*** 1.0000 
VDQ = Quality of voluntary disclosure achieved from multidimensional framework, Quantity= the level of voluntary disclosure, BANK-SIZE= is measured by the Logarithm of total 
assets at the year-end, GROWTH= is measured as the change of total assets divided by the lagged of total assets. LEVER= Leverage is measured by total liabilities to total assets at 
the end of the financial year,, PROFIT= Profitability as measured by net Income divided by lagged total Assets, LIQ= Bank Liquidity as measured by current assets divided by current 
liabilities at the end of the financial year. 
……………………………………….……………………………………………………………….……………………………………….……………………………………….……………………………………….……………………………………….……………………………………….…… 
 
 
 
Table 6. 7 Correlation Matrices Analysis for NIBs 
 VDQ Bank-size Growth LEVER PROFT LIQ 
VDQ 1.0000      
Bank-size 0.3304*** 1.0000     
Growth 0.1087*** 0.1005*** 1.0000    
LEVER -0.1123*** -0.0193 -0.3881*** 1.0000   
PROFT -0.1595*** 0.0183 -0.0483 0.0017 1.0000  
LIQ 0.0405 -0.0349 0.0087 -0.0705 -0.0494 1.0000 
VDQ = Quality of voluntary disclosure achieved from multidimensional framework, Quantity= the level of voluntary disclosure, BANK-SIZE= is measured by the Logarithm of total assets 
at the year-end, GROWTH= is measured as the change of total assets divided by the lagged of total assets. LEVER= Leverage is measured by total liabilities to total assets at the end of the 
financial year,, PROFIT= Profitability as measured by net Income divided by lagged total Assets, LIQ= Bank Liquidity is measured by current assets divided by current liabilities at the end 
of the financial year. ……………………………………….……………………………………………………………….……………………………………….……………………………………….……………………………………….……………………………………….……………………………………….………………. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
179 
Table 6. 8 Results of Panel Data Regression for the Relationship Between VDQ and MBV for both IBs and NIBs 
 
 IBs NIBs 
MBV Obs Coef. Z P>|z| Obs Coef. Z P>|z| 
VDQ 290 12.1057 3.00 0.003*** 770 31.7785 3.44 0.001*** 
Bank-Size 290 -0.1599 -1.10 0.271 770 -0.0755 -0.66 0.508 
Growth 290 -3.8743 -1.11 0.268 770 -9.8894 -1.41 0.159 
LEVER 290 -8.5203 -2.40 0.017*** 770 -24.8852 -2.92 0.003*** 
PROFT 290 4.7197 0.74 0.357 770 2.8111 2.04 0.041** 
LIQ 290 -0.0317 -0.50 0.620 770 -0.1552 -0.62 0.537 
_Cons 290 6.8455 2.37 0.001 770 3.9541 2.40 0.002 
Random-effect GLS regression, R2: 0.1809, Prob > Chi2: 0.0001 
Random-effect GLS regression, R2: 0.1421, Prob > 
Chi2: 0.0001 
***, **and * indicate the significance of coefficient at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels respectively. 
 
MBV= market-based value is an indicator for market reaction, which is measured by using the aggregate of both Tobin’s Q and earnings per -share. VDQ = Quality 
of voluntary disclosure achieved from multidimensional framework, BANK-SIZE= is measured by the Logarithm of total assets at the year-end, GROWTH= is 
measured as the change of total assets divided by the lagged of total assets. LEVER= Leverage is measured by total liabilities to total assets at the end of the 
financial year,, PROFIT= Profitability as measured by net Income divided by lagged total Assets, LIQ= Bank Liquidity as measured by current assets divided by 
current liabilities at the end of the financial year. 
……………………………………….……………………………………………………………….……………………………………….……………………………………….……………………………………….……………………………………….……………………………………….…… 
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6.5 Summary of the Chapter 
This chapter seeks to measure VDQ in both types of banks (IBs and NIBs) in MENA 
countries by developing a multidimensional framework. It also aims to examine 
whether the VDQ differs significantly between IBs and NIBs. This chapter provides a 
descriptive analysis of the multidimensional framework for the entire sample, across 
years and across countries, for 106 banks listed in MENA countries over a 10- year 
period, from 2006 to 2015. Based on the descriptive analysis for the entire sample, it 
illustrates that the mean value of VDQ is 0.5774. Moreover, the descriptive analysis 
across years indicates that the highest and lowest mean values of VDQ are 0.6465 and 
0.5352 in 2015 and 2012 respectively. Furthermore, comparing VDQ across countries, 
banks listed in Kuwait stock market reported the highest mean value of VDQ while 
banks listed in Iraq stock market reported the lowest mean value of VDQ. These 
findings are in line with agency, signalling and stakeholders theories, suggesting that 
VDQ is the most appropriate solution for decreasing or avoiding an asymmetric 
information issue. 
 
Based on the descriptive statistics of the multidimensional framework for IBs in 
comparison to NIBs, the descriptive analysis shows that the median values of VDQ (as 
a cut-off point) in IBs is 5% higher compared to NIBs, signifying that IBs are more 
likely to disclose high quality information compared with NIBs. In addition, the 
univariate analyses (t-test) of VDQ for IBs in comparison to NIBs, the result indicates 
a significant difference between IBs and NIBs, and the mean values of VDQ in IBs 
overwhelms those of VDQ in NIBs during 2007, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2015. In 
years 2006, 2008, 2013 and 2014, however, the t-test shows an insignificant difference 
between IBs and NIBs with regards to VDQ. Although, the t-test provides mixed 
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results on the difference in VDQ of IBs and NIBs based on years, the full sample 
confirms that the mean value of VDQ in IBs is higher than NIBs. Furthermore, the t-
test shows a significant difference at the 1% level, indicating that VDQ in the banking 
sector in MENA countries is different based on the bank’s type, and it confirms that 
IBs are more likely to disclose high quality information voluntarily compared with 
NIBs. In addition, this chapter examines the validity of the multidimensional 
framework by examining the relationship between VDQ and market reaction. The 
regression result shows a positive relationship between the quality of disclosure 
(VDQ) and MBV. This suggests that the dimensions that considered by the 
multidimensional framework to measure the quality are useful and the framework has 
captured the quality of the information disclosed voluntarily. 
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Chapter Seven: Empirical Analysis (The Relationship between 
Earnings Management and Voluntary Disclosure Quality) 
Data Analysis and Discussion 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter seeks to answer the third question of this study, namely, “what is the 
relationship between EM and VDQ in IBs and NIBs listed in MENA countries?” The 
current study developed a multidimensional approach to measure the VDQ, while the 
two-stage model was employed to measure EM. The regression results show a 
negative relationship between EM and VDQ in both IBs and NIBs. This negative 
association was confirmed through robustness analysis in which EM that obtained 
from Jones model modified for banking institutions was used as dependent variable to 
assess the validity of the key findings. Furthermore, the results of the additional 
analysis have supported this negative influence of VDQ on EM. This chapter is 
organised as follows: section 7.2 provides the descriptive statistics. Section 7.3 
presents the multicollinearity results. Section 7.4 shows the results of panel data 
regression. Sections 7.5 and 7.6 present the robustness analysis and the additional 
analyses respectively. Section 7.7 reports the results of the endogeneity check while 
section 7.8 provides the summary of this chapter. 
7.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 7.1 provides summary statistics for all study variables observed from 2006 to 
2015. The EMLLP that obtained from the two-stage model is used as dependent 
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variable. The independent variable is the VDQ, whereas, corporate governance 
variables and bank characteristics were employed as control variables. With respect to 
dependent (EMLLPs) and independent variables (VDQ), please refer to chapters five 
and six as they provide in-depth explanations of their descriptive statistics (see chapter 
five, section 5.5 and chapter six, section 6.5). 
 
Table 7.1 illustrates that the independence of the board of directors (IBD), board of 
directors’ expertise (BDEX), duality of board of directors (DU), board gender 
diversity (BGD) and board size (BZ) in both IBs and NIBs have mean values of 
0.4678 and 0.2225; 0.9166 and 0.7142; 0.1275 and 0.2467; 0.0083 and 0.1670; 9.1827 
and 8.9467 respectively. These results imply that the proportions of IBD, BDEX and 
the average value of BZ in IBs are higher than NIBs, whereas, the average values of 
DU and BGD in IBs are lower compared to NIBs. This suggest that the board 
members in IBs are more experts, independent, and are less likely to hold more than 
one position with low rate of gender diversity compared to NIBs. These findings are 
consistent with those of Mollah et al., (2017) and Wasiuzzaman and Nair 
Gunasegavan, (2013) who found that the average values of IBD, BDEX and BZ are 
higher for IBs than for NIBs, while, DU and BGD are lower in IBs compared with 
NIBs. In addition, the board meetings (BM) in both IBs and NIBs have mean values of 
5.3448 and 4.4766 respectively, signifying that the directors on the board of IBs meet 
more frequently compared to NIBs. These results are in line with those of Ishak and 
Al-Ebel, (2013), who found that the average value of BM over 137 banks in GCC is 
5.4. 
Furthermore, these results are in line with corporate governance codes that are applied 
in MENA countries. For instance, one-third of the board of directors should be 
independent, the roles of chairman and CEO should be separated, board size should 
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not exceed 16 members and there should not be less than 4 meetings a year (Shehata, 
2015). 
In the case of audit committee variables, table 7.1 shows that the independence of the 
audit committee (IAC) and audit committee expertise (ACEX) in both IBs and NIBs 
have mean values of 0.8451 and 0.3571: 0.7172 and 0.4805 respectively. These results 
signify that the audit committee members in IBs are more experts and independent 
compared to NIBs. These findings are consistent with Li et al., (2012), who found that 
the average value of IAC is about 84%.  
Furthermore, the audit committee size (ACZ), audit committee meetings (ACM) and 
audit committee gender diversity (ACG) in both IBs and NIBs have an average values 
of 3.0586 and 3.0571; 4.6413 and 4.5298; 0.0068 and 0.0075 respectively. This 
implies that both types of banks have almost the same size, number of meetings and 
proportion of females in the audit committee. These findings are quite similar to the 
results reported by Inaam and Khamoussi, (2016); Soliman and Ragab, (2014) and 
D'Amato and Gallo, (2016) who found that the mean values of ACZ, ACM and ACG 
are 3, 4.94 and 0.05 respectively. In addition, these results are consistent with the 
corporate governance codes that are adopted in MENA countries. For instance, the 
composition of audit committees should be at least three members, and the majority of 
the audit committee should be independent, financially expert and meet at least four 
times a year (Shehata, 2015). 
Table 7.1 shows that the audit firm (Big4) in both IBs and NIBs has a mean value of 
0.7551 and 0.5103 respectively. These results signify that IBs are more likely to be 
audited by one of the BIG4 audit firms compared to NIBs. These findings are 
consistent with Pillai and Al-Malkawi, (2017), who found that the average value of 
Big4 is 76%.   
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The managerial ownership (MOS) in IBs and NIBs has average values of 0.0598 and 
0.0381 with maximum values of 0.4998 and 0.8590 respectively. This result is 
consistent with that reported by Forssbaeck, (2011) who found that the mean value of 
managerial ownership of 331 banks from different regions from 1995 to 2005 is 3.6%. 
On the other hand, this finding implies that managerial ownership in both IBs and 
NIBs in MENA countries is very low compared with those reported by Bokpin, 
(2013), who found that the mean value of managerial ownership in 26 listed banks in 
Ghana is 14%. The ownership concentration (BH) in IBs and NIBs has mean values of 
0.2692 and 0.3076 with a large rate of dispersion. This result implies a low level of 
ownership concentration compared to the result of Bouvatier et al., (2014) who found 
that the average value of ownership concentration in 873 European commercial banks 
is 56.08%. 
In terms of the banks’ characteristics, bank size, growth, leverage, profitability and 
liquidity in IBs have mean values of 9.9402, 0.1805, 0.0224, 0.8148 and 2.0739 with 
maximum values of 32.082, 0.9275, 0.5309, 0.8909 and 87.5589 respectively. In 
comparison, the average values of bank size, growth, leverage, profitability and 
liquidity in NIBs have mean values of 6.8124, 0.1337, 0.3677, 0.6020 and 1.2032 with 
maximum values of 32.082, 0.6298, 2.125 and 45.201 respectively. These results 
imply that the mean values of bank size, growth, profitability and liquidity in IBs are 
higher than those of NIBs, while the mean value of leverage in IBs is lower than those 
for NIBs.  
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Table 7. 1 Descriptive Statistics of IBs and NIBs 
 
Variables  
IBs NIBs 
Obs Mean Median S.D Min Max Obs Mean Median S.D Min Max 
Dependent Variable 
EMLLP 290 0.0938 0.1030 0.0387 0.0117 0.5939 770 0.1181 0.1023 0.1500 0.0004 0.9970 
Explanatory variables  
VDQ 290 0.5878 0.5793 0.0575 0.4178 0.7679 770 0.5735 0.5333 0.0507 0.2380 0.6917 
IBD 290 0.4678 0.5000 0.2169 0 0.9090 770 0.2225 0.1818 0.2532 0 .9090 
BZ 290 9.1827 9 2.3932 3 16 770 8.9467 10 3.1256 0 16 
BDEX 290 0.9166 0.4545 0.1913 0.3333 1 770 0.7142 0.3340 0.4495 0.2857 0.9090 
DU 290 0.1275 0 0.3342 0 1 770 0.2467 0 0.4314 0 1 
BGD 290 0.0083 0 0.0270 0 0.1250 770 0.1670 0 0.0383 0 0.3333 
BM 290 5.3448 6 1.6150 2 10 770 4.4766 4 2.5325 2 11 
IAC 290 0.8451 1 0.3329 0 1 770 0.3571 0.3300 0.3786 0 1 
ACZ 290 3.0586 3 0.4991 2 5 770 3.0571 3 1.0694 2 6 
ACM 290 4.6413 4 0.8333 4 9 770 4.5298 4 1.0877 4 11 
ACEX 290 0.7172 0.5212 0.4511 0.3333 1 770 0.4805 0.3906 0.4999 0.3333 1 
BIG 4 290 0.7551 1 0.4307 0 1 770 0.5103 1 0.5002 0 1 
ACG 290 0.0086 0 0.0456 0 0.2500 770 0.0075 0 0.0420 0 0.3333 
MOS 290 0.0598 0 0.1069 0 0.4998 770 0.0381 0 0.1310 0 0.8590 
BH 290 0.2692 0.1830 0.2847 0.0001 0.934 770  0.3076 0.2185 0.3254 6.68e07 0.9838 
BANK- SIZE 290 9.9402 7.1740 8.7464 0.0003 32.0828 770 6.8124 3.2296 7.5624 0.0053 32.8636 
GROWTH 290 0.1805 0.1374 0.1544 0.0050 0.9275 770 0.1337 0.1226 0.0811 0.0001 0.9120 
LEVER 290 0.0224 0.0143 0.0648 -0.4435 0.5309 770 0.3677 0.3788 0.0843 0 0.6298 
PROFIT 290 0.8148 0.8746 0.2026 -0.4179 0.8909 770 0.6020 0.6202 0.4586 -0.0031 2.125 
LIQ 290 2.0739 1.1413 7.3137 -2.3924 87.5589 770 1.2032 1.1360 1.6157 0 45.201 
 
Note:  Dependent variable: EMLLP= Discretionary accruals gained from Two-stage model, Independent variables: VDQ = Quality of voluntary disclosure score, IBD= 
Independence Board of Directors as measured by the ratio of independent non-executive directors number to the total number of board members, BZ= Board Size as 
measured by the number of board members on the board, BDEX= Board of director’s expertise measured as the proportion of experienced board members on the board, 
DU= Duality A dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the Chief executive officer is holding two roles, BGD= Board Gender Diversity measures as a percentage of female 
on the board of directors, BM=Board Meeting as measured by the number of board meetings held in the financial year, IAC= Independence of Audit Committee as 
measured by the ratio of independent non-executive directors to total number of audit committee, ACZ= Audit committee size as measured by the number of audit 
committee members, ACM= Audit committee meetings as measured by the number of board meetings held in the financial year, ACEX= Audit committee expertise 
measured as proportion of experienced audit members on the audit committee, BIG4= a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the bank is audited by Big 4 and 0 
otherwise, ACG= Audit committee gender diversity measures as a percentage of female on the audit committee, MOS= Managerial Ownership as measured by the number 
of shares held by managers to total number of outstanding shares, BH= Block holders as measured by the ratio of outside stockholders owning 5% or more of outstanding 
shares within the bank, BANK-SIZE= is measured by the Logarithm of total assets at the year end, GROWTH= is measured as the change of total assets divided by the 
lagged of total assets. LEVER= Leverage is measured by total liabilities to total assets at the end of the financial year, PROFIT= Profitability as measured by net Income 
divided by lagged total Assets, LIQ= Bank Liquidity as measured by current assets divided by current liabilities at the end of the financial year.  
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7.3 Multicollinearity  
The collinearity issue exists when there is a strong linear relationship between two or 
more independent variables leading to problems in estimating the regression coefficients 
(Alghamdi and Ali, 2012). Multicollinearity can cause several issues, such as a bias in the 
result or an increase in the standard error and variance, which may affect the significance, 
reliability, and stability of the model (Studenmund, 2005). In order to check for the 
existence of collinearity problems, the current study used two statistical tests, which are 
the correlation coefficients matrix and the variance inflation factor (VIF). Following 
Alghamdi and Ali (2012); Gujarati (2008) and Harris and Raviv (2008), the cut-off points 
of high levels of correlation between the explanatory variables in the correlation 
coefficients matrix and variance inflation factor are ±80% and VIF value of 10 
respectively.  
Tables 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4 provide the level of correlation and values of VIF as well as the 
tolerance values in IBs and NIBs. It can be seen that there are low correlation coefficients 
among the independent variables, except the correlation coefficients between ACEX and 
BIG4. Tables 7.2 and 7.3 show that the correlation matrix, which is indicated that there is 
highly significant correlation between ACEX and BIG4, at the level of 0.8890 and 0.8848 
in IBs and NIBs respectively. In addition, table 7.4 shows that ACEX has the highest 
degree of collinearity compared with other explanatory variables, at 6.28 and 5.63, with a 
very low tolerance value of 0.1592 and 0.1776 in both IBs and NIBs respectively. The 
multicollinearity issue between ACEX and BIG4 may inflate standard errors and hence 
cause some variables statistically insignificant and vice versa. Following Studenmund 
(2005), and Gujarati (2009), this study omitted the variable that has a high level of 
correlation and a low level of tolerance with a less significant relationship with the 
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dependent variable in order to avoid the multicollinearity problem. Thus, the current 
study omitted the ACEX variable, since the regression result shows that ACEX is 
insignificant compared with BIG4. Having defined and solved the issue of high 
correlation between ACEX and BIG4, the multicollinearity problem no longer exists 
between the study variables.   
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Table 7. 2 Correlation Matrices Analysis for IBs  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 VDQ IBD BZ BDEX DU BGD BM IAC ACZ ACM ACEX Big4 ACG MOS BH 
Bank-
size 
Growth LEVER PROFIT LIQ 
VDQ 1.0000                    
IBD -0.0078 1.0000                 
BZ -0.1360* 0.1034 1.0000                  
BDEX -0.0087 0.3493** 0.4156*** 1.0000               
DU -0.0326 0.2104** 0.1677* 0.4110* 1.0000              
BGD -0.0125 0.2139* 0.2539*** -0.0009 0.1200** 1.0000             
BM -0.2097 0.3664*** 0.3080*** 0.3532*** 0.1957** 0.0077 1.0000            
IAC -0.0270 0.6744*** 0.3941*** 0.4326*** 0.3194** 0.1099 0.4385*** 1.0000           
ACZ -0.1135 0.3370*** 0.4226*** 0.3494*** 0.3769** 0.3507 0.2391** 0.4650*** 1.0000          
ACM -0.1696* 0.1483* 0.1041* 0.1097 0.1333 -0.1259 0.3109*** 0.1829** 0.2337*** 1.0000         
ACEX 0.2094* 0.0098 -0.0930 0.0357 0.0353 0.1702*** 0.0437 -0.1216* 0.0892 -0.0129 1.0000        
Big4 0.2041*** 0.0262 -0.0102 0.0129 0.0707 0.1787*** 0.0369 -0.0783 0.0831 -0.0334 0.8890 1.0000       
ACG 0.0320 0.0834 0.0963 0.0375 0.0723 0.6022*** -0.0983 0.0880 0.3570*** -0.0775 0.1187* 0.1076 1.0000      
MOS -0.0419 0.2069*** 0.1372** 0.0332 -0.0769 -0.0423 -0.1584*** 0.1153* 0.1741*** 0.0010 0.0321 0.0341 0.0250 1.0000     
BH -0.0581 0.1146 0.3597*** 0.1380** 0.0819 0.2255*** -0.0298 0.3072 0.3537*** 0.0068 -0.1174* 0.0227 0.1687*** 0.3371*** 1.0000    
Bank-size 0.2784*** -0.0899 -0.1906*** 0.0643 -0.0106 0.2172*** -0.2043*** -0.1419* -0.0278 -0.1444* 0.3265*** 0.2674*** 0.2188** -0.1219* -0.1617*** 1.0000   
Growth -0.0101 -0.0693 -0.0208 -0.0381 0.1038 -0.0664 0.2116*** -0.0437 -0.0394 -0.0881 0.2299*** 0.2258*** -0.1502* -0.0285 -0.1573*** -0.0134 1.0000  
LEVER -0.0229 -0.0852 0.0029 -0.1543*** -0.0050 0.0074 -0.2020*** -0.0774 -0.0453 -0.1012 -0.1844*** -0.1585*** -0.0270 -0.0614 -0.0109 -0.0071 0.0452 1.0000 
PROFIT 0.0146 0.0002 -0.0543 -0.0210 -0.1027 0.0381 -0.0653 0.0555 -0.0539 -0.1039 -0.2462*** -0.1844** 0.1187* -0.4104*** 0.0440 -0.0383 -0.3540*** -0.0628 1.0000  
LIQ 0.0341 0.1386*** 0.0071 0.0224 0.0475 -0.0326 0.0179 0.0462 0.0001 0.1175* 0.0779 0.0699 -0.0262 0.3166*** -0.0087 0.0401 0.0606 -0.1423** -0.4704*** 1.0000 
 
***, **and * indicate the significance of coefficient at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels respectively. 
 
  190 
Table 7. 3 Correlation Matrices Analysis for NIBs  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 VDQ IBD BZ BDEX DU BGD BM IAC ACZ ACM ACEX Big4 ACG MOS BH 
Bank-
size 
Growth LEVER PROFIT LIQ 
VDQ 1.0000      
IBD 0.1325*** 1.0000                 
BZ 0.0163 0.3235*** 1.0000                  
BDEX 0.1951*** 0.4563** 0.5881*** 1.0000               
DU 0.0923* 0.3264*** 0.5091*** 0.5948*** 1.0000              
BGD 0.0192 0.0774* 0.2962*** 0.2714*** 0.1118 1.0000             
BM 0.2448*** 0.4772*** 0.4082*** 0.5551*** 0.3494** 0.0530 1.0000            
IAC 0.2389*** 0.6296** 0.3417* 0.5104*** 0.3182*** 0.1764*** 0.4890** 1.0000           
ACZ 0.1278** 0.4407*** 0.4549*** 0.4526*** 0.2025*** 0.1742** 0.5435*** 0.4171*** 1.0000          
ACM 0.1847*** 0.3652** 0.1265** 0.2964*** 0.1321*** 0.0504 0.4855* 0.3653*** 0.3674** 1.0000         
ACEX 0.3520** 0.1508*** -0.2599*** -0.0128 -0.0283 -0.2221 0.1085*** 0.0670 0.0823* 0.1744*** 1.0000        
Big4 0.3248*** 0.1696** -0.1914*** 0.0188 -0.0423 -0.2151*** 0.1588*** 0.0891* 0.1545*** 0.1691*** 0.8848** 1.0000       
ACG 0.0929* 0.2338** 0.2080 0.1167 -0.0598 0.2935 0.1409*** 0.1817*** 0.3062*** 0.0544 0.0505 0.1256*** 1.0000      
MOS 0.0665 0.0928* 0.2164 0.0787 0.1161 -0.0791 0.1725*** 0.1609*** -0.0323 0.1162 -0.2408*** -0.2290*** 0.0076 1.0000     
BH 0.0826 0.3155*** 0.2231 0.3031 0.1536 -0.0602 0.3903*** 0.2502** 0.3982*** 0.1512*** 0.0079 0.0406 -0.0191 0.0017 1.0000    
Bank-size 0.4304** 0.1393 0.0543 0.2168 0.1531*** 0.0275 0.2685 0.1289*** 0.1095* 0.2073*** 0.3040*** 0.2395*** 0.1331*** 0.1069* 0.0672 1.0000   
Growth 0.1063* -0.0456 -0.1955*** -0.0460 -0.0580 -0.0962** 0.0424 0.0141 -0.0605 -0.0021 0.2855*** 0.3070*** -0.0085 -0.0672 0.0236 0.0937** 1.0000  
LEVER -0.0977*** 0.0508 0.2178*** 0.0867 0.0694 0.1019 -0.0074 0.0023 0.0789* 0.0116*** -0.2771*** -0.2495 0.0048** 0.0667 -0.0125 0.0286 -0.6746 1.0000 
PROFI -0.1552** -0.0130 0.1647** 0.0724* 0.0420 0.0713* -0.0509 0.0254 -0.0392* -0.0798 -0.1884*** -0.2370*** -0.0243 0.1187 0.0798 0.0208 -0.0494*** 0.0484 1.0000  
LIQ 0.0710* -0.0289 -0.0823** -0.0527 -0.0613 -0.0158 -0.0272 -0.0242 -0.0392 -0.0175 0.0023 -0.0046 -0.0061 -0.0139 -0.0286 -0.0269 0.0088 -0.4618*** -0.0528 1.0000 
***, **and * indicate the significance of coefficient at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels respectively. 
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Table 7. 4 VIF Analyses for all Study Variables in IBs and NIBs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 IBs (Obs 290) NIBs (Obs 770) 
Variables VIF 1/ VIF VIF 1/ VIF 
ACEX 6.28 0.1592 5.63 0.1776 
Big4 5.74 0.1742 5.30 0.1888 
IAC 2.99 0.3349 2.05 0.4875 
IBD 2.89 0.3465 2.04 0.4901 
BGD 2.43 0.4118 1.39 0.7168 
BZ 2.17 0.4598 2.32 0.4044 
PROFT 2.07 0.4840 3.26 0.3071 
ACZ 2.03 0.4930 2.05 0.4879 
BM 2.02 0.4959 2.27 0.4409 
MOS 2.00 0.4992 1.31 0.7660 
BDEX 1.99 0.5026 2.58 0.3883 
ACG 1.85 0.5419 1.38 0.7225 
BH 1.73 0.5794 1.39 0.7201 
DU 1.50 0.6656 1.85 0.5412 
Bank-size 1.50 0.6668 1.49 0.6704 
LIQ 1.45 0.6897 1.68 0.5940 
Growth 1.41 0.7071 2.51 0.3977 
ACM 1.31 0.7628 1.49 0.6729 
LEVER 1.22 0.8216 1.15 0.8660 
VDQ 1.21 0.8236 1.46 0.6843 
Mean VIF  2.29  2.30  
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7.4 Multivariate Analysis 
This section illustrates the multiple regression analysis in order to achieve the third 
objective. Before proceeding to examine the association between EM and VDQ based 
on panel data analysis, several procedures and specification tests should be performed 
in order to ensure the regression model fits the data. Firstly, the question of whether 
pooled data or panel data regression is suitable for the current study sample. Following 
Beck, (2001); Samimi et al., (2012); and Usman and Tandelilin (2014) the current 
study applied the Chow test in order to compare between pooled and panel regression. 
The result of the Chow test shows that the F statistics have a high level of significance 
(F= 0.0001 and F=0.0001) for both IBs and NIBs respectively, indicating that panel 
data is more appropriate (see appendices, 7.1 and 7.2).  
Secondly, the Hausman specification test is used to compare between random and 
fixed effects. The result of the Hausman tests are (Prob > Chi2 = 0.6290 and 0.6261) in 
IBs and NIBs respectively, confirms that the random effect model is the more 
appropriate model for the current study (see appendices, 7.3 and 7.4). Thirdly, the 
modified Wald test is used in order to examine the heteroscedasticity in the study’s 
model. The result shows that there is no heteroscedasticity (P-Value=0.1507 and 
0.2136) in the model used in the current study (see appendices, 7.5 and 7.6). Fourthly, 
a histogram test is employed in order to check the normality issues. This test provides a 
frequency distribution of the current study variable, which is considered as a technique 
for constructing an estimate of an unobservable underlying probability density function 
(Field, 2013; Liu & Shell, 2012). The histogram test shows that the population of the 
current study sample is normally distributed (see appendices 7.7 and 7.8). Finally, the 
Quantile-Quantile (Q-Q plot) test is used to examine the linearity problem. The Q-Q 
plot provides a graph that plots the quantiles of the study variable against the quantiles 
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of the particular distribution (Field, 2012). The Q-Q plot test indicates that the 
relationship between the explanatory (VDQ, CG and bank's characteristics) variables 
and the dependent variable (EM) are linear. 
Table 7.5 provides the results of the random effects regression analysis for the model 
used in this study. The R2 of the model in both the IBs and NIBs samples are 0.3428 
and 0.1848 respectively, suggesting that 34% and 18% of the variation in the 
dependent variable is explained by the study’s explanatory variables. Although the R2 
of the model in NIBs sample is low, it is typical in the EM (Jenkins & Velury, 2008; 
Meek et al., 2007; O'Hanlon et al., 1992; Riahi & Mounira, 2011; Shin & Wang, 2012; 
Yu et al., 2010). Table 7.5 shows that the p-value of the regression model is highly 
significant at the 1% level. This result indicates that the model has a valid explanatory 
power and can be compared with EM and VDQ empirical studies (Pyo & Lee, 2013; 
Riahi & Mounira, 2011; Sun & Rath, 2010; Sun et al., 2010; Yip et al., 2011).  
Based on the result reported in table 7.5, the coefficients of VDQ are negatively and 
significantly associated with EM at 1 % level in both types of banks. This result 
emphasises that IBs and NIBs in MENA countries with higher VDQ, report lower 
levels of EM, which supports the third hypothesis and suggests that there is a negative 
relationship between VDQ and EM. This finding is consistent with Lobo and Zhou 
(2001), Sanjaya and Young (2012), and Kurniawan (2013) who found that companies 
with a high quality of voluntary disclosure are less engaged in EM. Thus, the current 
study accepts the third hypothesis (H3).  
The findings are in line with the long-term perspective, suggesting that banks provide 
high VDQ in order to reduce asymmetric information and boost the confidence of 
owners about the company’s current and future performance (Uyar et al., 2013). The 
findings are also consistent with the agency and signalling theories, which suggest a 
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negative association between VDQ and EM. Both theories suggest that EM is a form 
of agency cost because it causes information asymmetry and accept voluntary 
disclosure as the most appropriate solution for decreasing information asymmetry 
(Davidson et al., 2004; Huang & Zhang, 2011).  
Table 7.5 shows that the independence of audit committee (IAC) is significant at 10% 
level and is negatively associated with EM in IBs. This outcome implies that IBs are 
likely to report lower EM since they have a high ratio of independent members in the 
audit committee. This finding is in line with Klein (2002); Choi et al., (2004); and 
Inaam and Khamoussi (2016), who indicated that the level of EM declines with the 
independence of the audit committee. Generally, this result suggests that IAC in IBs 
has a considerably negative effect on EM, whereas IAC has insignificant influence on 
EM in NIBs. The coefficient of audit firms (BIG4) has a negative and significant 
relationship with EM at 1% and 10% levels in both IBs and NIBs respectively. These 
findings indicate that both types of banks that are audited by Big 4 companies are less 
likely to engage in EM practices. This result is in line with Francis et al., (1999); Lin et 
al., (2006); Lin and Hwang (2010); and Kanagaretnam et al., (2010), who found that 
the use of big audit firms (Big4) is linked with low EM behaviour.  
With regards to the ownership structure, the coefficient of blockholders (BH) is 
negatively and significantly associated with EM at 1% level in NIBs while it has an 
insignificant association with EM in IBs. This result highlights that NIBs with a higher 
ratio of BH report lower levels of EM, and suggests that BH who own at least 5% of 
the firm’s shares and do not serve as director or CEO are vital in reducing managers’ 
opportunistic behaviour (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). This outcome is in line with Klein 
(2002), and Ding and Zhang (2007), who found a negative and significant association 
between BH and EM practices.  
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In terms of bank characteristic variables, the coefficient of bank size is significant at 
1% and 10% levels and is negatively related to EM in both IBs and NIBs respectively. 
The results reported by both types of banks are consistent with the suggestion of 
Hagerman and Zmijeski (1979), that larger banks are less likely to engage in EM 
compared to small banks, due to increase in regulators’ monitoring procedures and 
their focus on any potential issue that may arise with regards to EM practices. A 
similar argument is made by Xie et al., (2003); Hong and Andersen (2011); Leventis, 
et al., (2011); Shu and Chiang, (2014) and Abdelsalam et al., (2016) who indicated that 
large banks employ better monitoring mechanisms because they may be operating in a 
business environment that is subject to high scrutiny, which thus reduces their 
opportunities to engage in EM compared to small banks. 
Concerning bank growth, the coefficients of growth have a negative and significant 
association with EM at 5% and 1% levels in both IBs and NIBs respectively. This 
outcome implies that banks with high growth opportunities are more likely to report 
lower EM, because they experience increased monitoring, which decreases their 
likelihood of engaging in EM (Cornett et al., 2009). This result is in line with He, 
Wong and Young (2012), and Bova (2013), who found that high growth firms are less 
likely to engage in EM practices compared to low growth firms. 
With regards to bank profitability, table 7.5 illustrates that the coefficient of 
profitability has a negative and significant association with EM at 10% level in NIBs 
while it has an insignificant relationship with EM in IBs. This result implies that NIBs 
with low profitability are more likely to engage in EM, and supports other EM studies, 
which reported that there is a negative and significant relationship between 
profitability and EM (Bekiris & Doukakis, 2011; Waweru & Riro, 2013).  
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The coefficient of liquidity (LIQ) is negatively and significantly correlated with EM at 
1% level in IBs, whereas it has an insignificant association with EM in NIBs. This 
result indicates that IBs in MENA countries with a high liquidity ratio (LIQ) are likely 
to report less EM. This finding is consistent with LaFond et al., (2007) and Ascioglu et 
al., (2012), who found evidence that companies with greater levels of EM are mostly 
those with a lower liquidity ratio.  
In comparison, the coefficients of all board of directors’ variables, ACZ, ACM, ACG, 
MOS and LEVER are statistically insignificant with EM. These findings indicate that 
those variables have no influence on EM either in IBs or NIBs. The coefficients of 
both BDEX and DU are consistent with Marrakchi et al., (2001); Xie et al., (2003); 
Abdul Rahman et al., (2006) and Sun et al., (2011), who suggests that CEO duality and 
directors' expertise are unrelated to EM. The coefficients of both BGD and ACG are 
similar to the findings of Sun et al., (2011), who reported that gender differences have 
no relationship with EM. The insignificant coefficient of ACZ with EM is in line with 
Xie et al., (2003) and Visvanathan (2008), who found that the size of audit committee 
has no relationship with EM. Regarding to the coefficient of ACM, it is similar to the 
empirical results of Peasnell et al., (2005) and Haniffa et al., (2006), who found no 
association between ACM and EM. The insignificant coefficient of MOS is in line 
with the result reported by (Gabrielsen et al., 2002).   
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Table 7. 5 Results of Panel Data Regression for the Relationship between EM and 
VDQ in IBs and NIBs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EMLLPs IBs NIBs 
Variables Obs Coef. Z P>|z| Obs Coef. Z P>|z| 
VDQ 290 -0.0559 -2.52 0.012*** 770 -0.3549 -5.72 0.001*** 
IBD 290 0.0052 0.30 0.768 770 0.0225 1.11 0.266 
BZ 290 0.0011 0.81 0.417 770 0.0012 0.63 0.528 
BDEX 290 0.0025 0.16 0.874 770 -0.0146 -1.26 0.208 
DU 290 0.0056 0.65 0.519 770 -0.0046 -0.33 0.739 
BGD 290 -0.0034 -0.29 0.773 770 -0.0091 -0.68 0.495 
BM 290 -0.0004 -0.20 0.843 770 0.0006 0.30 0.766 
IAC 290 -0.0201 -1.71 0.088* 770 0.0062 0.53 0.595 
ACZ 290 0.0047 0.74 0.462 770 0.0032 0.67 0.504 
ACM 290 -0.0025 -0.84 0.402 770 0.0009 0.21 0.832 
Big4 290 -0.0163 -2.51 0.012*** 770 -0.0231 -1.64 0.098* 
ACG 290 -0.0179 -0.97 0.334 770 0.0294 0.96 0.338 
MOS 290 0.0219 0.71 0.477 770 -0.0469 -0.93 0.352 
BH 290 0.0014 0.14 0.890 770 -0.0578 -3.00 0.003*** 
Bank-size 290 -0.0008 -2.50 0.012*** 770 -0.0030 -1.75 0.080* 
Growth 290 -0.0340 -1.97 0.048** 770 -0.2065 -3.67 0.001*** 
PROFT 290 -0.0233 -1.47 0.141 770 -0.1097 -1.71 0.087* 
LEVER 290 -0.0086 -0.24 0.813 770 -0.0164 -1.39 0.165 
LIQ 290 -0.0010 -2.86 0.004*** 770 -0.0027 -1.30 0.193 
_Cons 290 0.1754 5.73 0.0001 770 0.5033 6.41 0.0001 
 
Random-effect method GLS regression,  
R-sq: 0.3428,  Prob > Chi2: 0.0001 
R-sq: 0.1848, Prob >Chi2: 0.0001 
 
***, **and * indicate the significance of coefficient at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels respectively.   
Dependent variable: EMLLP= Discretionary accruals gained from Two-stage model. 
Independent variables:  VDQ = Quality of voluntary disclosure score, IBD= Independence Board of Directors as measured by 
the ratio of independent non-executive directors number to the total number of board members, BZ= Board Size as measured 
by the number of board members on the board, BDEX= Board of director’s expertise measured as the proportion of 
experienced board members on the board, DU= Duality A dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the Chief executive officer 
is holding two roles, BGD= Board Gender Diversity measures as a percentage of female on the board of directors, BM=Board 
Meeting as measured by the number of board meetings held in the financial year, IAC= Independence of Audit Committee as 
measured by the ratio of independent non-executive directors to total number of audit committee, ACZ= Audit committee size 
as measured by the number of audit committee members, ACM= Audit committee meetings as measured by the number of 
board meetings held in the financial year, ACEX= Audit committee expertise measured as proportion of experienced audit 
members on the audit committee, BIG4= a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the bank is audited by Big 4 and 0 
otherwise, ACG= Audit committee gender diversity measures as a percentage of female on the audit committee, MOS= 
Managerial Ownership as measured by the number of shares held by managers to total number of outstanding shares, BH= 
Block holders as measured by the ratio of outside stockholders owning 5% or more of outstanding shares within the bank, 
BANK-SIZE= is measured by the Logarithm of total assets at the year end, GROWTH= is measured as the change of total 
assets divided by the lagged of total assets. LEVER= Leverage is measured by total liabilities to total assets at the end of the 
financial year, PROFIT= Profitability as measured by net Income divided by lagged total Assets, LIQ= Bank Liquidity as 
measured by current assets divided by current liabilities at the end of the financial year. 
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7.5 Robustness Check  
In order to strengthen the primary results of the association between EM and VDQ in 
both IBs and NIBs in MENA countries, a robustness test was employed. Therefore, the 
current study used the Jones model, modified for banking institutions, as an alternative 
measure of EM to assess the validity of the key findings in table 7.5. Table 7.6 shows 
that the coefficients of VDQ are negatively and significantly associated with EM at 1% 
level in both IBs and NIBs. These results are in line with the main findings presented 
in table 7.5, which indicate that both IBs and NIBs with higher VDQ are less likely to 
practice EM.  
However, it is worth mentioning that the coefficients of IBD and BZ are significant at 
the 10% and 5% levels and are negatively associated with EM in NIBs. Additionally, 
the coefficient of BM is negatively significant at 5% with EM in IBs. These findings 
are in line with EM and corporate governance studies (e.g. González & García-Meca, 
2014b; Lin & Hwang, 2010; Quttainah et al., 2013), which indicated that IBD, board 
size and frequency of BM are vital factors that enable the board to monitor and 
maintain better control of managerial opportunistic behaviour and have a negative 
effect on EM practices. In addition, the coefficient of LEVER is positively and 
significantly related to EM at the 1% level, suggesting that banks with high leverage 
tend to engage in EM. This result is in line with those reported by Mohd Saleh et al., 
(2007); Buniamin et al., (2012) and Abdullah et al., (2016), who found that high 
leverage firms are more likely to manage earnings. 
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Table 7. 6 Results of Panel Data Regression for the Relationship between EM and 
VDQ in IBs and NIBs Based on Modified Jones Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EMDA IBs NIBs 
Variables Obs Coef. Z P>|z| Obs Coef. Z P>|z| 
VDQ 290 -0.0418 -3.33 0.001*** 770 -0.2499 -6.08 0.001*** 
IBD 290 0.0070 0.62 0.534 770  -0.0223 -1.86 0.063* 
BZ 290 -0.0013 -1.36 0.173 770 -0.0022 -2.07 0.039** 
BDEX 290 0.0120 1.20 0.229 770 -0.0044 -0.61 0.542 
DU 290 -0.0060 -1.03 0.303 770 -0.0075 -1.04 0.298 
BGD 290 -0.0007 -0.09 0.926 770 -0.0071 -0.99 0.324 
BM 290 -0.0023 -1.95 0.050** 770 0.0002 0.16 0.872 
IAC 290 -0.0122 -1.68 0.093* 770 0.0078 1.05 0.294 
ACZ 290 0.0004 0.11 0.914 770 -0.0041 -1.41 0.159 
ACM 290 0.0005 0.27 0.787 770 0.0013 0.52 0.606 
Big4 290 -0.0065 -1.47 0.143 770 -0.0120 -1.89 0.058** 
ACG 290 -0.0011 -0.08 0.934 770 0.0224 1.44 0.149 
MOS 290 -0.0295 -0.96 0.338 770 -0.0129 -0.59 0.557 
BH 290 0.0062 0.85 0.395 770 0.0109 1.21 0.226 
Bank-size 290 0.0003 1.17 0.241 770 0.0005 1.26 0.209 
Growth 290 0.0143 1.33 0.183 770 -0.0382 -1.03 0.301 
PROFT 290 -0.0323 -3.21 0.001*** 770 0.0122 0.30 0.765 
LEVER 290 0.0612 2.80 0.005*** 770 -0.0032 -0.57 0.568 
LIQ 290 -0.0007 -0.24 0.812 770 0.0014 0.99 0.321 
_Cons 290 0.0681 3.56 0.000 770 0.2249 4.56 0.000 
Random-effect method GLS regression,  
R-sq: 0.3540,  Prob > Chi2: 0.0001 
R-sq: 0.2921, Prob >Chi2: 0.0001 
 
***, **and * indicate the significance of coefficient at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels respectively.   
Dependent variable: EMDA= Discretionary accruals gained from Modified Jones model by Yasuda et al., (2004). 
Independent variables:  VDQ = Quality of voluntary disclosure score,  IBD= Independence Board of Directors as measured 
by the ratio of independent non-executive directors number to the total number of board members, BZ= Board Size as 
measured by the number of board members on the board, BDEX= Board of director’s expertise measured as the proportion 
of experienced board members on the board, DU= Duality A dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the Chief executive 
officer is holding two roles, BGD= Board Gender Diversity measures as a percentage of female on the board of directors, 
BM=Board Meeting as measured by the number of board meetings held in the financial year, IAC= Independence of Audit 
Committee as measured by the ratio of independent non-executive directors to total number of audit committee, ACZ= Audit 
committee size as measured by the number of audit committee members, ACM= Audit committee meetings as measured by 
the number of board meetings held in the financial year, ACEX= Audit committee expertise measured as proportion of 
experienced audit members on the audit committee, BIG4= a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the bank is audited 
by Big 4 and 0 otherwise, ACG= Audit committee gender diversity measures as a percentage of female on the audit 
committee, MOS= Managerial Ownership as measured by the number of shares held by managers to total number of 
outstanding shares, BH= Block holders as measured by the ratio of outside stockholders owning 5% or more of outstanding 
shares within the bank, BANK-SIZE= is measured by the Logarithm of total assets at the year end, GROWTH= is 
measured as the change of total assets divided by the lagged of total assets. LEVER= Leverage is measured by total 
liabilities to total assets at the end of the financial year, PROFIT= Profitability as measured by net Income divided by 
lagged total Assets, LIQ= Bank Liquidity as measured by current assets divided by current liabilities at the end of the 
financial year. 
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7.6 Additional Analyses 
In order to ensure the validity and robustness of the preliminary findings, the current 
study re-runs the model using different sub-samples of banks with relatively strong 
incentives to manipulate earnings. Following Wongsunwai, (2013);  Doukakis, (2014) 
and Ipino and Parbonetti, (2017), the current study focused on highly leveraged banks, 
defined as bank-years that are above the median ratio of total liabilities to the total 
assets. This is because banks with a high leverage ratio may have strong incentives to 
engage in EM to avoid debt covenant violation (Scholtens & Kang, 2013). The findings 
in table 7.7 confirmed the main results presented in table 7.5, which support a negative 
and significant relationship between EM and VDQ. 
In addition, EM research suggests that managers tend to manipulate accounting figures 
to avoid earnings decreases (Burgstahler & Dichev, 1997; Dechow et al., 2010; Hamdi 
& Zarai, 2012). The current study created a sub-sample based on banks with strong 
levels of incentives to avoid earnings decreases. Following Burgstahler & Dichev, 
(1997) and Hamdi & Zarai, (2012), the sub-sample includes bank-years with changes in 
net income over lagged total assets (CROA) in the interval between (0, 0.005). Then the 
model was re-run. The outcomes in table 7.7 provided similar findings to those 
presented in table 7.5. 
Furthermore, Abdelsalam, et al., (2016) argue that political problems are more prevalent 
in particular non-Gulf cooperation council countries (NGCC) such as Egypt, Syria, 
Tunisia, Yemen and Iraq. The motivation of bank managers in NGCC to engage in EM 
is expected to be high, since these countries are in early reform stages, have small 
securities markets, are underdeveloped, and have low levels of investor protection 
system (Baatour & Othman, 2016; Sourial, 2004). Therefore, the current study re-ran the 
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model using a sub-sample that includes banks listed in NGCC. Table 7.7 shows that the 
findings remain relatively similar compared with the main findings in table 7.5. 
According to the argument of empirical EM studies, it is very difficult for big companies 
to manipulate earnings because they are more closely followed by investors and 
regulators than small companies (Albrecht & Richardson, 1990; Bhattacharya, 2001; 
Lee & Choi, 2002; Siregar & Utama, 2008). Furthermore, small companies are inclined 
to engage in EM more frequently to avoid losses compared to big companies (Albrecht 
& Richardson, 1990b; Lee & Choi, 2002). Consequently, this study re-runs the model 
for the observation of small-sized banks by using the median as a cut-off point. Table 
7.7 shows that the result is in line with the primary findings in table 7.5.   
Several studies argued that managers of low growth companies have more incentives to 
use discretionary accruals in order to increase the appearance of sustainable growth, 
share value and attract more investors to meet their capital needs (e.g. Collins, Pungaliya 
& Vijh, 2012; Summers & Sweeney, 1998; Zang, 2011). The current study, therefore, 
re-runs the model on low growth banks, defined as bank-years that are below the median 
ratio of the change of total assets divided by the lagged total assets. The findings 
confirmed the key outcomes presented in table 7.5. 
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Table 7. 7 Additional Analyses 
 
IBs NIBs 
 Obs 
Coef Z Obs Coef Z 
H-LEV 139 -0.0163* -1.79 391 -1.1350*** -11.34 
CROA 130 -0.0225* -1.81 461 -0.1007*** -12.01 
NGCC 270 -0.0177* -1.80 579 -1.4166*** -8.44 
SBZ 125 -0.0325* -1.71 405 1.1836*** -7.00 
L-GRO 131 -0.0275* -1.85 399 -1.3830*** -8.02 
* 
Significance at the 0.10 level. 
** 
Significance at the 0.05 level. 
*** 
Significance at the 0.01 level.  
H-LEV= subsample for all banks with high leverage (above median), CROA= subsample for banks with a 
change in return on assets in the interval between (0, 0.005). NGCC= subsample of all banks listed in none 
Gulf cooperation council counties, SBZ= subsample for small banks size, L-GRO= subsamples for banks 
with low growth. 
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
 
 
7.7 Controlling for Potential Endogeneity Problems  
EM and voluntary disclosure literature addressed an important question of whether 
corporate disclosure and EM have a first order effect on some outcome variables and 
suffer from an endogeneity bias (Beyer et al., 2010; Choi et al., 2013; Lobo & Zhou, 
2001). Beyer et al., (2010) indicated that it is hard to make an assessment of the causal 
connection and recognise the exact impact that one mechanism would have on another 
one. There are three types of endogeneity problem. These include simultaneity, 
measurement error and observations omitted from the regression (Choi et al., 2013). 
However, simultaneity is considered the most common type of endogeneity in terms of 
the association between EM and corporate disclosure  (Brown & Hillegeist, 2007; 
Larcker & Rusticus, 2010; Ntim, Opong, Danbolt & Thomas, 2012). Simultaneity may 
exist when both dependent and independent variables are determined, either by 
internal factors such as managers’ overall policies, or external aspects such as legal 
effects, rules and regulations concerning the market for corporate control (Choi, Lee & 
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Park, 2013; Ntim et al., 2012). In addition, McKnight and Weir, (2009) indicated that 
the presence of the simultaneity issue leads to an inefficient, inconsistent and biased 
conclusion when addressing the relationship between the dependent and independent 
variables. Several studies indicated that, two approaches have been used to avoid the 
endogeneity issue, which include using instrumental variables and utilising 
simultaneous equation (Choi et al., 2013; Coles, Daniel & Naveen, 2008; McKnight & 
Weir, 2009). However, both instrumental variables and simultaneous equation 
approaches provide similar results (Coles, Daniel & Naveen, 2008; Himmelberg, 
Hubbard & Palia, 1999).  
Before proceeding to examine the instrumental variable, the Durbin and Wu-Hausman 
tests were used in order to investigate the existence of endogeneity (Ntim & 
Soobaroyen, 2013). However, the Durbin and Wu-Hausman test provides (P= 0.001) 
in both IBs and NIBs respectively (see appendices 7.9 and 7.10). This result indicates 
that the alternative hypothesis of the existence of endogeneity issue between the 
dependent variable (EM) and the independent variable (VDQ) is accepted. As a result, 
the existence of endogeneity may have an influence on the regression model, leading 
to an ineffective, inconsistent and biased outcome. Consequently, to examine whether 
the existence of a simultaneity issue has an impact on the current study findings, the 
instrumental variable of 2SLS regression is adopted to control the endogeneity issue. 
This method is considered as the most appropriate econometric approach in addressing 
the endogeneity issue in accounting research, because it provides a way of obtaining 
the optimal linear combination of instruments (Moumen, Othman & Hussainey, 2015; 
Wooldridge, 2010). The instrumental variable is utilised to cut the correlation between 
the independent variables and error term. The lagged value of VDQ was employed as 
the endogenous independent variable. Table 7.8 illustrates the results of 2SLS 
regression of the model in both IBs and NIBs respectively after controlling for 
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simultaneity. The coefficients of lagged VDQ in both IBs and NIBs are significant at 
the 1% level and negatively associated with EM. These findings are similar to the 
prior results of random effect regression presented in table 7.5 and suggest that IBs 
and NIBs in MENA countries with a high VDQ are less likely to involve in EM 
practices. Moreover, these results are in line with Choi et al., (2013) and Jaggi et al., 
(2009) who suggested that there is a significant and negative simultaneity relationship 
between corporate disclosure and EM practices. The result of the 2SLS regression is 
an indication that VDQ in both IBs and NIBs in MENA countries is an important 
factor that can impact the level of EM in the opposite direction. In regards to the 
control variables, the findings of 2SLS regression provide almost similar results to 
those presented in table 7.5. 
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Table 7. 8 Instrumental Variables (2SLS Regression)  
 
EMLLPs 
 IBs NIBs 
Variables Obs Coef. P>|z| Obs Coef. P>|z| 
Lag-VDQ 290 -0.1893 0.033** 770 -2.5379 0.01*** 
IBD 290 0.0005 0.975 770 -0.0590 0.077* 
BZ 290 0.0003 0.837 770 -0.0045 0.106 
BDEX 290 -0.0020 0.911 770 -0.0564 0.006*** 
DU 290 -0.0041 0.638 770 0.0096 0.594 
BGD 290 -0.0084 0.521 770 -0.0139 0.443 
BM 290 -0.0036 0.165 770 0.0054 0.113 
IAC 290 -0.0031 0.816 770 0.0049 0.819 
ACZ 290 0.0002 0.967 770 0.0026 0.735 
ACM 290 -0.0059 0.133 770 -0.0027 0.665 
Big4 290 -0.1104 0.026** 770 0.0084 0.632 
ACG 290 -0.0069 0.704 770 0.0559 0.131 
MOS 290 0.0148 0.641 770 -0.0455 0.370 
BH 290 -0.0020 0.843 770 -0.0462 0.027** 
Bank-size 290 -0.0007 0.061* 770 0.0031 0.009*** 
Growth 290 -0.0361 0.050** 770 -0.2268 0.043** 
PROFT 290 -0.0439 0.024** 770 0.0318 0.798 
LEVER 290 -0.0015 0.970 770 0.0026 0.849 
LIQ 290 -0.0009 0.012** 770 -0.0038 0.399 
_Cons 290 0.3007 0.001 770 1.7874 0.001 
Random-effect method GLS regression,  
R-sq: 0.2392,  Prob > Chi2: 0.0001 
Random-effect method GLS regression,  
R-sq: 0.1585,  Prob > Chi2: 0.0001 
*** **and * indicate the significance of coefficient at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels respectively.  
Independent variables: Lag-VDQ= is the lagged variable of VDQ. 
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7.8 Summary of the Chapter 
In this chapter the researcher attempts to answer the study’s third question; namely, 
what is the relationship between EM (discretionary accruals) and VDQ in IBs and 
NIBs in MENA countries? The empirical result on the relationship between EM and 
VDQ in IBs and NIBs over a 10-year period, from 2006 to 2015 was presented. The 
two-stage model was used to measure EM, while VDQ was measured through 
developing the multi-dimensional approach. The results show that VDQ has a 
negative influence on EM. This result is in line with the agency and signalling 
theories, which suggest a negative relationship between EM and VDQ.  Several 
analyses were used in this chapter to ensure the validity of the results and to maintain 
consistency with the theories used in this study. For instance, Jones model modified 
for banking institution was adopted as an alternative measurement for EM in order to 
examine whether the different measure of EM has any influence on the main 
outcomes. The results emphasised that banks in MENA countries with a high VDQ 
are less likely to engage in EM. Furthermore, the result obtained by re-running the 
model using sub-samples of banks with relatively high incentives of EM emphasised 
the negative and significant relationship between EM and VDQ.  In general, these 
analyses confirm that both IBs and NIBs in MENA countries with a high VDQ are 
less likely to manipulate earnings. 
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Chapter Eight: Summary and Conclusions 
 
8.1 Introduction  
This study has three objectives namely: (1) To investigate and compare EM in IBs 
and NIBs in MENA countries, (2) To investigate and compare VDQ in IBs and NIBs 
in MENA countries, and (3) To examine the relationship between EM and VDQ in 
IBs and NIBs in MENA countries. With regards to the first and second objectives, 
EM literature indicated that, in an Islamic context, opportunistic behaviour of EM is 
prohibited and immoral in IBs (Hamdi & Zarai, 2013). Managers of institutions with a 
religious affiliation usually follow certain socially acceptable norms, which are 
related to anti-manipulative behaviour (Dyreng, Mayew & Williams, 2012). On the 
other hand, the perspective of disclosure in IBs is based on both the concept of 
accountability and the full disclosure, which involves disclosing all necessary 
information regarding their activities to assist investors and to make sure that these 
activities are in line with Islamic principles (Baydoun & Willett, 2000; Haniffa & 
Hudaib, 2002; Maali, Casson & Napier, 2006). IBs are motivated by Islamic law 
“Shari’ah” to disclose more information voluntarily, irrespective of their local 
standards, due to the importance of accountability in Islamic society (Maali, Casson, 
& Napier, 2003). The difference in the business ethics between IBs and NIBs has 
motivated the researcher to compare both EM and VDQ in each bank type.  
In respect of the third objective, EM and voluntary disclosure literature provides two 
different points of view with regards to the effect of voluntary disclosure on EM, 
including long-term perspectives and managerial opportunism. The first perspective 
suggested that managers tend to report more credible information voluntarily to 
concerned groups in order to reduce asymmetric information and boost the confidence 
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of owners about the company’s current and future performance (Uyar, Kilic & 
Bayyurt, 2013). This signifies a negative association between EM and voluntary 
disclosure (Hunton et al., 2006; Iatridis & Kadorinis, 2009; Katmun, 2012; Lobo & 
Zhou, 2001; Tariverdi et al., 2012). On the other hand, the second view argued that 
managers may disclose poor (low quality) information voluntarily in order to lid their 
opportunistic behaviour of EM and to protect themselves against any possible reaction 
and attention from stockholders (Li et al., 2012). This indicates a positive relationship 
between EM and voluntary disclosure (Kasznik, 1999; Muttakin et al., 2015; Patten & 
Trompeter, 2003; Prior et al., 2008). 
 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 8.2 shows the outlines 
of the study results. Section 8.3 provides the implications of the study, while section 
8.4 present the limitations of the study and suggestions for future research. 
8.2 The Study Results  
Q1: Is there any difference in EM practices between IBs and NIBs?  
The findings of the first objective were introduced in chapter 5. Both univariate and 
multivariate analyses were used. To achieve the first objective, one hypothesis (H1) 
was developed to answer this question. A comparative analysis based on the t-test was 
used to examine whether the level of EM37  differ significantly in IBs and NIBs 
through years scaled from 2006 to 2015 and entire sample. The findings of the t-test 
show that the entire sample confirms a significant difference between IBs and NIBs 
regarding EM, with high mean values of EM in NIBs. This suggests that IBs behave 
differently and they are less involved in EM compared with NIBs. These findings 
                                                        
37 EM that obtained from both the two-stage model and the Jones model adjusted by Yasuda et al. (2004).  
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support the hypothesis H1. In addition, the use of further and robustness analyses 
confirmed the key findings that IBs are less likely to engage in EM compared to 
NIBs.  
Q2: Is there any difference in terms of VDQ between IBs and NIBs?  
The findings of the second objective were addressed in chapter 6 by employing both 
univariate and multivariate analyses. To achieve the second objective, one hypothesis 
(H2) was formulated to answer this objective. With respect to the VDQ, the 
descriptive statistics of the multidimensional framework for IBs in comparison to 
NIBs, shows that the median values of VDQ (as a cut-off point) in IBs is 5% higher 
compared to NIBs, signifying that IBs are more likely to disclose high quality 
information compared with NIBs. A comparative analysis based on the t-test and 
graphic approach were utilised to examine whether VDQ that was obtained from the 
multidimensional framework differ significantly through the years scaled from 2006 
to 2015 and bank type. The findings of both the t-test and graphic approach showed 
that there is a significant difference between IBs and NIBs regarding VDQ, with high 
mean values of VDQ in IBs. This suggests that IBs and NIBs do not behave in the 
same manner in terms of VDQ, confirming the second hypothesis H2. In addition, the 
use of the robustness analysis supported the main findings that IBs are more likely to 
disclose wider and reliable information voluntarily compared to NIBs. 
Besides the above analysis, this study examined the validity of the multidimensional 
framework by examining the relationship between VDQ and market reaction. The 
regression result shows a positive relationship between voluntary disclosure quality 
(VDQ) and MBV 38 . This suggests that the dimensions considered by the 
                                                        
38 The market-based value (MBV) as an indicator for market reaction, which is measured by using the aggregate of both 
Tobin’s Q and earnings per-share. The former is measured as the market value of equity to book value of equity, whereas, 
earnings per-share is measured as net income to outstanding ordinary shares. 
  
 
210 
multidimensional framework to measure the quality are useful and the framework has 
captured the quality of the information disclosed voluntarily. 
Q3: What is the effect of the VDQ on EM practices in both IBs and NIBs in 
MENA countries?  
The results of the third objective were presented in chapter 7; both univariate and 
multivariate analyses were utilised. To achieve the third objective, one hypothesis 
(H3) was developed to answer this objective, the overall results suggesting that the 
VDQ influences the magnitude of EM. In particular, the regression analysis of the 
model revealed that the coefficients of VDQ in both IBs and NIBs are negatively and 
significantly associated with EM. This result emphasises that IBs and NIBs in MENA 
countries, with higher VDQ, report lower levels of EM; this supports the third 
hypothesis (H3). The findings are in line with both the agency and signalling theories, 
which suggest a negative association between voluntary disclosure and EM. The 
agency theory suggests that the agency conflict exists if the agents intend to maximise 
their own interests. The problem of information asymmetry is considered the main 
factor of the agency problem. According to agency theory, bank managers (agent) 
may disclose more information voluntarily to shareholders (principal) in order to 
reduce the agency cost (Huang & Zhang, 2011).  
On the other hand, the long-term perspective of signalling theory suggest that banks 
with high voluntary disclosure are not only interested in increasing current profits and 
executives' wealth but also in enhancing and building a solid future relationship with 
stockholders (Qu et al., 2015). In addition, the results of additional and sensitivity 
analyses confirmed the key findings of a negative association between EM and VDQ. 
Concerning the issue of endogeneity between EM and VDQ, the robustness test 
(2SLS) regression technique) showed that the primary results are robust and 
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consistent, signifying that the endogeneity problem has no impact on the association 
between EM and VDQ. 
8.3 The Study Implications  
The outcomes summarised in the former section have both practical and theoretical 
implications. 
8.3.1 Practical Implications 
Firstly, the findings of this study may provide a clear image that facilitates managers 
to evaluate the bank's financial accountability and transparency, which in turn, assists 
the bank to enhance shareholders' understanding of its financial reporting quality. 
Priority should be given by the bank manager to develop voluntary disclosures in a 
complete and appropriate form. The reported findings are helpful for both bank 
managers and boards of directors who are wishing to determine how VDQ influences 
EM practices and to evaluate financial reporting quality. The result of this study may 
provide empirical evidence that assist shareholders in MENA countries to make better 
decisions when evaluating the reliability and quality of financial reports. Furthermore, 
financial analysts may use the study findings to evaluate how the quality of voluntary 
disclosure reduces EM, and thus, affect capital market decisions. Since high quality 
financial reporting is considered as lifeblood of stock market, the market may 
perceive that firms with high VDQ are linked with more accurate investment 
decisions and credit assessment. Thus, the capability of investors to assess banks’ 
performance will be enhanced through having high quality information. 
Secondly, The current study provides the external users (e.g. regulators, auditors, 
owners, investors and creditors) with a deeper understanding of factors that may 
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enable them to capture EM and to avoid making inaccurate decisions. For instance, it 
will assist regulators to identify weak areas that require tightening. It will help 
auditors to enhance the level of evaluating and reporting on EM and, furthermore, it 
will allow audit committees, investors, and other users to concentrate more on those 
areas of the financial statements where they should be most sceptical. 
Thirdly, this study may offer important implications to regulators and policy makers 
to understand the importance of VDQ in protecting investors’ rights. The findings of 
this study provides empirical evidence on the significant effect of VDQ in mitigating 
EM, which may help standard setters in enhancing the guidance to support banks to 
provide high VDQ. 
Fourthly, this study has methodological implication; the developed multidimensional 
framework in this study may help researchers in the area of disclosure to consider 
employing this framework in their study. That is because; this framework considers 
both the quantity and richness of disclosed information with the attention toward 
satisfying the conceptual frameworks of both FASB and IASB. 
Finally, in respect to corporate governance mechanisms, the findings of the present 
study also carry important implications for the regulatory bodies, showing that they 
have to pay more attention to boards of directors and audit committees, as they are 
essential factors which influence both the quality of disclosure and mitigating EM 
practices in developing countries. In addition, the findings of this study may help 
researchers working in the MENA countries to verify the effect of boards of directors 
and audit committees on different types of disclosure and sectors, because different 
implications may exist in different corporate disclosure. 
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8.3.2 Theoretical implications 
Firstly, the findings of the current study provide strong support for the long-term 
perspective, which suggests that firms provide VDQ in order to build a solid future 
relationship with stockholders (Sun et al, 2010). This view is linked to both agency 
and signalling theories, as they suggest that managers tend to report more information 
voluntarily to users in order to reduce asymmetric information and boost the 
confidence of owners about the company’s current and future performance (Uyar et 
al., 2013). The outcomes of this study prove that the VDQ has negative and 
significant influences on EM practice in both types of banks (IBs and NIBs). 
Therefore, in order to decrease EM practices, both IBs and NIBs may have to increase 
their VDQ.  
Secondly, the results of the current study show that there is an insignificant 
relationship between board composition and EM practices in both types of banks (IBs 
and NIBs). This means that stakeholders do not have the capability to impact the 
direction in which banks conduct themselves, suggesting that stakeholders do not 
have the power to apply pressure on bank managers in order to meet their 
anticipations. 
Thirdly, the result of the current study is in line with the Islamic perspective of 
disclosure, which ensures theoretical accountability for IBs and is in line with the 
Shari’ah law and AAOIFI standard. These additional regulations ensure full 
disclosure and social accountability for IBs (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2002; Ousama & 
Fatima, 2010), which has a negative impact on EM practices.  
Fourthly, with regard to the positive influence of VDQ on MBV (as an indicator for 
market reaction), this result adds to the evidence on the relationship between VDQ 
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and MBV (Cahan, et al., 2016; Jiao, 2011; Nekhili, et al., 2017). This finding is in 
line with the outcomes of several voluntary disclosure studies that take into account 
the agency theory in order to build their framework. These studies indicated a positive 
and significant association between high VDQ and capital market reaction on the 
information disclosed by the company.  
Finally, the outcomes provided in the current study have significant implications for 
the association between EM and VDQ proposed by agency, signalling, and 
stakeholder legitimacy theories. These theories specify the relationship between EM 
and VDQ in different situations. Based on the findings of the current study with tenets 
of these theories, the author suggests that the agency and signalling theories are the 
most appropriate theories for exploring the relationship between EM and VDQ. 
8.4 Study Limitation and Suggestions for Future Research  
Although the current study has made a significant effort in order to secure meeting the 
study objectives and answering the research questions, it still suffers from several 
limitations, which could be considered as opportunities for future research. 
Firstly, the lack of data availability regarding the written-off loans for both IBs and 
NIBs has prevented the current study from utilising other EM measurement models, 
such as Kanagaretnam, Krishnan and Lobo’s (2010) and Cheng, Warfield and Ye’s 
(2011) models. Although the models used in this study are the most suitable models to 
capture the value of discretionary accruals in the banking industry (Elnahass, Izzeldin 
& Abdelsalam, 2014; Kwak, Lee & Eldridge, 2009), employing other models, which 
include written-off loans may be a crucial path for future research. 
Secondly, the current study depends only on annual reports to measure VDQ. 
Although annual reports provide the most comprehensive pertinent data on an annual 
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basis, and are considered to be a major source of voluntary disclosure to users (Neu et 
al., 1998), voluntary information can be released through other channels such as web 
sites, press-releases, prospectuses or interim reports. Thus, banks are likely to offer 
additional information via these different channels to shareholders rather than only 
through annual reports, which in turn could influence the VDQ in the annual reports. 
However, these different channels of communication could, therefore, offer a source 
for considerable data collection for future research on VDQ. Such results may 
determine differences and similarities across both types of data sources. 
Consequently, this limitation provides good opportunity for future studies to use one 
of these channels to measure VDQ.  
Thirdly, the study sample consisted only of IBs and NIBs listed in MENA countries. 
Therefore, the findings of this study may not be applicable or generalised to other 
different sectors. Additionally, this study is limited to IBs operate in MENA 
countries. Other Islamic institutions were excluded from this study (i.g. Islamic 
investment companies and Islamic insurance companies (Takaful). Therefore, It 
would be interesting for future research to examine the relationship between VDQ 
and EM practices for other Islamic financial institutions. 
Fourthly, due to the availability of data during this research, the data is limited to the 
period from 2006 to 2015, with 2008 being considered by economists as the year 
when the global financial crisis started (Ntim et al., 2013). Thus, it is possible that the 
results may have been driven by changes in specific year(s) during or after the 
financial crisis. Therefore, further research can use the most recent data in conducting 
the association between EM and VDQ. 
Finally, this study used several steps to mitigate the likelihood of correlated variables, 
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such as additional control variables, different measurements, the Hausman test and an 
endogeneity test. Although this study examined the endogeneity issue between EM 
and VDQ through an instrumental variable, a potential avenue for future research 
could be through employing simultaneous system equation as suggested by Al 
Farooque et al., (2010). 
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Appendices 
Appendix 4.1 Checklist of VD categories and items:  
1. Bank’s background (06):  Key words 
Bank’s history  History 
Characterization of bank structure Bank structure 
Bank's activities (general information) Activities 
Establishment date Establishment 
Bank correspondence address or bank official address Address 
Bank email or web page address Email / web address 
2. Bank Strategy (03):  
Administration's vision, strategies and objectives strategies / vision 
Bank future strategy and development. Future strategy / development 
Strategy influence on future outcomes Strategy-impact or  influence 
3. Corporate Governance (18)  
Chairman’s details Chairman’s details 
Directors’ details  Directors’ details 
Duties of board members. Board duties 
Number of shares held by directors. Shares held by directors / 
directors' shares 
Bank's top five shareholders Top shareholders / Block-
holders 
Number of shares held by managers. Shares held by managers / 
managers' shares 
CEO’s details CEO  details 
Definition of independent executive directors Independent directors 
Nature of bank chairman  Chairman 
Directorship or directors' engagement Directors’ engagement / 
directorship 
Board of directors’ pictures. Manually checked 
Chairperson picture. Manually checked 
Information about changes in board members. Changes in board members / 
board changes 
Date and number of board meetings Board meeting 
Audit committee list. Audit committee 
Statement of bank chairman  Chairman’s statement 
CEO's statement. CEO’s statement 
Managers classification  Executive managers 
4.   Accounting Policies (7)  
Fixed assets valuation  Fair value / historical cost 
Depreciation methods Depreciation  
Transactions of foreign currency Currency transaction 
Events occurred after 31/12 After balance sheet 
Accounting standards employed during the year Accounting standards  
IFRS or IAS compliance statement IFRS / IASs 
Contingent liabilities treatments Contingent liabilities 
5. Financial Performance (ratios) (16):   
Information about the bank’s financial position Financial position 
Disclosure on non-performing loans (NPLs) / Impaired loans Non-performing loans  / 
Impaired loans 
Analysis of bank’s liquidity position Liquidity position 
ROA Return on assets  
ROE Return on equity  
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Liquidity ratios. Liquidity ratio 
EPS Earnings per share / EPS 
Capital adequacy ratios. Capital adequacy ratio 
Total dividends. Total dividends 
Dividends per share for the period Dividends per share 
The current year expansion number of branches Branches 
Financial statistics / financial highlights for more than one year  Financial highlights 
Two years of comparative income statement  Manually checked 
Two years of comparative balance sheet Manually checked 
Cash flow statement Cash flow 
Key achievement during the current year Achievement 
6. Risk Management (07):   
The overall policy of risk management Risk policy / risk philosophy 
Information about risk measurement and risk assets  Risk assets / risk 
measurement / monitoring 
Information about managing and controlling risk Risk controlled 
Brief discussion on risk management committee  Risk committee 
Information on management committee of assets and liability Assets-liability committee. 
The structure of risk management  Risk structure 
7. Credit Risk Exposure (06):   
Disclosure on credit exposure  Credit exposure 
The structure of credit risk management  Credit risk structure 
Disclosures about the current loan.  Current loan 
Information about assets and loans problems  Loan / assets problems, risk 
ratings.  
Credit rating system disclosure Credit rating 
Information on the process of risk management Collaterals, guarantees, 
netting agreement, managing 
concentrations 
8.  Currency and market Risk (03):   
Broken down by assets and liabilities.   Manually checked 
The of maturity assets, liabilities and currency Assets maturity, liabilities 
maturity 
Market risk segments information Market risk 
9.  Exposure to Liquidity Risk (02):   
Discussion about sources of funds and availability of liquid assets Liquid assets/use of funds 
Maturity information about deposits and other liabilities.  
Other information on liquidity risk 
Maturity of depositors 
10.  Key Non-financial Statistics (06):   
Information about branch location.  Location 
Number of branches. Branches 
Number of expansion branch in the current year Branch expansion 
Branch computerization information Branch computerisations / 
computerised 
ATM information.  ATM 
ATM location   ATM location 
11.   Corporate Social Disclosure (04):   
Information about sporting of recreational, social projects, education and sponsoring 
public health   
Sponsoring, health, social 
project  
Donations to charity information  Donations, charity 
Information about government sponsored campaigns and supporting national pride National pride, campaigns. 
Bank social activities Social activities 
12.   Employee information (05):  
Total number of employees Number of employee 
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Source: the researcher's development 
 
 
Appendix 4.2 Depth index  
 
 
Depth of information disclosed Operationalization 
Relevance  
To what extent does the banks in 
MENA region employ fair value 
instead of historical cost?  
1 = Only historical cost 
2 = Mostly historical cost 
3 = Balance fair value / historical cost. 
4 = Most fair value 
5 = Fair value only 
To what extent do banks in MENA 
region provide non ‐ financial 
information in terms of bank 
opportunities and risks complement 
the financial information? 
1= The information is not presented. 
2= There is limited information.  
3= There is sufficient information. 
4= Relatively more information is provided. 
5= There is very extensive information.   
To what extent do banks in MENA 
region provide information about 
risk that contains good insights into 
the risk profile of the company? 
1 = No information provided 
2 = Limited information is provided about risk profile 
3 = Sufficient information is provided about risk 
profile 
4 = Relatively much information is provided about 
risk profile 
5 = Very extensive is provided about risk profile 
To what extent do banks in MENA 
region provide information about 
forward- looking information? 
1= The information is not presented. 
2= There is limited information.  
3= There is sufficient information. 
4= Relatively more information is provided. 
5= There is very extensive information.   
To what extent do banks in MENA 
region provide information about 
CSR? 
1= The information is not presented. 
2= There is limited information.  
3= There is sufficient information. 
4= Relatively more information is provided. 
5= There is very extensive information.   
To what extent do banks in MENA 
region provide a proper disclosure of 
the extraordinary gains and losses? 
1 = No proper information provided 
2 = Limited proper information is provided 
3 = Sufficient proper information is provided 
4 = Very much proper information is provided 
5 = Very extensive proper information is provided 
To what extent do banks in MENA 
region provide information 
regarding employee policies? 
1= The information is not presented. 
2= There is limited information.  
3= There is sufficient information. 
4= Relatively more information is provided. 
Number of employees trained Trained employees 
Policy on employees training Training policy 
Average compensation per employee Compensation 
Employees welfare information  Welfare 
13.  Others (03):   
General voluntary disclosure information On-line facilities / Credit 
card / International banking 
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5= There is very extensive information.   
To what extent do banks in MENA 
region provide an analysis 
concerning cash flows? 
1 = No analysis information is provided 
2 = Limited analysis information is provided 
3 = Sufficient analysis information is provided 
4 = Very much analysis information is provided 
5 = Very extensive analysis information is provided 
To what extent do banks in MENA 
region provide information about the 
intangible assets? 
1= The information is not presented. 
2= There is limited information.  
3= There is sufficient information. 
4= Relatively more information is provided. 
5= There is very extensive information.   
To what extent do banks in MENA 
region provide information about the 
“off‐balance” activities?  
1= The information is not presented. 
2= There is limited information.  
3= There is sufficient information. 
4= Relatively more information is provided. 
5= There is very extensive information.   
To what extent do banks in MENA 
region provide information about the 
financial structure? 
1= The information is not presented. 
2= There is limited information.  
3= There is sufficient information. 
4= Relatively more information is provided. 
5= There is very extensive information.   
To what extent do banks in MENA 
region provide information about the 
banks’ going concern? 
1= The information is not presented. 
2= There is limited information.  
3= There is sufficient information. 
4= Relatively more information is provided. 
5= There is very extensive information.   
To what extent do banks in MENA 
region provide feedback to users of 
the annual. report as to how various 
market events. and significant 
transactions. affected the company? 
1 = No feedback is provided 
2 = Little feedback is provided 
3 = Feedback is present 
4 = Feedback assists understanding. how events and 
transactions. influenced the bank 
5 = Comprehensive feedback is provided 
Faithful 
representation  
 
To what extent do banks in MENA 
region provide valid arguments to 
support the decision. for certain 
assumptions and. estimates in annual 
report? 
1 = No valid arguments is provided 
2 = Limited. Valid. arguments is provided 
3 = Sufficient valid arguments is provided 
4 = Very much valid arguments is provided 
5 = Very extensive valid arguments is provided 
To what extent do banks in MENA 
region base their choice. for certain 
accounting. principles on valid 
arguments? 
1 = No valid arguments is provided 
2 = Limited. Valid. arguments is provided 
3 = Sufficient valid arguments is provided 
4 = Very much valid arguments is provided 
5 = Very extensive valid arguments is provided 
Which type of auditors’ report is 
included in the banks annual report? 
1 = Adverse. opinion 
2 = Disclaimer. of opinion 
3 = Qualified. opinion 
4 = Unqualified. opinion, financial. figures 
5 = Unqualified. opinion; financial figures. internal 
control 
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To what extent do banks in MENA 
region provide information. on 
corporate governance? 
1= The information is not presented. 
2= There is limited information.  
3= There is sufficient information. 
4= Relatively more information is provided. 
5= There is very extensive information.   
To what extent do banks in MENA 
region provide information. related 
to both negative and positive 
contingencies? 
1= The information is not presented. 
2= There is limited information.  
3= There is sufficient information. 
4= Relatively more information is provided. 
5= There is very extensive information.   
To what extent do banks in MENA 
region provide information. related 
to bonuses of the board of directors? 
1= The information is not presented. 
2= There is limited information.  
3= There is sufficient information. 
4= Relatively more information is provided. 
5= There is very extensive information.   
Understandability 
To what extent is the annual report 
of banks in MENA region presented. 
in a well-organized method? 
1 = Very bad display 2 = Bad display 
3 = Poor display 
4 = Good display 
5 = Very good display 
To what extent banks in MENA 
region provide graphs and tables and 
how clarify the presented 
information in their annual reports? 
1 = No presented graphs 
2 = 1‐4 presented graphs 
3 = 5‐9 presented graphs 4 = 10‐15 presented graphs 
5 = > 15 presented graphs 
To what extent banks in MENA 
region used language and technical 
jargon that is easy to follow in their 
annual report? 
1 = Very much jargon 
2 = Much jargon 
3 = Conservative employ of jargon 4 = Limited 
employ of jargon. 5 = No jargon at all. 
What is the size of the glossary 
provided in the banks in MENA 
region annual reports? 
1 = Glossary is not provided.  
2 = The glossary is less. than one page. 
3 = The glossary is approximately one page. 4 = The 
glossary is about 1‐2 pages long. 
5 = The glossary is more than two pages 
To what extent banks in MENA 
region report information about the 
concerning mission and strategy in 
their annual reports? 
1= The information is not presented. 
2= There is limited information.  
3= There is sufficient information. 
4= Relatively more information is provided. 
5= There is very extensive information.   
To what extent is the annual report 
of banks in MENA region 
understandable. in the researcher 
perception? 
1 = Very poorly understandable 
2 = Poorly understandable 3 = Understandable 
4 = Good. understandable 
5 = Very good understandable 
To what extents do banks in MENA 
region provide sufficient and clear 
notes about the income statement 
and the balance sheet? 
1 = No sufficient and clear notes provided. 
2 = Very short notes, hard to understand. 
3 = Notes that explains what happens. 
4 = Notes are good explained  
5 = Very extensive and sufficient explanation is 
provided. 
Comparability 
To what extents do banks in MENA 
region provide information about the 
changes in accounting policies? 
1= The information is not presented. 
2= There is limited information.  
3= There is sufficient information. 
4= Relatively more information is provided. 
5= There is very extensive information.   
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To what extents do banks in MENA 
region provide information about the 
changes in accounting estimates? 
1= The information is not presented. 
2= There is limited information.  
3= There is sufficient information. 
4= Relatively more information is provided. 
5= There is very extensive information.   
To what extents do banks in MENA 
region provide a comparison results 
of current period with previous 
periods? 
1 = No comparison 
2 = Only with previous year 3=With5years 
4 = 5 years + description of implications 5 = 10 years 
+ description of implications 
To what extents do banks in MENA 
region present financial ratios in 
their annual reports? 
1 = No ratios are provided. 
2 = one up to five ratios are provided. 
3 = Six up to ten ratios are provided. 4 = Eleven up to 
fifteen ratios are provided. 5 = More than fifteen 
ratios are provided. 
To what extents do banks in MENA 
region provide information 
concerning banks’ shares? 
1= The information is not presented. 
2= There is limited information.  
3= There is sufficient information. 
4= Relatively more information is provided. 
5= There is very extensive information.   
To what extent did the banks adjust 
previous accounting period’s 
figures? 
1 = Adjustments are not provided 
2 = Adjustments are described 
3 = Adjustments are provided for only one year. 
4=2years 
5= More than two years notes are provided. 
Timeliness  
How long it takes for the external 
auditor to sign the bank's annual 
report? 
It is measured by the natural logarithm of days: 
1 = 1- 1.99 
2 = 2‐2.99 
3 = 3‐3.99 
4 = 4‐4.99 5 = 5‐5.99 
 
Source: the researcher's development 
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Appendix 5.2 the Normality Distribution of Model 1 (EMLLP) 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 5.3 the Normality Distribution of Model 2 (EMDA) 
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Appendix 6.1: Chow Test for IBs Sample  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 6.2: Chow Test for NIBs Sample  
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Appendix 6.3: Hausman Test for IBs  
 
 
 
 
Appendix 6.4: Hausman Test for NIBs  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 6.5 The Normality Distribution of IBs 
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Appendix 6.6 The Normality Distribution of NIBs 
 
Appendix 7.1: Chow Test for IBs Sample  
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Appendix 7.2: Chow Test for NIBs Sample  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 7.3: Hausman Test for IBs  
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Appendix 7.4: Hausman Test for NIBs  
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Appendix 7.5: Modified Wald Test (heteroscedasticity) for IBs 
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Appendix 7.6: Modified Wald Test (heteroscedasticity) for NIBs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 7.7 The Normality Distribution of IBs 
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Appendix 7.8 The Normality Distribution of NIBs 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 7.11: Endogeneity (Wu-Hausman Test for IBs): 
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Appendix 7.12: Endogeneity (Wu-Hausman Test for NIBs): 
 
 
 
 
